

Final evaluation report of UN Peacebuilding Fund programmes in Acholiland, Northern Uganda

26 January 2012

Iris Wielders
Lorna Juliet Amutjojo

Acknowledgements

This evaluation benefited from the assistance of an enthusiastic and dedicated group of UN staff in the RC office, UNDP, OHCHR, FAO, WFP, UNCDF, UNICEF, IOM and UNFPA. All made time for interviews (often twice), sent through documents requested and help organise field visits. Many thanks to all.

A special thanks to Cindy Calago, Theresa Del Ministro and other RCO staff, including drivers, for their assistance in organising interviews, coordinating field visits and getting us around in Acholiland, Kampala, and in between.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
1.INTRODUCTION	7
METHODOLOGY	7
ASSESSING PEACE BUILDING OUTCOMES.....	8
2.CONFLICT DRIVERS AND PEACE BUILDING PROCESSES IN ACHOLILAND	9
3.RELEVANCE: MOST SIGNIFICANT RESULTS ACHIEVED AND RELEVANCE FOR PEACE BUILDING	11
4.THEORIES OF CHANGE.....	14
5.DO NO HARM/CONFLICT SENSITIVITY	15
6.RESPONSES TO GAPS.....	16
7.VALUE FOR MONEY.....	17
8.RISK TAKING	18
9.RIGHT MOMENT OF INTERVENTION	18
10.CONTRIBUTION TO INCREASED UN COHERENCE AND SYNERGY	18
11.GENDER SENSITIVITY.....	20
12.SUSTAINABILITY.....	21
13.CATALYTIC EFFECTS.....	22
14.NATIONAL OWNERSHIP	23
15.COORDINATION.....	25
JSC AND TAP.....	25
PBSO OVERSIGHT ROLE.....	26
COORDINATION OF THE SEPARATE PBP JOINT PROGRAMMES	26
16.EFFICIENCY	27
DESIGN.....	27
IMPLEMENTATION	29
MONITORING	29
REPORTING	29
17.RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS	30
ANNEX A JP1 PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT SHEET	33
ANNEX B: JP2 PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT SHEET	41
ANNEX C: JP3 PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT SHEET	48
ANNEX D: EVALUATION INCEPTION REPORT	56
DATES	59
DELIVERABLES	59
KEY ACHIEVEMENT AREAS (OECD/DAC CRITERIA)	60
INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS.....	60
PROCESS RELATED PBF PMP CRITERIA	60
CONTENT RELATED PBF PMP CRITERIA	60
ANNEX E: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED	65
ANNEX F: LIST OF INTERVIEWS	70
DATE	70
INTERVIEW/FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION	70
ANNEX G: COMMENTS OF PBF RECIPIENT UN AGENCIES ON THE DRAFT FINAL EVALUATION REPORT	73

Executive summary

Introduction

The UN Peace building Fund provided USD 14 million for peace building programming in Northern Uganda, through its Peace and Recovery Facility (PRF). The Uganda Peacebuilding Programme (PBP) was designed as 3 joint programmes (JP1, JP2, JP3) plus 1 coordination programme (P4). The PBP was implemented between January 2011 and September 2012 in Acholiland, the region within Northern Uganda most affected by the GoU-LRA conflict.

It is established practice that peace building interventions should address key drivers of conflict. However, the PBF aims to fund a select number of peace building focused interventions, and cannot address all conflict drivers. Therefore, in order to assess whether the PBF interventions in Northern Uganda were designed and implemented to *maximize* peace building outcomes that were a *priority*, this evaluation has gone beyond establishing whether or not interventions addressed conflict drivers.

In addition, it has investigated to what extent the interventions led to the strengthening of conflict management capacities. Conflict management capacities is a broad term for different institutions and processes in society that can help to resolve conflict without resorting to violence, referring to a spectrum ranging from social cohesion, to informal and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, to the formal law and order sector, to specifically designed peace processes to address larger scale conflict.

Finally, in order to ensure that peace building interventions contribute to peace building, it is necessary to make sure they Do No Harm; in other words, to make sure they are conflict sensitive. Although it is beyond this evaluation to comprehensively assess the conflict sensitivity of all PBP programmes, the incorporation of Do No Harm principles in programming has been investigated.

Key findings

In terms of its relevance for peace building in Acholiland, this evaluation finds that the PBP:

- made a significant contribution to peace building through targeted programming in the areas of access to justice/transitional justice
- made a relevant contribution to peace building in the area of strengthened conflict management capacities (including land-related) at the community/household level, through its programming related to GBV, child protection and human rights
- made a weak contribution to peace building through its programming related to livelihoods support and youth empowerment

Although relevant programme documentation included brief references to conflict sensitivity considerations, and some evidence of understanding of Do No Harm amongst some of the IPs and UN agencies, the PBP lacked a comprehensive and systematic integration of Do No Harm principles in design and monitoring.

The main catalytic effects of the PBP in terms of peace building lie in the areas of transitional justice, land and in how the PBP helped to “put peacebuilding back on the agenda” in Acholiland. Approximately two thirds of total funding was spent on programmes that made a significant or relevant contribution to peace building. Generally, there was good national ownership of the PBP through general alignment to the GoU PRDP and good cooperation with the Office of the Prime Minister, relevant line agencies and the local government. National ownership of peace building programming in Northern Uganda needs to be considered in light of corruption risks.

Although the PBP contributed to addressing certain relevant drivers of conflict, it did not incorporate a comprehensive focus on strengthening conflict management capacities and peace processes in society. For the most part, the PBP programmes were not designed to be maximally focused on peace building related outcomes. Many of the PBP interventions were part of existing or planned programmes of the agencies

involved, without adjustments to maximize peace building outcomes. Although the PBP responded to funding gaps in the broader post-conflict recovery framework of the GoU (PRDP), it was not closely aligned to PRDP objective 4 that was most directly relevant for peace building and reconciliation.

The sustainability of some of the PBP interventions was enhanced due to the fact that they were part of existing/planned programmes of the implementing agencies. The inclusion of local government in many of the interventions has also enhanced sustainability. However, the evaluation found several examples of challenges with regards to sustainability. In particular, it is questionable whether the short timeframes of PBF funding were suited to the livelihoods activities supported.

In general, agencies valued the pilot experience of joint programming under the PBP. Some good attempts were made to achieve greater coherence between the program elements. However, in terms of enhanced peace building outcomes, this evaluation found little added value resulting from joint programming. The PBP results were not reported against the Priority Plan as an overarching peace building framework, and each agency implemented separate projects under the umbrellas of the three joint programmes. This “scattered” implementation approach led to a decrease in cost effectiveness of the overall PBP programme.

The JSC, TAP and JSC Secretariat executed their functions in a satisfactory manner, although coordination did not include specialised peace building expertise. However, the coordination of the 3 separate programmes by a lead agency in each, without a detailed oversight responsibility for the JSC Secretariat, meant that overall oversight was weakened.

There were a number of weaknesses in the design process:

- No comprehensive conflict analysis of Ancholiland was undertaken to underpin programming
- Although the programmes were aligned to the PRDP, not all were focused on those aspects of the PRDP most directly relevant for peace building
- The RBMs of the 3 JPs show some weaknesses in their design, leading to a lack of clarity in reported achievements

Implementation of the PBP was delayed significantly due to weaknesses in design; the time needed to identify IPs; and some IP capacity challenges. Despite these delays and some other implementation challenges, the implementing agencies have been able to execute most of their planned interventions within the extended project timeframe.

Although E-MIS has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, it faced challenges as a mechanism for tracking outputs and outcomes.

Despite references to enhancing women’s roles in peace building in programme documentation, the PBP was not designed to achieve this as an outcome. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, women benefited strongly from a number of PBP interventions.

Key recommendations (selection from all recommendations in the report)¹

Beyond targeting conflict drivers, peace building programmes need to include a specific focus on strengthening conflict resolution capacities and peace processes in society. PBSO should provide more specific guidance as to how peace building programming can be strengthened, beyond making reference to addressing conflict drivers. Peace building programme design should be based on specific conflict analysis.

Do No Harm considerations should be systematically integrated into any programming in conflict-prone and fragile contexts, and in particular in peace building programming. PBSO should make the integration of Do No Harm considerations compulsory for peace building programmes to be funded by the PBF.

¹ This summary presents an aggregation of the key recommendations, and therefore does not conform to the same numbering as the recommendations in the body of the report

Livelihood/economic recovery support should only be considered for peace building funding when it is clearly articulated how such support will be adjusted to contribute to peace building outcomes, and where it carefully considers funding timeframes in order to ensure the sustainability of such interventions.

When deciding on joint peace building programming, the transaction costs should be weighed up against the potential added value of better peace building outcomes derived from joint programming.

To increase cost effectiveness of peace building programming, coordination needs further strengthening, and programmes need to be designed more specifically towards peace building outcomes.

The peace building outcomes of PBF programmes can be strengthened through the inclusion of specific peace building expertise in the JSC secretariat and TAP. The JSC Secretariat should play an active role in the overall coordination of PBF peace building programmes.

Peace building programmes should incorporate a focus on the empowerment of women specifically as actors in peace building and conflict resolution at all levels in society.

When aligning to GOU programmes focusing on Northern Uganda, peace building programmes should take into account corruption risks

An automated reporting system like E-MIS cannot overcome weaknesses in the design of RBMs or substitute for dedicated specialised peace building coordination.

1.Introduction

This report presents the final evaluation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) programmes that were implemented in Acholiland in Northern Uganda between January 2011 and September 2012.

The UN RCO put in an eligibility request to the UN Peacebuilding Fund on 24 February 2010. On 4 June 2010, the country was declared eligible for PBF PRF (Peacebuilding Recovery Facility) funding². The aim of the PRF is to provide short-term (maximum of 18 months) funding for catalytic peace building programming that addresses significant risks of relapse into conflict. The PBF approves a Peacebuilding Priority Plan, after which the responsibility for further approval and monitoring of project implementation against the PPP are delegated to the national level in the form of a Joint Steering Committee, comprising representation of the UN, government and civil society.³

In July 2010, a first draft of the priority plan was submitted to the PBSO. On 27 October 2010, the Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the UN RC and the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, met and approved the Terms of Reference for the JSC, the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, and referred four programme documents to the PS for signing. The PBSO provided 14 million USD, which was implemented through four Joint Programmes (Joint Programme (JP) 1, JP2, JP3 and P4), involving eight different UN agencies plus the Resident Coordinator's office.

Methodology

This report assesses the successes and challenges of these PBF programmes with regards to their contributions to peace building in Acholiland. It uses two sets of criteria according to the ToR of the evaluation: relevant OECD/DAC criteria; and the Peacebuilding Fund's global Performance Management Plan (PMP). The evaluation team consisted of an international consultant (team leader) and a national consultant. The team leader drew up an inception report with a detailed data collection methodology, which was discussed with the UN agencies and approved by PBSO (attached). Next, the team spent three weeks in Uganda, including 10 days in Acholiland, collecting data through interviews with the UN agencies, Implementing Partners (IPs), stakeholders and beneficiaries (list of interviews attached). A draft report was shared with PBSO, after which a further updated draft was shared with the PBF recipient UN agencies in Uganda. UN agencies offered a number of comments, which can be found in annex G. These resulted in changes and clarifications where appropriate in the final report.

This main report assesses the Uganda Peace building Program (PBP) in its entirety, building on more detailed assessments of the 3 separate implementation programmes JP1, 2 and 3 (annexed). Because P4 was a supporting project for the 3 implementation programs, its assessment is integrated into this main report; hence there is no separate annex for P4.

Because the PBP was implemented through only three sub-programmes, it is important that the main report is read in conjunction with the separate programme assessments in the annexes, as they contain detailed information, including more detailed references to evidence, which is not always repeated in the main report. Where this main report does not refer to specific evidence this can be found in the separate programme assessments.

This report starts with a brief conflict assessment of Acholiland. It outlines the main conflict drivers and peacebuilding processes against which the PBF programs are being assessed for the purpose of this evaluation. Next, key achievements and challenges are outlined in more detail according to the main OECD/DAC criteria. Each section includes key findings and recommendations where appropriate. A final section summarizes all recommendations.

² Uganda eligibility decision letter from UN ASG peacebuilding support to UNRC Uganda, 4 June 2010

³ Application guidelines for the UN PBF, UN Fund website

Assessing peace building outcomes

There are different definitions of the concept of peace building. It is sometimes used to designate post-conflict recovery in a broad sense; there is a tendency to see interventions that aim to address the consequences of conflict as peace building. In Acholiland this tendency is perhaps even stronger due to the violence, duration, and extreme consequences of the conflict.⁴ In summary; a first difficulty with the concept of peace building is that it is sometimes conflated with recovery. It is important to maintain a distinction between these two concepts however. A second difficulty with the concept of peace building is that it is always context specific, and therefore what exactly comprises peace building will vary in different places and change with time; peace building always needs to be assessed against the conflict context.

The PBF uses the 2007 definition from the UN SG's Policy Committee:

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”⁵

Therefore, an analysis of the conflict context, focusing on the identification of conflict drivers, is an essential first step to target peace building interventions. Indeed, the PBSO advised the RCO in Uganda that “PBF should target a select number of activities that address key drivers of the conflict and are designed to achieve peacebuilding outcome level results” and “...the PBF should concentrate on areas with a clear gap of funding for peacebuilding activities”.⁶

It is established practice that peace building interventions should address key drivers of conflict. However, the PBF cannot fund all interventions that aim to address conflict drivers. Indeed, the PBF aims to fund a select number of peace building focused interventions. Therefore, in order to assess whether the PBF interventions in Northern Uganda were designed and implemented to *maximize* peace building outcomes that were a *priority* within the Northern Uganda context, this evaluation needs to do more than just establish whether or not interventions addressed conflict drivers. Two additional aspects can be investigated.

Firstly, to what extent the interventions led to the strengthening of conflict management capacities. Conflict management capacities is a broad term for different institutions and processes in society that can help to resolve disagreements, disputes and conflict without resorting to violence. It is also core to the PBF definition outlined above, and refers to a spectrum ranging from social cohesion, to informal and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, to the formal law and order sector, to specifically designed peace processes to address larger scale conflict. Interventions that attempt to strengthen social cohesion/conflict management capacities can include psychosocial support, community dialogues, support for mediation processes, the strengthening of the police and justice sectors, and support to formal peace processes.

Secondly, in order to ensure that peace building interventions contribute to peace building, it is necessary to make sure they Do No Harm; in other words, to make sure they are conflict sensitive. It is not possible to guarantee peace building outcomes, no matter how well designed the interventions, if there has been no investigation to ensure that first and foremost, such interventions do not unwittingly contribute to conflict. For example, a well-intended short-term employment scheme for youth can be designed to contribute to peace building, but can unwittingly contribute to

⁴ Perceptions of peacebuilding in Acholiland as close to recovery were expressed in many of the interviews held for this evaluation.

⁵ PBF (new) application guidelines 19 October 2012, final draft.

⁶ Consolidated comments on the draft PPP Uganda, email correspondence between PBSO and UNRC, 26 August 2010 8

conflict if only youth from certain conflicting factions benefit, and not those from others. Therefore, Do No Harm considerations must be included in both the design and monitoring of interventions.

2. Conflict drivers and peace building processes in Acholiland

The Northern Uganda conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda (GOU) has lasted more than two decades since 1986. The conflict has had far reaching consequences in the Northern Uganda regions of Acholi, Lango, Teso, West Nile and Karamoja. The conflict ceased to be internal once the LRA traversed the Uganda borders, set up bases in Sudan and the Central Africa Republic, and began incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo. Within Uganda, the Acholi region has borne the worst consequences of the conflict between the LRA and the GOU. Over 1.1 million people were displaced, including to government camps, and an estimated 25,000 children were abducted to be used as combatants, labourers, or sex slaves.⁷ The extreme violence employed by the LRA against the civilian population has been well documented.⁸

Between 2006 and 2008, the Juba peace process attempted to bring an end to the conflict. Although a comprehensive peace agreement remains unsigned, the process has yielded some positive results in a series of agreements that were signed: the five point agenda on Ceasing of Hostilities; Comprehensive Solutions; Reconciliation, Justice and Accountability; DRRR and Amnesty. Since 2006, a measure of peace and stability has returned to Northern Uganda, as the conflict has effectively been displaced outside Uganda's borders. The GOU's strategy for post-conflict reconstruction was set out in the Peace Recovery and Development Plan. A process of return from the camps has nearly completed. In December 2009, only 15% of the total displaced population was estimated to remain in camps.⁹

The return process has been accompanied by new conflict dynamics, in particular conflict related to land. The majority of land in Acholi is held under customary tenure. It is not "owned" by individuals in a manner comparable to modern legal property ownership. Instead, rights over land can be varied and flexible depending on the use of the land, are based on verbal rather than written agreements, and are not formally registered. Land is held under custodianship, not ownership, passing from one generation to the next.¹⁰

During the war and the large scale displacement of people to camps, people's access to and use of the land changed dramatically. Furthermore, the land conflict situation was compounded by the long period spent by people in the camps with irregular access to their land, destruction of boundary markers and in some instances loss of those with knowledge on land boundaries. Consequently, the return of IDPs to their land was accompanied with a increase in land conflict, with single women/mothers, orphans, and former abductees especially vulnerable to losing access to land and therefore their primary, in most cases only, livelihood.¹¹ These issues of increased conflict and vulnerability were embedded in broader change processes (including demographic pressures) and the difficult parallel existence of customary/traditional governance systems (with diminishing authority) and modern legal governance frameworks.

This dilemma between formal and informal governance extends beyond land-related conflict to access to justice more broadly. Although traditional authority is weakening and the level of trust of people in traditional leaders is decreasing, the majority of people in Acholiland still look to traditional justice mechanisms for various reasons, including the higher costs and longer duration of formal processes, and the stronger focus on restoration of relationships in traditional mechanisms. This also depends on what wrongdoing justice is sought for. At the same time however, traditional

⁷ UNICEF (2005) Report on the situation of children and women in the Republic of Uganda

⁸ See for example Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (2010) *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*

⁹ Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, October 2010, p.3

¹⁰ CSOPNU (2004) *Land Matters in Displacement: The importance of land rights in Acholiland and what threatens them*

¹¹ See for example UN Uganda (2012) *Report on Drivers, Trends and Patterns of Land Conflict in the Acholi sub-region* 9

justice is often dispensed in hierarchical and patriarchal settings, which can have detrimental consequences for women and youth.

The war in Acholiland has led to a drastic increase in mental illnesses, which is linked to general distress and a decrease in trust, social cohesion and community resilience. Existing customary/traditional coping strategies have been weakened by displacement, poverty and the erosion of customary/family values and norms. Alcohol abuse is an associated widespread problem, and seen as both a cause and a consequence of mental distress. At the same time, the health system lacks the capacity to offer adequate psychosocial care.¹²

During the war, women and girls were exposed to GBV in different ways, including physical, psychological abuse and sexual violence within the LRA, but also domestic and extended family abuse. Upon returning home, GBV remains a serious issue, embedded in broader problems and household stresses related to poverty, gender inequalities and a lack of recourse and assistance from social and justice services that lack capacity.¹³

A great number of youth in Acholi were either born in camps or raised in camps, with a number of them victims of the LRA, orphaned at a young age or growing up in dysfunctional families. Many have missed out on education, are illiterate and cannot find formal employment. Employment levels are very low, with a majority working only one day per week and earning very small incomes. These challenges are faced by all youth in Acholi, not only former abductees.¹⁴ Communities perceive idle, unemployed and frustrated youth as a risk, noting they can be easily manipulated into instigating violence.¹⁵

Despite the semblance of a 'post-conflict' situation, and associated focus on recovery related assistance, the conflict between GOU and the LRA has not ended. Whilst the Uganda military forces continue to play a major role in operations designed to destroy the LRA, some tensions between the centre and Northern Uganda, grounded in historical and regional differences, continue.¹⁶ The LRA remains active across the border and continues to be a cause for insecurity and anxiety, whilst it is widely known that most of the senior combatants, including Kony himself, originate from the Acholi region.¹⁷

Despite the lack of final resolution to the conflict, the development of a framework for transitional justice has begun. Following the 2003 referral to the ICC, a fierce debate emerged on whether, and to what extent, transitional justice mechanisms should focus on formal courts of law and/or traditional justice mechanisms. The objections to the role of the ICC, strongly linked to fears that the indictment would constrain options for compromise to end the conflict, led to fierce lobbying which resulted in the inclusion of the 2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the GOU and the LRA, as part of the overall Juba agreement, which proposes that certain aspects of transitional justice can be drawn from custom. As with traditional justice more broadly, there are concerns related to human rights with regards to traditional transitional justice mechanisms.¹⁸

Both the focus on traditional mechanisms and on formal mechanisms of transitional justice can be politicized within the broader context of continuing tensions between the GOU and northern Uganda. Conflicts between ethnic groups over land that predate the war have been rekindled or worsened within the context of the war, and traditional compensation demands can become inflated, directed at government and conflated with the debate on reparations. There is also a risk of reparations being confused with recovery programming in general.

¹² UN Uganda (2012) Mental health and peace building in Acholiland

¹³ Annan (2010) The risk of return: Intimate partner violence in Northern Uganda's armed conflict. *Journal for Social Science & Medicine* 70.

¹⁴ Annan, Blatman, Horton (2006) The state of youth and youth protection in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey for War Affected Youth – report for UNICEF

¹⁵ See also the Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, final October 2010

¹⁶ Andrew Mwenda (2010) Uganda's politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA rebellion

¹⁷ Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, final October 2012

¹⁸ Tim Allen (2010) Bitter roots: the 'invention' of Acholi traditional justice

3.Relevance: most significant results achieved and relevance for peace building¹⁹

Access to justice and transitional justice

The PBP included a focus on access to justice, including support to the Uganda police force, the judiciary, the Uganda Human Rights Commission and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Within this sector, interventions were built around a focus on human rights, justice for children and GBV. Access to justice was supported through a combination of research; training; practical support to relevant institutions (including the Uganda Human Rights Commission and traditional leaders); community dialogues, and some support to mediation/conflict resolution processes. A manual on HR, CP and GBV was compiled, piloted and is now being used in police cadet training.²⁰ Further support was provided in the form of trainings to JLOS officials and community leaders, including traditional leaders, on human rights and conflict resolution, including a focus on land disputes. Journalists, academia, traditional leaders and youth groups were supported to raise awareness on access to justice. Diversion for children in conflict with the law was strengthened, including through the organisation of special sessions to address backlogs, and justice for children indicators integrated into the national JLOS strategy. A study was undertaken on community policing/police responses to human rights violations, and earlier collected data on land disputes was validated and a report drafted. The Uganda Human Rights Commission was supported in terms of regional office capacity and the convening of special sessions to reduce backlog.²¹

Furthermore, the development of transitional justice mechanisms and policy was supported through a combination of research, training, practical support to reconstructive surgery as an element of reparation, community dialogues, and memorialisation. Transitional justice processes were catalysed through a number of results. UHRC and OHCHR published a report focusing on reparations and commissioned additional work on transitional justice through the ICTJ. These were used in turn to inform policy development at the national level around transitional justice.²² Support was provided to the National Memorial and Peace Documentation Centre in Kitgum for its outreach, research and memorialisation activities. Within the realm of reparations, 574 victims were provided with reconstructive surgery, in addition to further psychosocial support provided to additional people. The 7 District Reconciliation and Peace teams were supported with trainings and practical support for a small number of mediation processes, together with the UHRC. The number of CSOs reporting on human rights was increased from 8 to 15. UHRC was supported in its human rights monitoring work and special sessions were organised to address backlogs.²³

In conclusion, the PBP made a significant contribution to result area 1 of the PBF Performance Management Plan: Security sector reforms and judiciary systems put in place and providing services and goods at national and local level that reinforce the Rule of Law (RoL).

Strengthened conflict management capacities at the household/community level

Beyond the contributions to access to justice and transitional justice specifically, the PBP has contributed to the strengthening of broader conflict management capacities. It did this through incorporating support for both informal and formal dispute resolution mechanisms, and through the interventions focused on protection (child protection and GBV) at the community level, including psychosocial support. Psychosocial support was provided to 8826 child survivors and 3926 GBV survivors under JP2, and additionally to some female-headed households under JP3, and to victims of physical violence under JP1. The JP2 facilitated 842 community dialogues through various methods, including a focus on GBV and child protection. Some dialogues included a specific focus

¹⁹ The assessment of relevance for peace building in this section is structured according to the PBSO instructions for such assessment provided in the project assessment sheets (assessment according to significant, relevant/on track or weak contributions to peace building). This assessment of PBP *overall* draws on the separate assessments of the 3 JPs (see annexed project assessment sheets).

²⁰ JP1 End-of-programme report ; interview with Uganda Police Force GBV/HR unit, 31 October 2012

²¹ Results summary derived from JP1 end-of-programme report

²² Interview with OHCHR, 15 November 2012

²³ Results summary derived from JP1 end-of-programme report

on conflict resolution through discussions on land dispute resolution.²⁴ Support was provided for the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups, but when the number of returnees dwindled, support was extended to previously returned young mothers.²⁵ In addition, the research by P4 on mental illness in Acholiland further contributed to building a better knowledge base on the need for psychosocial support. In this manner, the interventions and research contributed to strengthened social cohesion and conflict management capacities at the household and community level.

However, as noted in the section on Theories of Change below, the PBP was not designed to contribute to this particular peace building outcome. Many of the interventions were part of existing or planned programmes of the agencies involved, without making adjustments to maximize peace building outcomes. To maximize its contribution to this outcome, the programme could have adjusted what were mostly standard interventions to more explicitly support broader conflict management capacities, including a more specific focus of community dialogues on conflict resolution processes, and an extension of access to psychosocial support to all beneficiaries across the entire PBP portfolio, instead of the project-based approach used.²⁶

JP2 included a good project-based example of such a comprehensive approach at the community level, where work targeting GBV was enhanced by adding a focus on strengthening conflict resolution capacities. The CSO ACORD chose 4 sub-countries where GBV and land conflict and GBV were high, in consultation with local government. Through a series of community dialogue meetings, consensus was built on the main “peace threats” in the community. Existing community peace committees and other community members received additional training in peace building and GBV, including in the use of drama in GBV prevention. Some psychosocial support was also provided. Meanwhile the community drew up a social contract with pledges related to what they considered peace building priorities. Next, a small scale micro project was introduced that brought conflicting communities together, e.g. the clearing of a road between two communities in land dispute, and the refurbishment of the roof of a school building located near a disputed land boundary between two communities. In the first example, the community reported a reduction in the violence associated with the conflict. In the second case, the land boundary dispute has been resolved and the community can now progress to the building of teachers’ huts to increase the capacity of the school.²⁷

In conclusion, the PBP made a relevant contribution to result area 2 of the PMP: Conflicts resolved peacefully and in a manner that supports the coexistence of all relevant actors/groups that were involved in conflicts that undermine peace building efforts

Strengthening land-related conflict management capacities

As a subset of this broader support to conflict resolution capacities, the PBP included a focus on land related conflict resolution. The PBP supported land dispute resolution through research, practical support to mediation processes related to land, and some mediation and conflict resolution training that included a focus on land-related dispute resolution. However, the results related to land were, for the most part, not articulated in the design of the programmes. There was no specific outcome or Theory of Change related to land in the programme design.

Therefore, in conclusion, the PBP has made a relevant contribution to this aspect of peace building, and to the following specific PMP indicator for results area 2:

Indicator 2.3 Management of natural resources (including land): # of PBF supported sector programmes with mechanisms in place to address peacefully disputes grounded in competition for access to land and use of limited resources (e.g. land, water).

²⁴ JP2 end-of-programme report

²⁵ JP2 end-of-programme report

²⁶ The need for additional and more systematic focus on dialogue, mediation and conflict resolution support was also raised in a recent conflict analysis study of Uganda. See UNICEF (2012) Uganda conflict analysis: UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme, p.43

²⁷ « Good Practice in ACORD Uganda Area Program, Kitgum Field Office », 12 September 2012 ; Interviews with ACORD beneficiaries, 9 November 2012 ; Interview with ACORD, 9 November 2012

Livelihoods support – catalysing the roles of youth, women and other marginalized groups in peace building

The PBP included a substantial focus on livelihood support, through interventions focused on agricultural support, entrepreneurship, marketing, and the reintegration of former abductees. Value addition training was provided in 7 districts, with some evidence of good results in terms of small business start ups at the community level.²⁸ The capacity of microfinance institutions was assessed and some initial support provided to capacity development. A cross border trade assessment was conducted along with the development of a trade promotion strategy. Local Economic Development (LED) strategies were developed through consultative processes with local level government. Although LED strategies normally involve the establishment of public-private partnership, this did not eventuate in most of Acholiland due to the weakness of the private sector.²⁹ Although the manual for the development of LED strategies incorporated a section on peace building, this was focused on an overview of overly academic concepts related to peace building and conflict resolution, without a clear indication of how these were to be integrated into the strategies.³⁰ 232 new Farmer Field Schools were established and supported in agricultural knowledge, skills, crop production levels, saving skills, entrepreneurial skills and market access. Fourteen farmer processor groups were assisted with equipment, and trainings were provided on cassava-based baking products, the production of High Quality Cassava Flour and on village savings methods. Further trainings supported 8750 farmers to use satellite collection points to sell their produce. 46 peer support groups made up of 820 female household heads received reintegration case management assistance, capacity-building in sustainable agriculture and integrated animal management focusing on seed multiplication, animal management and animal traction (all preceding in JP3). 171 child/young mothers formerly associated with armed conflict were provided with vocational skills training and initial start up income generation support (JP2).

Although in a broader sense, inclusive economic growth is an important contributing factor to post-conflict stability, poverty is not a direct driver of conflict.³¹ The focus of the programme on livelihoods in and of itself may have contributed to providing some peace dividends, but this is not the same as contributing substantially to peace building outcomes. The programme was not designed to leverage outputs related to livelihood support for vulnerable/marginalized groups to act as catalysts to prompt further peace building, or to ensure that such support contributed to social cohesion in communities.

The programme also incorporated a focus on the empowerment of youth in some interventions. JP1 included interventions that focused on enhancing the participation of young people in social transformation processes. However, two of these worked with different youth groups that were not coordinated. OHCHR supported a Youth Strengthening Strategy (YSS) whilst UNICEF supported the establishment of a Youth Coalition. The YSS registered 100 youth groups in Gulu but was not part of the Youth Coalition, which was nevertheless established after a mapping of existing youth organisations.³² In addition, the JP1 Prodoc had no outcome related to youth empowerment. The Prodoc of JP3 made reference to the potential role of unemployed and frustrated youth as drivers of conflict, but the programme design did not incorporate a specific focus on youth, nor had the RBM set targets related to number of youth reached through interventions. For the focus on women, the picture is similar; although it is clear that women benefited substantially from support under the PBP, such support was, for the most part, not specifically designed to enhance women's participation in peace building (see section on gender sensitivity for more detail).

Furthermore, the sustainability of many of the livelihood support interventions is questionable, mostly due to the short timeframe of the programme (see section on sustainability for more detail).

²⁸ JP3 end-of-programme report; interviews with beneficiaries, 6 November 2012

²⁹ Interview with Ministry of Local Government, 7 November 2012. There were some exceptions, for example in Nwoya, where Delight Uganda invested in supporting fruit processing (JP3 JMV 25 August 2011)

³⁰ Ministry of Local Government (2011) Training Manual for Peacebuilding, Conflict resolution and Local Economic Development

³¹ The JP3 Prodoc also notes that « While the current weak economy and youth in Acholi are not immediate drivers of conflict, they would contribute to rapid escalation of conflict if other factors contribute. (...) the poor economic condition of the North and high youth unemployment constitute « kindling » for conflict and should be addressed. »

³² Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

Finally, livelihood support interventions in particular where they provide free resources to certain groups within communities, carry a risk in terms of their potential to Do Harm to social cohesion in communities. The PBP did not incorporate comprehensive measures to mitigate such risks, although some IPs working on livelihoods did exhibit some understanding of such principles (see section on Do No Harm for more detail).

Therefore, the conclusion is that although the PBP made significant attempts to support livelihoods, including that of women and youth, this support was not provided in such a way that it catalysed peace building relevant outcomes, either by catalysing the roles of women and youth in peace building, or by focusing on enhancing social cohesion in communities. Therefore, the PBP made a weak contribution to PMP results area 3: Youth, women and other marginalized members of conflict affected communities act as a catalyst to prompt the peace process and early economic recovery.

It is worth emphasizing that the assessment of JP3 contribution to peace building as weak does not mean that its separate interventions, e.g. the Farmer Field Schools, LED processes, business and entrepreneurship skills trainings and peer support groups of female headed households have not achieved some good results in terms of livelihoods diversification. However, the focus of this evaluation is on how such livelihoods diversification has contributed to peace building.

Key findings

The PBP made a significant contribution to peace building through targeted programming in the areas of access to justice/transitional justice. The PBP made a relevant contribution to peace building in the area of strengthened conflict management capacities (including land related) through its programming related to GBV, child protection and human rights. The PBP made a weak contribution to peace building in the area of empowering youth and women to act as catalysts in peace building, through its programming related to livelihoods support and youth empowerment.

Many of the PBP interventions were part of existing or planned programmes of the agencies involved, without adjustments to maximize peace building outcomes. For the most part, the PBP programmes were not designed to be maximally focused on peace building related outcomes. Although the PBP contributed to addressing certain relevant drivers of conflict, it did not incorporate a comprehensive focus on strengthening conflict management capacities and peace processes in society.

Recommendations

3.1 Beyond targeting conflict drivers, peace building programs need to include a specific focus on strengthening conflict resolution capacities and peace processes in society

3.2 Livelihood/economic recovery support should only be considered for peace building funding when it is clearly articulated how such support will be adjusted to contribute to peace building outcomes

4.Theories of change

The Uganda Peacebuilding Program (PBP) was designed and implemented as three distinct joint programs, each with a different theory of change that aimed to focus on different conflict drivers as they had been identified in the context of Acholiland in Northern Uganda.

JP1 interventions focused on transitional justice, access to justice more generally (with a focus on human rights, children's rights and GBV), and youth empowerment. Its theory of change focused on linking the strengthening of access to justice, transitional justice mechanisms and human rights monitoring to the peace building process in Acholiland.³³ Despite including interventions that

³³ JP1 Programme document, justification section

focused on youth empowerment, this was not expressly stated as an outcome of the programme or outlined in the programme justification.

JP2 focused on protection. According to the programme logic, by strengthening protection from and stronger responses to GBV, the programme was aiming to contribute to facilitating an enabling environment for women's participation in peace building, and by strengthening the protection of children, the programme aimed to address children's vulnerability to violence.³⁴ However, interviews with agency staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries made it clear that during the course of implementation, this theory of change had shifted. Instead, peace building related outcomes were seen to lie in the strengthening of social cohesion and conflict management capacities at the household and community level, through its focus on GBV and child protection at the community level and inclusion of psychosocial support.³⁵

For JP3, the main theory of change was that the provision of economic opportunities, increased agricultural productivity and the strengthening of livelihoods diversification would prevent frustration and idleness from leading to conflict.³⁶ In addition, the programme document made reference to the potential role of unemployed and frustrated youth as drivers of conflict. However, the programme design has not incorporated a specific focus on youth, nor has its RBM set targets related to number of youth reached through interventions. It was also not articulated in the program design how the strengthening of livelihoods diversification would contribute to peace building.

Key findings

The PBP was based on relevant theories of change related to access to justice, transitional justice, human rights monitoring (JP1). For other aspects of the PBP, theories of change shifted from strengthening women's peace building participation/child protection towards the strengthening of social cohesion and conflict management capacities at the household/community level (JP2). The PBP also included references to theories of change related to youth empowerment but these were not clearly articulated in project design, missing specific and outcomes. JP3 was based on a Theory of Change linking livelihoods diversification to conflict prevention, but this link was not articulated further in the design of the programme.

(Recommendations)

(The weaknesses in the theories of change underlying the PBP programmes were related to design challenges. Recommendations related to design can be found in the sections on relevance and efficiency)

5. Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity

A crucial aspect of ensuring peace building outcomes involves the incorporation of Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity principles into programming. In conflict affected and fragile contexts, it is crucial that interventions are based on an in-depth analysis of risks, not just in terms of potentially negative consequences of the context for the programme, but also vice versa to ensure that negative impacts of programming on the context are minimized. In this respect, DNH involves both a focus on HOW interventions are implemented as much as WHAT they aim to achieve.

There is some reference to conflict sensitivity in the UNPRAP and the Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan.³⁷ Some training on Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity was included in the peace building and conflict resolution trainings organised by UNFPA for UN agencies and partners in June 2011. Further Do No Harm training (after recommendations to this effect from the Mid Term

³⁴ JP2 Programme document, programme description section

³⁵ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012; interview with ACORD beneficiaries, 9 November 2012

³⁶ JP3 Programme document, justification section

³⁷ The UNPRAP mentions conflict sensitivity and prevention as a cross-cutting theme ; Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, final October 2012

Review report) was discussed and encouraged by the TAP on 9 February 2012³⁸ and a more elaborate focus on conflict sensitivity was included in the second UNFPA training in June 2012.³⁹

Despite these efforts, throughout the PBF programmes understanding of Do No Harm principles was generally weak⁴⁰, and they were not systematically incorporated into design or monitoring. However there is some evidence of conflict sensitive implementation. With regards to interventions that aim to focus on women, an important consideration is to ensure that such a focus does not contribute to the disempowerment of men. Several IPs showed an understanding of this dynamic and had incorporated it into their programming.⁴¹ The Local Economic Development (LED) interventions did incorporate some Do No Harm considerations in that attempts were made to find micro-projects that maintain social harmony, and approaches were adjusted away from the need for land where there was land conflict.⁴² The research/land mapping commissioned by P4 also used conflict sensitive approaches in the ways in which it collected data.⁴³ More broadly, Ugandan agency and IP staff in particular also showed a keen awareness of local level politics in Acholiland, and the need to be as inclusive as possible in approaching communities and designing interventions.⁴⁴

On the other hand, some evidence was noted of tension within communities related to the selection of some and exclusion of others, in particular in livelihoods support where it included the provision of free resources.⁴⁵ Although such tension is not necessarily always directly related to conflict risk, it does not further social cohesion in communities. In the fragile context of Acholiland these potential impacts need careful consideration, and programmes need to mitigate actively against such Do No Harm risks.⁴⁶ On a broader scale, tensions are increasing between ethnic groups within Acholiland and between Acholiland and other regions in the north and this is partially linked to perceptions of concentration of aid assistance to Acholiland.⁴⁷

Key findings

The UNPRAP and Priority Plan included brief references to conflict sensitivity considerations, and there is some evidence of understanding of Do No Harm amongst some of the IPs and UN agencies in project implementation. However, the PBP lacked a comprehensive and systematic integration of Do No Harm principles in design and monitoring.

Recommendations

5.1 Do No Harm considerations should be systematically integrated into any programming in conflict-prone and fragile contexts, and in particular in peace building programming

5.2 From a Do No Harm perspective, recovery and peace building programming in Northern Uganda should take into account the need to balance assistance across the Greater North

6. Responses to gaps

³⁸ Minutes TAP meeting 9 February 2012

³⁹ Coalition for Peace in Africa (2012) Report of the linking policy and practice training held for UN partners in Northern Uganda; Coalition for Peace in Africa (2011) Local capacities for peace training for UNFPA, UNICEF, OHCHR and partners in Northern Uganda

⁴⁰ The majority of interviews with UN agency and IP staff checked on DNH understanding.

⁴¹ « Good practice in Food for the Hungry GBV Prevention », 13 September 2012. Interview with ARC funded CBO, 6 November 2012

⁴² Interview with Ministry of Local Government, 7 November 2012; interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁴³ Interview with P4 IPs, 2 November 2012

⁴⁴ Interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁴⁵ Interview with beneficiaries of value addition skills training, 6 November 2012; interview with beneficiaries of Farmer Field Schools, 9 November 2012, interview with beneficiaries of Farmer Field Schools marketing access network, 12 November 2012

⁴⁶ It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to provide a comprehensive assessment of whether or not PBF programming was conflict sensitive in its implementation.

⁴⁷ Uganda Human Rights Commission and OHCHR (2011) “The dust has not yet settled: Victims’ views on the right to remedy and reparation: A report from the greater north of Uganda”, pp.56-7.

The PBP responded to a funding gap in the UN Peace building and Recovery Action Plan for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP), within a broader context of decreasing funding available for post-conflict recovery assistance in Northern Uganda after the end of open conflict and the (almost completed) return of IDPs. The UNPRAP in turn was aligned to the Government of Uganda's Peace Recovery and Development Program (PRDP), which was heavily reliant on donor funding. In this respect, the PBP responded to funding gaps in broader post-conflict recovery programmes focused on Northern Uganda.

As noted above, the programme contributed to different aspects of peace building in Acholiland. However, the majority of the interventions implemented under the PBF were part of existing or planned programmes of the implementing agencies, and were therefore not specifically designed or maximally focused as peace building programmes. They were also not all aligned to those aspects of the PRDP most directly relevant for peace building (see section on national ownership)

Key findings

Responding to funding gaps in broader post-conflict recovery frameworks does not automatically mean that peace building gaps are being addressed

Recommendations

6.1 Beyond addressing funding gaps in post-conflict recovery frameworks, peace building programmes need to be further focused on addressing specific peace building related gaps

7. Value for money

The MPTFO requests that implementing agencies provide financial information according to the following categories: supplies, commodities, equipment and transport; personnel (staff consultants and travel); training of counterparts; contracts; other direct costs and indirect support costs. For the PBP in Uganda, this means financial information available shows expenditure against these categories for each agency, in each of the three Joint Programmes. This limits the possibility to make detailed value for money assessments according to outputs or outcomes within the programmes, as each agency has contributed to various outputs and outcomes.

However, by combining the information available per agency per JP with the agency's main focus areas in terms of peace building outcomes, broad expenditure estimates can be placed against some of the key achievements in terms of peace building outlined in this evaluation.

- Approximately one third of the funding was spent on strengthening access to justice (with a focus on human rights, GBV and child protection), and including transitional justice.
- Approximate one third contributed to the strengthening of social cohesion and community level conflict resolution capacities (including land related conflict resolution).
- Approximately one third of the funding went towards livelihoods support, which included some focus on youth and women.

An assessment of broader cost effectiveness of programming is included in the section on coherence.

Key findings

By combining the rough estimates in this section with the relevance assessments in the earlier section, the following key findings can be derived:

- *Approximately two thirds of the USD 14 million PBF funding resulted in relevant or significant contributions to peace building in Acholiland.*
- *Approximately one third of the USD 14 million PBF funding resulted in a weak contribution to peace building in Acholiland.*

Recommendations

7.1 To enable an in-depth value-for-money or cost effectiveness assessment, UN agencies should be asked provide details of expenditure against outputs and outcomes

8.Risk taking

The majority of the interventions implemented under the PBF were part of existing or planned programmes within the different agencies. For the most part, they were not specifically designed or maximally focused as peace building programmes, nor did they take additional risks to do so. However, one example of risk taking for better peace building outcomes was decided by UNICEF. UNICEF originally supported the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups (JP2), but when the number of returnees dwindled, support was extended to previously returned children, which saw the agency stretch its mandate to support young mothers.⁴⁸

Key findings

The PBP exhibited very few examples of risk taking for better peace building outcomes. The majority of interventions were part of existing or planned programmes of the implementing agencies, and not adjusted to maximize their contribution to peace building

9.Right moment of intervention

Overall, the support provided by the PBP in those areas where it made significant or relevant contributions to peace building was timely. However, the focus on land could have been more specifically designed from the outset. The support for the resolution of land-related conflict was developed as a result of other sectorial focus areas (transitional justice, human rights monitoring) during the implementation of the PBP. It appears that land related conflict was not considered a priority when the PBP was being designed⁴⁹, although land-related conflicts feature in the reconciliation programme articulated in the PRDP.⁵⁰

In addition, some questions can be raised concerning the inclusion of a reintegration focus in the PBP, including in the form of livelihood support interventions. As noted above in the section on risk taking, UNICEF needed to adjust its programming because the number of returning youth decreased substantially. With regards to the focus on young former abductees, there is substantial evidence that such a continuing focus on former abductees does not result in better needs based targeting of assistance, and further that it can create resentment.⁵¹

Key findings

Overall, the support provided by the PBP was timely, although support to land-related conflict resolution could have been included more comprehensively into the design of the programme.

10.Contribution to increased UN coherence and synergy

The majority of the UN agency staff noted that the joint programming of the PBP had been a good pilot experience. Although high transaction costs (in terms of additional time needed for design and coordination meetings) were noted, agencies felt the experience had been catalytic in terms of joint

⁴⁸ JP2 end-of-programme report ; interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012

⁴⁹ Many interviewees maintained that there was little realisation of the problems that would occur in terms of land-related conflict. Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012; Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012. This is a bit surprising, given the availability of evidence pre-dating the PBF. See for example CSOPNU (2004) “Land matters in displacement. The importance of land rights in Acholiland and what threatens them”; and USAID (2007) “Land matters in Northern Uganda: Anything grows, anything goes: Post conflict “conflicts” lie in land”

⁵⁰ GoU PRDP 1, p.95-6

⁵¹ Annan, Blatman, Horton (2006) The state of youth and youth protection in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey for War Affected Youth – report for UNICEF

programming. In particular, the Joint Monitoring Visits were highly valued. Despite this broad appreciation of the catalytic nature of the PBP in terms of piloting joint programming experience, UN coherence did face a number of challenges.

Firstly, there was little coherence between JP1/2⁵², and JP3. Apart from a conference at the start of the PBP, no regular meetings were organised to discuss the implementation of all 3 implementing programs in detail. No reporting was done against the Peacebuilding Priority Plan as is the formal requirement under PBF guidelines.⁵³ Instead, monitoring and reporting was devolved to the 3 joint implementation programmes. This meant that there has been no reporting against an overarching peace building framework.

Furthermore, although the 3 implementing programmes were each designed as one, almost all of the interventions under them were implemented by each agency separately. For the most part, each agency worked with its own counterparts and IPs. This led to some ostensible duplication of efforts e.g. three different interventions (implemented by three different agencies) developed market information systems (WFP's Purchase for Progress; FAO's Farmer Field School marketing networks; and UNCDF's LED strategies). In another example, two interventions focusing on disenfranchised youth worked with different youth groups that were not coordinated. OHCHR supported a Youth Strengthening Strategy (YSS) whilst UNICEF supported the establishment of a Youth Coalition. The YSS registered 100 youth groups in Gulu but was not part of the Youth Coalition, which was nevertheless established after a mapping of existing youth organisations.⁵⁴ Agencies also worked with the same IPs on different activities (e.g. RLP), and on occasion funded the same IP unbeknownst to each other (UNDP and OHCHR to AYNET).

From a programme-wide viewpoint, questions can be asked regarding the cost effectiveness of this approach. Agencies also noted such inefficiencies, for example with regards to community dialogue work, where each agency contracted different IPs to include community dialogue on different issues, sometimes in the same area.⁵⁵

Overall, agencies made serious attempts to increase the synergies between their different approaches and interventions with some good, small scale results, but were hampered by systemic constraints (different IPs, different timelines, different geographic focus) in doing so more systematically. Despite good attempts at finding synergies between the different interventions, there were limits to doing so once implementation had started. As noted by many interlocutors, for the PBP to have been genuinely coherent, the programmes would have needed to be planned that way from the design phase.⁵⁶

Key findings

In general, agencies valued the pilot experience of joint programming under the PBP. Some good attempts were made to achieve greater coherence between the program elements. However, in terms of enhanced peace building outcomes, this evaluation found little added value resulting from joint programming.

The PBP results were not reported against the Priority Plan as an overarching peace building framework, and each agency implemented separate projects under the umbrellas of the three joint programmes.

This "scattered" implementation approach led to a decrease in cost effectiveness of the overall PBP programme.

⁵² Although three different implementing programs were designed, it soon became clear that JP1 & JP2 could be more easily coordinated together due to an overlap in GBV related work (UNFPA) and child protection related work (UNICEF).

⁵³ PBF application guidelines, PBF website

⁵⁴ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

⁵⁵ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

⁵⁶ Interview with UNICEF 29 October 2012; interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012; Interview with FAO, 31 October 2012; interview with UNDP, 31 October 2012, interview with WFP, 1 November 2012

Recommendations

10.1 To enhance coherence, PBF funded programs need to report against the Priority Plan as an overarching peace building framework.

10.2 When deciding on joint peace building programming, the transaction costs should be weighed up against the potential added value of better peace building outcomes derived from joint programming

10.3 To increase cost effectiveness of peace building programming, coordination needs further strengthening, and programmes need to be designed more specifically towards peace building outcomes

11. Gender sensitivity

The Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan narrative refers to UNSCR 1325 and makes reference to women's participation in peace building, but there was no output or specific activity on this in the RBM of the Priority Plan.⁵⁷ The theory of change underpinning JP2 also referenced it: "by strengthening protection from and stronger responses to GBV, the programme was aiming to contribute to facilitating an enabling environment for women's participation in peacebuilding (...)."⁵⁸ However, again there were no outcomes or outputs explicitly targeted towards this outcome. For the most part, interventions that benefited women were part of existing or planned programmes of the agencies involved, without adjustments to ensure that this support would contribute to enhancing women's roles in peace building.

The PBP programme log frames were not designed to collect disaggregated data on how many women, men, boys and girls were reached through the interventions, although agencies noted they had collected such data for their internal reporting processes⁵⁹. It is however clear that women benefited strongly from the interventions under the PBP. A number of interventions were specifically focused on benefiting women, and women were well represented in the community groups that received support. Both JP1 and JP2 included a strong focus on GBV, including assistance from the Uganda Women's Network (UWONET) on advocating for the integration of CEDAW recommendations with relevant JLOS institutions. JP2 and JP3 included interventions that specifically targeted the reintegration of female former abductees through livelihood recovery interventions. Other livelihood recovery interventions tended to have a large proportion of women, including for example of the Farmer Field Schools under JP3.⁶⁰

Some challenges related to gender were also noted. For example, peace clubs and Child Protection Committees were established in communities to help with community level conflict resolution. Their methods raised some questions, as many approaches to conflict resolution at the household level were focused on keeping families together, with some potential negative consequences for women.⁶¹ With regards to interventions that aim to focus on women, an important consideration is to ensure that such interventions do not contribute to the (further) disempowerment of men. Several IPs showed an understanding of this dynamic and had incorporated this into their programming.⁶²

Key findings

Despite references to enhancing women's roles in peace building, the PBP was not designed to achieve this as an outcome. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, women benefited strongly from a number of PBP interventions.

⁵⁷ Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP). October 2010, p.9

⁵⁸ JP2 Prodoc, description section

⁵⁹ Interview with UNFPA, 15 November 2012; Interview with OHCHR, 15 November 2012

⁶⁰ Report of JP3 JMV July 2012

⁶¹ Report of JP1&2 JMV, December 2011

⁶² « Good practice in Food for the Hungry GBV Prevention », 13 September 2012. Interview with ARC funded CBO, 6 November 2012

Recommendations

11.1 Peace building programmes should incorporate focus on the empowerment of women specifically as actors in peace building and conflict resolution at all levels in society

11.2 Peace building programmes should monitor and report against gender-specific indicators

11.3 Peace building programmes should ensure a balance between empowering women whilst not contributing to the disempowerment of men

12. Sustainability

For some elements of the PBP, the sustainability was enhanced due to the fact that they were closely aligned to agency mandates and linked to on-going agency programmes. For example, UNICEF was planning to continue working on most of the JP2 outputs through other programmes. UNFPA likewise made plans to integrate further support under a different Joint Programme on GBV and by shifting some planned activities to UNWomen.⁶³ In addition, local level government authorities were involved in project implementation, enhancing the prospects for sustainability of some of the interventions, although the capacity of government to budget for and deliver services overall remains weak.

After the Mid Term Review recommended sustainability, preparation of exit strategies and resource mobilisation as priority issues, the JSC in February 2012 noted that this should be discussed a.s.a.p. and set a meeting in Gulu in March 2012 to do so.⁶⁴ In April 2012, all JPs were asked to put together exit strategies investigating the sustainability of their activities, outlining which activities would be discontinued/were completed and which ones would be picked up by other programs. However, not all agencies submitted matrices, and it is unclear whether these were reviewed towards the end of the program,⁶⁵ and there are some examples of challenges with regards to sustainability:

- The UHRC is unlikely to be able to sustain the same level of operations as were enabled by the PBP, including having to let go the additional staff that was hired with PBF funding to operate its regional offices, if no further funding is available.⁶⁶
- The support to the memorialization museum at the National Memory & Peace Documentation Centre has provided part of the memorial site, but without further funding it will remain unfinished.⁶⁷
- The support to an important mediation process in Kitgum also faced funding challenges at the end of the programme.⁶⁸
- The sustainability of the support provided to young mothers formerly associated with armed conflict through their enrolment in the Pader Second Chance Girls school was diminished because the girls could only be provided with 6 months instead of the usual 9 months training, due to a lack of capacity of the school.⁶⁹
- The establishment of a youth coalition in Acholiland is part of nation-wide efforts, which has not yet been completed and thus resulted in a nation-wide youth coalition, because funding is still being sought for consultations in the eastern regions of the country.⁷⁰
- Although the peace conference that was organised at Gulu university in April 2012 is generally regarded as having contributed to a re-opening of discussion on peace building in Acholiland⁷¹, there are questions as to the sustainability of the broader support provided to the university in the

⁶³ PBF exit strategies for UNFPA implementing partners ; JP2 RM matrix

⁶⁴ Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012

⁶⁵ Interview RCO, 14 November 2012

⁶⁶ Interview OHCHR, 1 November 2012 ; interview UHRC, 10 November 2012

⁶⁷ interview National Memory & Peace Documentation Centre, 8 November 2012

⁶⁸ Interview JRP, 8 November 2012

⁶⁹ Interview with Pader Second Chance Girls school, 9 November 2012

⁷⁰ Interview with Unicef, October 29; Interview with Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, 16 November 2012

⁷¹ Interview with OPM, 5 November 2012; Interview with DFID, 16 November 2012

establishment of a peace building resource including the monitoring of media on peace building related issues. Without further funding, the continuation of the centre is in question.⁷²

Furthermore, it is questionable whether the short timeframes of the PBF funding (further shortened due to delays in implementation) were suited to the livelihood recovery activities supported. For example, the Farmer Field Schools were implemented under the PBF within approximately half the timeframe from those implemented (around the same time but in different locations) under the longer term Agricultural Livelihood Recovery Project (ALREP) for Northern Uganda, funded by the EU.⁷³ At the time of evaluation, there was no further funding support available to the 232 newly established FFS established under the PBF, although attempts were being made to link the FFS to other support mechanisms.⁷⁴ Many other livelihood support activities had only just begun to generate results and were still facing significant challenges, raising questions about their future sustainability.⁷⁵ Although the Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan narrative asserts that “the PBF projects are intended to be short-term interventions with immediate impact (...)”⁷⁶, this was not the case for the livelihood support interventions.

Key findings

The sustainability of some of the PBP interventions was enhanced due to the fact that they were part of existing/planned programmes of the implementing agencies. The inclusion of local government in many of the interventions has also enhanced sustainability.

However, the evaluation found several examples of challenges with regards to sustainability. In particular, it is questionable whether the short timeframe of PBF funding were suited to the livelihoods activities supported.

Recommendations

12.1 Sustainability considerations should be considered and articulated in the design of PBF peace building programmes

12.2 Funding for support to livelihoods/economic recovery should carefully consider timeframes in order to ensure sustainability

12.3 Applications to the PBF should clarify how interventions can achieve sustainable or catalytic results specific to peace building results within the short timeframes of the PBF

13. Catalytic effects

The PBP has achieved some important catalytic effects in terms of peace building. Through the PBP support for the close cooperation between the UNRCO and the OPM office at the regional level in Acholiland, the UN system was able to influence the development of the second phase of the PRDP, in particular ensuring that some peace building related issues were given more attention.⁷⁷ The peace day celebrations that were organised in September 2011 and the peace conference at Gulu university in April 2012, are all perceived to have contributed to a re-opening of discussion on peace building in Acholiland, after the focus following the abrogated peace process that ended in 2008 had been on the shift from humanitarian emergency to recovery and development.⁷⁸ In

⁷² Interview with P4 IPs, 2 November 2012; interview with RCO, 5 November 2012

⁷³ Interview with ALREP, 5 November 2012; interview with FAO, 9 November 2012

⁷⁴ Interview with FAO, 9 November 2012. IPs also noted this challenge by pointing to the fact that some grants were given whilst FFS had not set up bank accounts yet (interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012)

⁷⁵ Interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012; WFP Gulu Sub office: Peace building programme – cassava value addition project brief, November 2012; Report of JP3 JMV August 2011, March 2012, July 2012; IOM exit strategy brief in the JP3 exit strategies document

⁷⁶ Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP). October 2010, p.7

⁷⁷ Interview with UN Heads of Agencies, 31 October 2012; interview with OPM, 5 November 2012

⁷⁸ Interview with OPM, 5 November 2012; Interview with DFID, 16 November 2012; Interview with TA District Chairman Gulu, 5 November 2012

general, the PBP was perceived by government stakeholders in particular to have contributed to the “software” of recovery in Acholiland, parallel to the heavy focus on “hardware” in the PRDP.⁷⁹

Within this broader effect of “putting peace building back on the agenda”, the work on transitional justice and on land has been particularly important. The work on transitional justice funded by the PBP helped define some of the issues of transitional justice and contributed to keep it on the government’s agenda.⁸⁰ The P4 research on land has contributed to generating debate in Acholiland on ways forward with regards to strengthening land conflict resolution, but also more broadly around the usage of customary land for development purposes.⁸¹

The evaluation found some further good, small scale examples of catalytic effects. The support to one of the CBOs providing psychosocial care enabled it to also train some additional CBOs to help them deal with mental illness cases should they encounter these.⁸² The database established for the UHRC in Acholiland with support of the PBP is now being expanded nationally.⁸³ For some of the IPs, catalytic effects of the PBP interventions related to the fact that these opened up new regions to further, different interventions by their organisations in future.⁸⁴ Others were able to generate interest from other donors for possible future funding, e.g. UWONET and Enterprise Uganda.⁸⁵ The support for the integration of juvenile justice indicators into relevant justice sector plans resulted in 11 indicators being integrated instead of the planned 3.⁸⁶

Key findings

The main catalytic effects of the PBP in terms of peace building lie in the areas of transitional justice, land and in how the PBP helped to “put peace building back on the agenda” in Acholiland.

Recommendations

13.1 The integration of conflict driver related research into peace building programming should be considered where it can play a catalytic role for peace building

14. National ownership

National ownership is a crucial aspect of good peace building practice, but with regard to the assistance provided to Northern Uganda, it needs to be weighed up with two factors. Firstly, there have been serious allegations of corruption of the PRDP at the highest levels in the OPM.⁸⁷ Secondly, all interaction of the Government of Uganda with the northern part of the country, including the PRDP, needs to be viewed through the lens of differences between the north and the government, which has been at the core of conflict in Northern Uganda that remains effectively unresolved.

The PBP was designed to be directly aligned to the United Nations Peace building and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP), and through this to the GOU Peace and Recovery Development Plan (PRDP).

The PBP is aligned to outcomes 1 and 4 of UNPRAP

- UNPRAP Outcome 1: Strengthened human rights, accountability and good governance capacity of key government, civil society institutions and mechanisms including traditional structures contribute to improved security, protection, access to justice and reconciliation for all people in Northern Uganda (for JP1 and 2)

⁷⁹ Interview with OPM, 5 November 2012; interview with OPM, 1 November 2012

⁸⁰ Interview with UN Heads of Agencies, 31 October 2012; interview with OHCHR, 15 November 2012; interview with RLP, 8 November 2012

⁸¹ Interview with P4 IPs, 2 November 2012, interview with TA District Chairman Gulu, 5 November 2012

⁸² Interview with JP2 IPs, 2 November 2012

⁸³ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁸⁴ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁸⁵ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012; Interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁸⁶ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012

⁸⁷ FGD with UN Heads of Agencies, 31 October 2012

- UNPRAP Outcome 4: Rural communities in the north have improved gender responsive sustainable livelihoods, diversified economic opportunities and basic social protection (for JP3)

According to the Priority Plan, JP1 and JP 2 addressed strategic objective 4 of the PRDP, which focuses on peace building and reconciliation, This objective was underfunded in the PRDP.⁸⁸

- PRDP objective 4: Putting in place mechanisms for rehabilitating victims of war and facilitating their reintegration into the communities while strengthening the local conflict resolution mechanisms and the relationship between civilians and government/public administration.

Indeed, the government interlocutors we spoke to pointed to objective 4 as the main focus of the PBP.⁸⁹ However, a closer look reveals that the alignment of the PBP to the PRDP has been somewhat more diffuse. The outcomes aimed for in JP1 are equally related to the enhancement of protection and the functionality of judicial and legal services, which are priority actions under the strategic objective 1 in the PRDP.⁹⁰ JP2 can be said to have contributed to both PRDP objective 4, and objective 2 on rebuilding and empowering communities.⁹¹ JP3 was not designed to be aligned to PRDP objective 4 at all, but to objective 2.

This diffusion of alignment of the PBP with PRDP objectives, instead of close alignment to objective 4 as the one most directly related to peace building and reconciliation, corresponds with the findings in this evaluation with regards to the relevance of the PBP programme for peace building.

Nevertheless, cooperation with the Office of the Prime Minister, which provides oversight implementation of the PRDP, was good, in particular at the regional level. Other relevant line ministries also evidenced a good degree of national ownership. JLOS directed the involvement of CJSI for work on justice for children, to ensure independence through an intermediary,⁹² and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development was aware of and involved in the work on child protection and GBV⁹³. Many interventions evidenced good coordination with local level government in terms of trainings and the selection of communities/parishes for community based interventions.

Key findings

Generally, there was good national ownership of the PBP through general alignment to the GoU PRDP and good cooperation with the Office of the Prime Minister, relevant line agencies and the local government.

Although the PBP was aligned to the GoU PRDP, it was not closely aligned to PRDP objective 4 that was most directly relevant for peace building and reconciliation.

National ownership of peace building programming in Northern Uganda needs to be considered in light of corruption risks and unresolved tensions between the GoU and Northern Uganda.

Recommendations

14.1 When aligning to GOU programmes focusing on Northern Uganda, peace building programmes should take into account corruption risks

⁸⁸ JP1 Programme Document ; United Nations Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP) ; Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP)

⁸⁹ Interview with OPM, 1 November 2012; interview with OPM, 5 November 2012; interview with TA District Chairman Gulu, 5 November 2012

⁹⁰ In fact, this is also noted in the UNPRAP, which again aligns focus area 1 to PRDP objective 4, but then in the situational analysis links it first and foremost to PRDP objective 1

⁹¹ This is in fact stated in the JP2 Prodoc

⁹² Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012; interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

⁹³ Interview with MGLSD, 16 November 2012

15.Coordination

JSC and TAP

In July 2010, a first draft of the priority plan was submitted to the PBSO by the RCO. On 27 October 2010, the Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the UN RC and the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister, met for the first time and approved the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (with amendments), and referred the four project documents to the PS for signing.⁹⁴ According to the process established by the PBSO, there should be time between the approval of the Priority Plan and the submission of projects to the Joint Steering Committee for approval. In Uganda, four programme documents were ostensibly ready at the same time as the final priority plan. This suggests that the programme documents were designed within a short timeframe, and including few consultations in Acholiland.⁹⁵

The JSC did not meet to execute its overview function in 2011. This was partially due to the fact that implementation of the PBP programmes was delayed. The JSC convened again in February 2012 to consider the results of the Mid-Term Review and the delays in programming. It established more detailed expenditure review mechanisms, and in April decided on the no-cost extension of 3 months.⁹⁶ The JSC met for the final time in September 2012 and discussed the closure of the programmes and tentative future plans.⁹⁷ The second TAP meeting was held on 14 April 2011 (minutes or dates for first TAP meeting not provided). At this point, agencies were still busy planning the details of the Joint Programmes that had been approved. Concern was expressed about the delays this represented, and agencies were asked to submit final work plans by the end of April. During the TAP meeting in February 2012, agencies were still set to fully disburse by the original June deadline,⁹⁸ but subsequent JSC and UNCT meetings requested more realistic expenditure projections. Consequently, a special TAP meeting was held on 5 March 2012 to review progress. During this meeting, the TAP Chair was requested to establish exact amounts for suggested fund reallocation before 12 March.⁹⁹ Next, the co-chairs of the JSC decided to grant a no-cost extension of three months, adjusting the operational closure date of the programmes from 30 June to 30 September 2012. The JSC also decided to reallocate 100.000 USD from the WFP to the land conflict research project under P4.¹⁰⁰ For the remainder of 2012, no TAP meetings were held. Instead, thematic meetings were convened on key peace building aspects: land, youth, and GBV.

The P4 programme was established, inter alia, to improve coordination. The Secretariat for the JSC was embedded within the RCO, and facilitated the work of the JSC and the TAP. It also provided updates on the PBP at monthly UN Team meetings in Kampala and the UN Area Coordination meetings in Gulu.¹⁰¹ It also established an Electronic Management Information System (E-MIS), and introduced guidelines and a template for Joint Monitoring Visits. The E-MIS system has been extended to use for other Joint Programs.

The coordination of the PBP has generally been seen to have acted as a pilot/catalyst for further UN Delivery as One Programming.¹⁰² Although the JSC did not meet as frequently as formally required, there was good coordination at the regional level between the UN and the OPM.

One weakness of the overall coordination of the PBP was that the JSC Secretariat and the broader RCO coordination did not include specialised peace building expertise.¹⁰³ This is also partially due

⁹⁴ Minutes JSC meeting 27 October 2012

⁹⁵ Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012; Interview with FAO, 31 October 2012; interview with UNDP, 14 November 2012

⁹⁶ Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012 ; Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

⁹⁷ Minutes JSC 28 September 2012

⁹⁸ Minutes TAP meeting 9 February 2011

⁹⁹ Minute TAP meeting 5 March 2012

¹⁰⁰ Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

¹⁰¹ P4 end-of-programme report; Interview with UNAC, 13 November 2012

¹⁰² FGD with UN Heads of Agencies, 29 October 2012

¹⁰³ UNFPA did organise two valued peace building and conflict resolution trainings, in June 2011 and June 2012

to the fact that the JSC was embedded within the RCO, which had responsibilities for much broader coordination. For example, the template established for Joint Monitoring Visits was generic, meant for all Joint Programmes. However, the monitoring of peace building programmes should at the very least include a Do No Harm lens.¹⁰⁴ More specific peace building expertise at the design phase of the programmes could have further strengthened the peace building focus of the 3 implementing programmes and assisted with reporting against an overarching peace building framework as per the Priority Plan.

Key findings

The JSC approved the Priority Plan plus 4 separate PBP programme documents when it first convened in October 2012. This suggests that the programme documents were designed within a short timeframe, and including few consultations in Acholiland.

The JSC, TAP and JSC Secretariat executed their functions in a satisfactory manner, although coordination did not include specific peace building expertise.

Recommendations

15.1 The peace building outcomes of PBF programmes can be strengthened through the inclusion of specific peace building expertise in the JSC secretariat and TAP.

15.2 Monitoring and reporting requirements for peace building programmes should include a focus on peace building outcomes including the integration of Do No Harm

PBSO oversight role

The PBF funding for the PBP in Uganda was directed through the Peace and Recovery Facility (PRF) modality. This means that the PBSO approves the Priority Plan, after which the further approval of programmes to implement this is devolved to the country level and authority delegated to the Joint Steering Committee, without further PBSO guidance. PBSO did organise a monitoring visit to Uganda, but this took place only in September 2012 when the PBP had nearly ended.

PBSO provided some useful steering for the development of the Priority Plan (see references in the introduction to this report). However, some challenges to achieving better peace building outcomes remained, including the fact that the reporting requirements set out by the MPTF were not adjusted to elicit peace building specific reporting (including, again, no incorporation of a focus on Do No Harm).¹⁰⁵

Recommendations

15.3 PBSO should provide more specific guidance as to how peace building programming can be strengthened, beyond making reference to addressing conflict drivers

15.4 PBSO should make the integration of Do No Harm considerations compulsory for peace building programmes to be funded by the PBF

15.5 PBSO/MDTF reporting requirements should be adjusted to enable the reflection of peace building outcomes, including the integration of Do No Harm considerations

Coordination of the separate PBP Joint Programmes

¹⁰⁴ Joint Monitoring template for UN Joint Programmes in Uganda

¹⁰⁵ In this way, the MDTF faces the same challenge as the Uganda RCO related to coordinating peacebuilding as a part of a broader, generic portfolio of joint programmes.

The coordination of the three implementing Joint Programmes was devolved to a lead agency for each of these programmes, although a JSC Secretariat representative did attend many of these JP coordination meetings. Because the JSC Secretariat was embedded within broader RCO coordination mechanisms, there was no one person during the duration of the programmes with key technical oversight responsibility over the PBP implementation.

JP1 and JP2 agencies decided to collapse their joint JP level meetings and joint monitoring visits,¹⁰⁶ and were lead alternatively by UNICEF and UNFPA.¹⁰⁷ UNDP was the lead agency for JP3. JP1&JP agencies met regularly in 2011, but less so in 2012. During 2011, the meetings included discussion on cooperative planning of joint activities, information sharing and the need for an M&E plan (including adjustments to the RBM).¹⁰⁸ After the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in October 2011 indicated a low level of implementation progress, agencies met to focus on strategies for implementation acceleration.¹⁰⁹ During the remainder of 2012, JP1&2 implementing agencies met less frequently, leading to weaker coordination.¹¹⁰ For example, OHCHR and UNDP were unaware that each had provided an additional grant to the IP AYINET towards the end of the JP1 programme implementation.¹¹¹

JP3 agencies met regularly. In a March 2011 meeting, agencies discussed their work plans, not all of which were ready at the time. It was noted that some work plans had deviated from the original Prodoc, and that substantive changes would need to be approved by the JSC. One agency (IOM) had already started implementation at this time.¹¹² Further regular JP3 coordination meetings discussed implementation updates, planning of Joint Monitoring Visits, and the identification of synergies between the different project components, and ways to strengthen these. In 2012, more attention was paid to implementation progress and the formulation of exit strategies.¹¹³

Key findings

Overall, agencies made good attempts to coordinate within JP1&2, and JP3.

Devolving coordination of the 3 separate programmes to a lead agency without a detailed oversight responsibility for the JSC Secretariat meant that overall oversight of the PBP was weakened.

Recommendations

15.6 The JSC Secretariat should play an active role in the overall coordination of PBF peace building programmes

16. Efficiency

Design

As noted in previous sections and elaborated in more detail in the separate programme assessments (annexed), the JPs were not designed to maximally target peace building outcomes in Acholiland. This can at least partially be attributed to the fact that no separate conflict analysis was undertaken for the PBP. Instead, reference was made to the analysis underpinning the UNPRAP and the PRDP.¹¹⁴ Both these analyses include references to peace building, but are more accurately

¹⁰⁶ Minutes TAP meeting 14 April 2011

¹⁰⁷ Interview with UNICEF, 15 November 2012

¹⁰⁸ Minutes of joint meetings JP1 and 2, 6 May, 25 May, 10 June, 12 September 2011

¹⁰⁹ Minutes of joint meetings JP1 and 2, 2 and 6 February 2012 ; JP1&2 : Key action points to accelerate implementation of peacebuilding programmes

¹¹⁰ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012 ; interview OHCHR, 15 November 2012

¹¹¹ interview OHCHR, 15 November 2012 ; interview UNDP 15 November 2012

¹¹² Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 28 March 2011

¹¹³ Minutes of JP3 coordination meetings, 11 May 2011, 14 July 2011, 25 August 2011, 2 March 2012, 31 May 2012, 16 July 2012

¹¹⁴ Interview with RCO, 29 October 2012; interview with JP1&2 IPs, 2 November 2012

described as broader post-conflict recovery frameworks. Furthermore, as noted in the section on national ownership, the PBP did not target only the peace building aspects of the PRDP framework.

Not much time was taken to consult comprehensively for the design process (see section on PBP overall coordination above) of the 3 implementation programmes, which in turn led to delays in programme implementation as various adjustments needed to be made. The first version of the JP1 programme did not include UNDP, and instead saw a larger amount of funds allocated to OHCHR. OHCHR found it could not spend this sum, and therefore began negotiations to bring UNDP into the project. This was achieved but at the cost of major delays.¹¹⁵ The Prodoc was signed in Feb 2011 although the start of the project was started on 1 Jan 2011. After the JP3 Prodoc was written and signed off by the JSC in October 2010, the more detailed design of interventions took a number of months and resulted in delays for some parts of the programme. The original Prodoc lists Implementing Partners as to be decided.¹¹⁶

JP1 and JP3 agencies have reported against a different RBM than the RBM approved in the original Prodoc, including changes in outputs. Some smaller adjustments to indicators were also made to JP2. The TAP of 14 April 2011 noted that consolidated GANTT charts were needed i.a. “(...) so that validation of any changes in the results matrices can be made and approved by the Steering Committee, before funding of activities that were not part of the original PBF projects can begin”.¹¹⁷ However it is unclear when, whether and how approval was given for some of these changes to the RBM. At the time of evaluation, agencies were preparing retrospective notes to file for some of these changes.¹¹⁸ Although some changes to the RBM have improved programme logic, overall the RBMs, of JP1 and 3 in particular, showed some weaknesses. In combination with some reporting challenges this has led to a lack of clarity around exact achievements (in particular quantitative) as reported in the end-of-programme report (see reporting section below).

Key findings

The implementation of the 3 JPs faced significant delays due to some flaws in the design process

The 3 JPs were not designed to maximally target peace building outcomes in Acholiland, due to a number of weaknesses in the design process:

- *No comprehensive conflict analysis of Acholiland was undertaken to underpin programming*
- *The design of the programmes lacked detailed consultation*
- *Although the programmes were aligned to the PRDP, they were not all focused on those aspects of the PRDP most directly relevant to peace building*

The RBMs of the 3 JPs were changed, with approval for these changes being sought only retrospectively at the end of the programme.

Recommendations

16.1 Peace building programme design should be based on specific conflict analysis

16.2 Peace building programmes should have access to specialised peace building expertise for their design and coordination

16.3 Peace building programmes can be based on alignment to existing post-conflict recovery frameworks, but their design should be based on additional investigation to incorporate a peace building perspective

16.4 Changes to approved programme RBMs should be discussed and approved expeditiously and during programme implementation

¹¹⁵ Interview OHCHR 1 Nov 2012 ; interviews UNDP 14 Nov 2012

¹¹⁶ Interview with FAO, 9 November 2012; interview with UNDP, 31 October 2012, interview with JP3 IPs, 31 October 2012

¹¹⁷ Minutes TAP meeting 14 April 2011

¹¹⁸ The evaluation team received retro-active notes to file from OHCHR, UNFPA and UNICEF, but these did not explain all changes made to the JP1, 2 and 3 RBMs.

Implementation

Where the overall timeframe of the PBP was already considered short, and on top of the delays caused by design factors (see above) some significant further delays were caused by the fact that after the Prodoc was signed, the identification and contracting of IPs took time. Other delays were caused by a lack of capacity of some IPs, and some by internal agency processes and procedures. However, despite these delays and other implementation challenges, the implementing agencies have been able to execute most of their planned interventions, or made some adjustments to activities during the course of implementation. WFP transferred to 100,000 USD to PBF P4 when its expenditure was delayed in 2012. There were some challenges around funding modalities for some IPs, who faced gaps in funding (AYINET, ICTJ, UHRC) which challenged the effectiveness of interventions. Some IPs reported that they were notified late of the approval of the project timeframe extension.

Key findings

Implementation of the PBP was delayed significantly due to weaknesses in design; the time needed to identify IPs; and some IP capacity challenges

IPs reported late notification of the approval of the project timeframe extension

Despite these delays and some other implementation challenges, the implementing agencies have been able to execute most of their planned interventions

Recommendations

16.5 The extension of programmes should be considered whilst there is still sufficient time to adjust implementation timeframes. PBSO could establish a deadline for extension approvals/notifications

Monitoring

Implementing agencies each had their own internal monitoring mechanisms. In addition, joint monitoring visits for JP1&2 were organised in December 2011 and March 2012. The JMV's resulted in many good ideas related to improvements on synergies and advocacy for the programmes. However, many of these ideas were then not followed up in subsequent TAP meeting discussions¹¹⁹, and agencies faced systemic constraints (different timelines, different geographic focus, different IPs) to the practical enhancement of synergies.

Recommendations

16.6 Joint monitoring visits are good practice and should be considered for all joint programmes

16.7 Ideas deriving from joint monitoring visits should be systematically included for discussion in follow-up coordination meetings

Reporting

No reporting was done against the Peacebuilding Priority Plan as is the formal requirement under PBF guidelines.¹²⁰ Instead, monitoring and reporting was devolved to the 3 joint implementation

¹¹⁹ This lack of discussion in TAP meeting does not preclude the possibilities that some ideas were followed up by agencies separately.

¹²⁰ PBF application guidelines, PBF website

programmes. This meant that there has been no reporting against an overarching peace building framework. Furthermore, reporting of results faced some challenges, mainly because the RBMs for JP1 and JP3 in particular were not well articulated in terms of indicators, outputs and outcomes. No programme-specific evaluations have been undertaken during the course of implementation apart from the overarching Mid Term Review and this overarching final evaluation.

Reporting arrangements of the separate programmes were facilitated through an electronic system that was established by the RCO office for all joint programming (also covering joint programs other than the PBF) with funds from the PBF under P4. Although E-MIS has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, the mechanisms for tracking outputs and outcomes faced challenges. Agencies were asked to put achievement percentages next to the output and outcome indicators when reporting on a quarterly basis. In the end-of-programme reports, these are all listed and their achievement percentages added up per indicator. For certain outputs, there are discrepancies between the total achievement rate in terms of percentages when compared to the targets set for the indicators. When combined with the weaknesses in the RBMs of the 3 JPs, the contribution of E-MIS to better management and administration of the joint programmes has been limited.

Furthermore, the end-of-programme reports list cumulative percentages under section IV A on “summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs”, instead of a qualitative, narrative overview of how project achievements link to the planned outputs and outcomes. This presents a missed opportunities to clarify the programme logic (and thus Theories of Change) at the end of the programme.¹²¹

Key findings

No reporting was done against the Priority Plan as an overarching peace building framework

The RBMs of the 3 JPs show some weaknesses in their design, leading to a lack of clarity with regards to reported achievements

Although E-MIS has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, it faced challenges as a mechanism for tracking outputs and outcomes.

The end-of-programme reports do not incorporate a narrative section linking project achievements to planned outputs and outcomes

Recommendations

16.8 For PRF funding, PBSO should insist on reporting against the Peacebuilding Priority Plan so that the broader results of peace building programming can be tracked and reported

16.9 An automated reporting system like E-MIS cannot overcome weaknesses in the design of RBMs or substitute for dedicated specialised peace building coordination

16.10 The PBF end-of-programme report should make it compulsory to incorporate a narrative summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs

17. Recommendations on how to improve programme effectiveness

This section repeats all recommendations put forward in the main report text. The separate programme assessments include some additional recommendations related to better peace building targeting. The executive summary aggregates a selection of key recommendations from this list.

3.1 Beyond targeting conflict drivers, peace building programs need to include a specific focus on strengthening conflict resolution capacities and peace processes in society

¹²¹ Although the end-of-programme reports include a narrative section on summary of qualitative achievements, these are not directly linked to the programme RBMs.

3.2 Livelihood/economic recovery support should only be considered for peace building funding when it is clearly articulated how such support will be adjusted to contribute to peace building outcomes

5.1 Do No Harm considerations should be systematically integrated into any programming in conflict-prone and fragile contexts, and in particular in peace building programming

5.2 From a Do No Harm perspective, recovery and peace building programming in Northern Uganda should take into account the need to balance assistance across the Greater North

6.1 Beyond addressing funding gaps in post-conflict recovery frameworks, peace building programmes need to be further focused on addressing specific peace building related gaps

7.1 To enable an in-depth value-for-money or cost effectiveness assessment, UN agencies should be asked provide details of expenditure against outputs and outcomes

12.1 To enhance coherence, PBF funded programs need to report against the Priority Plan as an overarching peace building framework.

12.2 When deciding on joint peace building programming, the transaction costs should be weighed up against the potential added value of better peace building outcomes derived from joint programming

12.3 To increase cost effectiveness of peace building programming, coordination needs further strengthening, and programmes need to be designed more specifically towards peace building outcomes

11.1 Peace building programmes should incorporate focus on the empowerment of women specifically as actors in peace building and conflict resolution at all levels in society

11.2 Peace building programmes should monitor and report against gender-specific indicators

11.3 Peace building programmes should ensure a balance between empowering women whilst not contributing to the disempowerment of men

12.1 Sustainability considerations should be considered and articulated in the design of PBF peace building programmes

12.2 Funding for support to livelihoods/economic recovery should carefully consider timeframes in order to ensure sustainability

12.3 Applications to the PBF should clarify how interventions can achieve sustainable or catalytic results specific to peace building results within the short timeframes of the PBF

13.1 The integration of conflict driver related research into peace building programming should be considered where it can play a catalytic role for peace building

14.1 When aligning to GOU programmes focusing on Northern Uganda, peace building programmes should take into account corruption risks

15.1 The peace building outcomes of PBF programmes can be strengthened through the inclusion of peace building expertise in the JSC secretariat and TAP

15.2 Monitoring and reporting requirements for peace building programmes should include a focus on peace building outcomes including the integration of Do No Harm

15.3 PBSO should provide more specific guidance as to how peace building programming can be strengthened, beyond making reference to addressing conflict drivers

15.4 PBSO should make the integration of Do No Harm considerations compulsory for peace building programmes to be funded by the PBF

15.5 PBSO/MDTF reporting requirements should be adjusted to enable the reflection of peace building outcomes, including the integration of Do No Harm considerations

15.6 The JSC Secretariat should play an active role in the overall coordination of PBF peace building programmes

16.1 Peace building programme design should be based on specific conflict analysis

16.2 Peace building programmes should have access to specialised peace building expertise for their design and coordination

16.3 Peace building programmes can be based on alignment to existing post-conflict recovery frameworks, but their design should be based on additional investigation to incorporate a peace building perspective

16.4 Changes to approved programme RBMs should be discussed and approved expeditiously and during programme implementation

16.5 The extension of programmes should be considered whilst there is still sufficient time to adjust implementation timeframes. PBSO could establish a deadline for extension approvals/notifications

16.6 Joint monitoring visits are good practice and should be considered for all joint programmes

16.7 Ideas deriving from joint monitoring visits should be systematically included for discussion in follow-up coordination meetings

16.8 For PRF funding, PBSO should insist on reporting against the Peacebuilding Priority Plan so that the broader results of peace building programming can be tracked and reported

16.9 An automated reporting system like E-MIS cannot overcome weaknesses in the design of RBMs or substitute for dedicated specialised peace building coordination

16.10 The PBF end-of-programme report should make it compulsory to incorporate a narrative summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs

Annex A JP1 Programme assessment sheet

Project Title Peacebuilding through justice for all and human rights¹²²		
Project Number: 00076968		
UN Agency: UNICEF, UNFPA, OHCHR, UNDP	Priority Area (PMP strategic result): Results areas: see below	
National counterpart: Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS Secretariat and District Coordination Committees (DCC) - Acholiland; District Local Governments (Community based services - Acholiland; Ministry of Local Government (Local Council Courts) - Acholiland; Uganda Human Rights Commission; Uganda Police Services; Refugee Law Project; UWONET		
Project Number	76968	
Project Title	Peacebuilding through justice for all and human rights	
Project Scope	Acholiland	
Project Budget	UNICEF: 3,088,372 USD OHCHR: 739,447 USD UNFPA: 620,000 USD UNDP: 1,451,937 Total: 5,899,756 USD	
Execution rate at 20/11/12	Final updates to funds disbursement rates had not yet been logged at the time of the evaluation. Financial closure for the programme is 31 December 2012. Funds disbursement rates up to 30 September (operational programme closure) were: OHCHR: 86% UNDP: 93% UNFPA: 96% UNICEF: 100%	
Duration	Months foreseen: 18 months Actual: 21 months	
Date approved by SC : 16 February 2011	Start Date : 1 January 2011	End Date : 30 September 2012 for operational closure; 31 December for financial closure
<p>Project Description : Focusing on Acholiland, this programme has contributed to the respect and fulfilment of human rights, children’s rights, legal rights of returnees to land and women’s rights; access of vulnerable populations to formal and informal justice, and to countering youth disenfranchisement</p> <p>Overall goals and expected outcomes: Overall objective (UNPRAP Outcome 1): Strengthened human rights, accountability and good governance capacity of key government, civil society institutions and mechanisms including traditional structures contribute to improved security, protection, access to justice and reconciliation for all people in Northern Uganda.</p> <p>Expected outcomes: (UNPRAP) Program outcome 1.1: Local justice, law, order and security government institutions and services apply international human rights, justice and protection standards (UNPRAP) Program outcome 1.2: Transitional justice processes, mechanisms and capacities for mediation, peace building, conflict resolution and reconciliation facilitated (UNPRAP) Program outcome 1.3: Human rights and protection advocacy, monitoring and reporting capacity strengthened among civil society networks and independent national institutions</p> <p>Key Outputs: Outcome 1.1 included 7 outputs related to the strengthening of both the supply and demand of access to justice (both formal and informal) in terms of justice for children, GBV and human rights generally. A combination of strategies was employed: studies; trainings; awareness raising; and support to particular institutions including the Uganda Human Rights Commission. Outcome 1.2 included 4 outputs related to the strengthening of transitional justice processes and mechanisms and capacities for mediation, peace building, conflict resolution and reconciliation. Output 1 focused on community based programmes, output 2 on dialogues between districts and communities; output 3 on the establishment of a memorialization centre in Kitgum, and output 4 on CSO capacity building in transitional justice. Outcome 1.3 included 4 outputs. Two focused on the capacity building of the Uganda Human Rights Commission and civil society in human rights monitoring, whilst 3 and 4 focused on empowering youth. These two final outputs are not reflected in the outcomes set for the programme.</p>		

¹²² This assessment has relied on the end-of-programme report as of 20 November 2012 for the majority of information related to reported results.

Pg 2 Project Evaluation Sheet

<p>Global Assessment:</p> <p>Overall outcome achievements (with reference to PMP indicators and planning targets)</p>	<p>The JP1 programme included a focus on broad underlying drivers of potential conflict in Acholiland, in particular on transitional justice, access to justice more generally (with a focus on human rights, children’s rights and GBV), and youth empowerment. In this manner, it can be said to have made strong contribution to peace building in Acholiland. JP 1 included support to the Uganda police force, the judiciary and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, focusing on their work related to human rights, justice for children and GBV. In this manner, access to justice was supported through a combination of research ; training ; practical support to relevant institutions, including the Uganda Human Rights Commission and traditional leaders ; and community dialogues. The inclusion of a focus on GBV contributed to ensuring the human rights of women and girls in particular. There were however some challenges in achieving results. For example, questions can be raised to what extent community dialogues contributed to peace building, as they were sometimes conflated with awareness raising on various issues¹²³ and can sometimes lead to a lack of focus and raising of unrealistic expectations.¹²⁴ Lastly, challenges remain in ensuring that traditional governance and conflict resolution mechanisms meet international human rights standards.¹²⁵ JP 1 included a strong focus on support for transitional justice in the broad sense. Under outcome 1, access to justice was supported through a focus on both formal and informal mechanisms, with a focus on human rights, justice for children and GBV. Under outcome 2, the development of transitional justice mechanisms and policy was supported through a combination of research ; trainings ; practical support to reconstructive surgery as an element of reparation ; community dialogues ; and memorialisation. JP1 can be said to have made a <u>significant</u> contribution to the following PMP results¹²⁶:</p> <p>- Results area 1 : <i>Security sector reforms and judiciary systems put in place and providing services and goods at national and local level that reinforce the Rule of Law (RoL) ; indicator 1.2 RoL: # of PBF supported sector programmes where communities use transitional justice systems to resolve conflicts/disputes without recourse to violence ensuring the respect of Human Rights of women and girls in particular</i></p> <p>JP1 incorporated support to land dispute resolution through a study ; practical support to mediation processes related to land ; and some mediation and conflict resolution training. However, support to land dispute resolution was not comprehensively designed as a sectoral program, with many activities coming online when, during the course of programme implementation, land-related conflict was identified as a major impediment to sustainable peace building in Acholiland. Therefore the JP1 contribution to this indicator can be said to be <u>relevant/on track</u> :</p> <p>Results area 2 : <i>Conflicts resolved peacefully and in a manner that supports the coexistence of all relevant actors/groups that were involved in conflicts that undermine peace building efforts ; indicator 2.3 Management of natural resources (including land): # of PBF supported sector programmes with mechanisms in place to address peacefully disputes grounded in competition for access to land and use of limited resources (e.g. land, water)</i></p> <p>JP1 included interventions that focused on enhancing the participation of young people in social transformation processes. However, two of these worked with different youth groups that were not coordinated. OHCHR supported a Youth Strengthening Strategy (YSS) whilst UNICEF supported the establishment of a Youth Coalition. The YSS registered 100 youth groups in Gulu but was not part of the Youth Coalition, which was nevertheless established after a mapping of existing youth organisations.¹²⁷ The programme was also not designed to contribute to this results area, as there was no stated outcome related to this youth empowerment. Therefore, the JP1 contribution to this result area can be said to be <u>on track/relevant</u>:</p> <p>Results area 3 : <i>Youth, women and other marginalized members of conflict affected communities act as a catalyst to prompt the peace process and early economic recovery</i></p>
--	--

¹²³ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

¹²⁴ Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012

¹²⁵ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

¹²⁶ It should be noted that, although the evaluation was directed to evaluate against the PBSO PMP results areas and indicators, the PMP dates from October 2011 and had not yet been established at the time when the Uganda PBF interventions were being designed.

¹²⁷ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV

	Positive Results	Incorporated in the section on outcome achievements above and on effectiveness below
	Negative Results	None
Relevance	Relevance in terms of PP, national priorities and underlying conflict dynamics (theory of change?)	<p>JP1 was designed to be directly aligned to the United Nations Peace building and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP). The outcomes for JP1 are taken directly from this framework. The UNPRAP in turn is aligned to the Government of Uganda's Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP). According to the Priority Plan and the Prodoc, JP1 addressed PRDP strategic objective 4 on peace building and reconciliation : « putting in place mechanisms for rehabilitating victims of war and facilitating their reintegration into the communities while strengthening the local conflict resolution mechanisms and the relationship between civilians and government/public administration ». This objective was underfunded in the PRDP.¹²⁸ However, the outcomes aimed for in JP1 are equally related to the enhancement of protection and the functionality of judicial and legal services, which are priority actions under strategic objective 1 in the PRDP.¹²⁹ Better alignment to PRDP objective 4 would have required a better targeted peace building programme (see also section on recommendations below).</p> <p>The theory of change underlying the programme focuses on linking the strengthening of access to justice, transitional justice mechanisms and human rights monitoring to the peace building process in Acholiland.¹³⁰</p>
	PBF responding to an urgent financial and/or PB gap ?	<p>JP1 responded to a funding gap in the UNPRAP and, at least partially, to the lack of funding towards PRDP objective 4 (see section on relevance above). Because PRDP objective 4 was most directly focused on peace building and reconciliation according to government priorities, JP1, through its alignment to this objective, also responded to addressing a gap in peace building, in particular through its support for transitional justice, dispute resolution and mediation. However, the programme could have been better targeted to achieve better peace building outcomes (as outlined in the section on recommendations below)</p>
Effectiveness	Attainment of peace relevant outcomes? cost effectiveness?	<p>A manual on HR, CP and GBV was compiled, piloted and is now being used in police cadet training.¹³¹ Further support was provided in the form of trainings to JLOS officials and community leaders, including traditional leaders, on human rights and conflict resolution with a focus on land disputes. A quantitative access to justice study for GBV survivors was undertaken. Journalists, academia, traditional leaders and youth groups were supported to raise awareness on access to justice. Diversion for children in conflict with the law was strengthened, including through the organisation of special sessions to address backlogs, and justice for children indicators integrated into the national JLOS strategy. A study was undertaken on community policing/police responses to human rights violations, and earlier collected data on land disputes was validated and a report drafted. The Uganda Human Rights Commission was supported in terms of regional office capacity and the convening of special sessions to reduce backlog.</p> <p>Transitional justice processes were catalysed through a number of results. UHRC and OHCHR published a report focusing on reparations and commissioned additional work on transitional justice through the ICTJ. These were used in turn to inform policy development at the national level around transitional justice.¹³² Support was provided to the National Memorial and Peace Documentation Centre in Kitgum for its outreach, research and memorialisation activities. Within the realm of reparations, 574 victims were provided with reconstructive surgery, in addition to further psychosocial support provided to additional people. The 7 District Reconciliation and Peace teams were supported with trainings and practical support for a small number of mediation processes, together with the UHRC.</p> <p>The number of CSOs reporting on human rights was increased from 8 to 15. UHRC was</p>

¹²⁸ JP1 Programme Document ; United Nations Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP) ; Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP)

¹²⁹ In fact, this is also noted in the UNPRAP, which again aligns focus area 1 to PRDP objective 4, but then in the situational analysis links it first and foremost to PRPD objective 1

¹³⁰ JP1 Programme document, justification section

¹³¹ JP1 End-of-programme report ; interview with Uganda Police Force GBV/HR unit, 31 October 2012

¹³² Interview with OHCHR, 15 November 2012

		<p>supported in its human rights monitoring work and special sessions were organised to address backlogs. More than 4000 youth were empowered to contribute proactively to social transformation through work with youth groups and youth centres.¹³³</p> <p>Comments related to cost effectiveness of separate projects can be found in the economy section below. With regards to overall cost effectiveness, questions can be raised as to the effectiveness of the overall implementation of JP1. Although the programme was designed as one, it was implemented by each agency separately. For the most part, each agency worked with its own counterparts and IPs to implement its own activities. From a programme-wide viewpoint, questions can be asked regarding the cost effectiveness of this approach. Agencies occasionally worked with the same IP on different activities, and sometimes funded the same IP unbeknownst to each other (see under coordination in the section on program management below). Agencies also noted the inefficiencies in these approaches, for example with regards to community dialogue work. Each agency contracts different IPs to include community dialogue on different issues, sometimes in the same area.¹³⁴</p>
Efficiency	Project management performance	<p>Design</p> <p>The first version of the programme did not include UNDP, and instead saw a larger amount of funds allocated to OHCHR. OHCHR found it could not spend this sum, and therefore began negotiations to bring UNDP into the project. This was achieved but at the cost of major delays.¹³⁵ The Prodoc was signed in Feb 2011 although the project was started on 1 Jan 2011.</p> <p>JP1 agencies have reported against a different RBM than the one approved in the original Prodoc. Although the new RBM presents some improvements compared to the original, other logical changes were not made. Notably, outputs 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 relate to youth empowerment, but this objective is absent from the three outcomes listed for the programme. In addition, some indicator targets were further adjusted late in the implementation.¹³⁶ In addition, it is unclear when, whether and how approval was given for some of these changes to the RBM. At the time of evaluation, agencies were preparing retrospective notes to file for some of these changes.¹³⁷ Overall, changes to lower levels of the RBM (output indicators and activities) have decreased the program logic. In combination with some reporting challenges this has led to a lack of clarity around exact achievements (in particular quantitative) as reported in the end-of-programme report (see reporting section below).</p> <p>Implementation</p> <p>Further delays were caused by the fact that after the Prodoc was signed, the identification and contracting of IPs took time. This meant that significant parts of the programme were further delayed.¹³⁸ However, despite these delays and other implementation challenges, the agencies have been able to execute most of their planned activities, with some good results (see above). OHCHR made changes to its activities during the course of the project. Due to time constraints, some activities that were originally planned as direct implementation were changed into grants to relevant CBOs.¹³⁹ There were some challenges around funding modalities for some IPs, who faced gaps in funding (AYNET, ICTJ, UHRC) which challenged the effectiveness of interventions.¹⁴⁰</p> <p>Coordination</p> <p>In 2011, JP1 and JP2 agencies decided to collapse their joint JP level meetings and joint monitoring visits.¹⁴¹ JP1&JP2 agencies met regularly in 2011, but less so in 2012. During 2011, the meetings included discussion on cooperative planning of joint activities, information sharing and the need for an M&E plan (including adjustments to the RBM).¹⁴² After the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in October 2011 indicated a low level</p>

¹³³ Results summary derived from JP1 end-of-programme report

¹³⁴ Report of the March 2012 JP1&2 JMV.

¹³⁵ Interview OHCHR 1 Nov 2012 ; interview UNDP 14 Nov 2012 ; interview OHCHR 15 November

¹³⁶ The evaluator compared written comments from the RCO M&E specialist on draft Q3 2012 report to final Q3 reporting

¹³⁷ The evaluator received retroactive notes to file from OHCHR and UNFPA, but these did not explain all changes made to the JP1 log frame

¹³⁸ UNDP and OHCHR in particular - see JP1 End-of-project report, section IIA. Some delays were also caused by UNICEF internal shift to a new financial management program – see JP1&2 : Key action points to accelerate implementation of peacebuilding programmes

¹³⁹ Interview OHCHR 1 Nov 2012 ; OHCHR document « Changes made to the initially approved main activities »

¹⁴⁰ JP1 End-of –programme report section IV C

¹⁴¹ Minutes TAP meeting 14 April 2011

¹⁴² Minutes of joint meetings JP1 and 2, 6 May ; 25 May ; 10 June ; 12 September 2011

		<p>of implementation progress, agencies met to focus on strategies for implementation acceleration and closer monitoring.¹⁴³ During the remainder of 2012, JP1&2 implementing agencies met less frequently, leading to weaknesses in coordination.¹⁴⁴ For example, OHCHR and UNDP were unaware that each had provided an additional grant to the IP AYNET towards the end of the programme implementation.¹⁴⁵</p> <p>Monitoring</p> <p>Implementing agencies each had their own internal monitoring mechanisms.¹⁴⁶ In addition, joint monitoring visits were organised in December 2011 and March 2012. During the March 2012 monitoring visit, problems with one of UNDP's Responsible Partners were noted. It was established that the IP responsible for monitoring the RP had insufficient capacity to do so, making direct monitoring and verification of reporting by UNDP necessary. The JMV's resulted in many good ideas related to improvements on synergies and advocacy for the programme. However, many of these ideas were then not followed up in subsequent TAP meetings, and agencies faced systemic constraints (different timelines, different geographic focus, different IPs) to the practical enhancement of synergies.</p> <p>Reporting</p> <p>Reporting arrangements to PBSO were facilitated through an electronic system that was established by the RCO office for all joint programming with funds from the PBF under P4.</p> <p>Although the electronic system has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, the mechanisms for tracking output and outcome related achievements faced challenges. Agencies were asked to put achievement percentages next to the output and outcome indicators when reporting on a quarterly basis. For the final end-of-project report, these percentages are automatically added up by the system, generating inflated cumulative achievement percentages.¹⁴⁷</p> <p>In addition, agencies have reported against output indicators on a quarterly basis. In the end-of-programme report, these are all listed and their achievement percentages added up per indicator. There are discrepancies between the total achievement rate in terms of percentages when held against the targets set for the indicators.¹⁴⁸</p> <p>The end-of-programme report lists the inflated cumulative percentages under section A on "summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs", instead of a qualitative, narrative overview of how project achievement link to the planned outputs and outcomes. This presents a missed opportunities to clarify the programme logic (and thus Theories of Change) at the end of the programme.¹⁴⁹</p> <p>In addition, the work by UWONET on the prioritization of GBV in the law and justice sector through a focus on CEDAW recommendations, is listed in various sections of the end-of-programme report, but is not included in the final RBM at the end of the report.¹⁵⁰</p>
<p>Economy</p>	<p>Cost of local services/goods?</p>	<p>The MPTFO requests that implementing agencies provide financial information according to the following categories: supplies, commodities, equipment and transport; personnel (staff consultants and travel); training of counterparts; contracts; other direct costs and indirect support costs. This means it is not possible to assess in detail the value-for-money of procurement of goods and services per activity, output or outcome, as each incorporates the interventions of different agencies. Agencies have not been asked to report financially against outputs or outcomes. Each recipient agency has stated that it has utilised its own internal checks, guidelines and processes to ensure the transparency and accountability of expenditure.¹⁵¹</p>

¹⁴³ Minutes of joint meetings JP1 and 2, 2 and 6 February 2012 ; JP1&2 : Key action points to accelerate implementation of peacebuilding programmes

¹⁴⁴ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012 ; interview OHCHR, 15 November 2012 ; interview UNDP 14 November 2012

¹⁴⁵ interview OHCHR, 15 November 2012 ; interview UNDP 15 November 2012

¹⁴⁶ JP1 End-of-programme report section IIC

¹⁴⁷ JP1 End-of-programme report section IVA

¹⁴⁸ For example, indicator 1.2.1.3 on « number of community members participating in dialogues on transitional justice mechanisms including persons receiving reconstructive surgery as a result of a grant to AYNET » had a target of 100, but lists eleven different reporting entries, with figures adding up to 4217 people reached, yet the achievement percentages for the indicator add up to 140%.

¹⁴⁹ Although the end-of-programme report includes a narrative section on summary of qualitative achievements, these are not directly linked to the program RBM.

¹⁵⁰ JP1 End-of-programme report. This was discussed with UNFPA staff, who admitted having difficulty working out where to report this activity in the RBM, and were unsure why it had been included into JP1 (staff who were involved in JP1 design had since left). Interview with UNFPA, 14 November 2012.

¹⁵¹ End-of-programme report section IIB. The verification of detailed expenditure procedure was beyond the scope of this evaluation with the financial information available, and could be taken up in a subsequent audit of the programme.

Sustainability/national ownership	Capacity to national institutions to sustain project results	In April 2012, all JPs were asked to put together exit strategies investigating the sustainability of their activities, outlining which activities would be discontinued/were completed and which ones would be picked up by other programs. However, not all agencies submitted matrices, and it is unclear whether these were reviewed towards the end of the program. ¹⁵² For example, OHCHR stated that work of the UHRC will be continued through UHRC's regular funding ¹⁵³ , but the evaluation found that UHRC is facing serious challenges in this respect, including having to let go the additional staff that was hired with PBF funding to operate its regional offices, if no further funding is available. ¹⁵⁴ The support to the memorialization museum at the National Memory & Peace Documentation Centre has provided part of the memorial site, but without further funding it will remain unfinished. ¹⁵⁵ The support to an important mediation process in Kitgum through the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) also faced funding challenges at the end of the programme. ¹⁵⁶
	Catalytic leverage (financial leverage, unblocking political processes?)	The main catalytic effect in terms of peace building in Acholiland achieved by JP1 is its contribution to the national debate on transitional justice. Other interventions have contributed to building initial knowledge and practice on land dispute resolution and mediation. There are further examples of smaller catalytic effects. The support to one of the CBOs providing psychosocial care enabled it to also train some additional CBOs to help them deal with mental illness cases should they encounter these. ¹⁵⁷ The database established for the UHRC in Acholiland with support of the PBP is now being expanded nationally. ¹⁵⁸ For some of the IPs, catalytic effects of the PBP interventions related to the fact that these opened up new regions to further, different interventions by their organisations in future. ¹⁵⁹ UWONET was able to generate interest from other donors for possible future funding. ¹⁶⁰ The support for the integration of juvenile justice indicators into relevant justice sector plans resulted in 11 indicators being integrated instead of the planned 3. ¹⁶¹
Transparency, accountability	Decision making at JSC level	On 27 October 2010, the Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the UN RC and the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister, met for the first time and approved the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (with amendments), and referred the four project documents to the PS for signing. ¹⁶² According to the process established by the PBSO, there should be time between the approval of the Priority Plan and the submission of projects to the Joint Steering Committee for approval. In the case of Uganda, it seems that the four project documents were ready at the same time as the final priority plan. Implementing agencies were partially selected based on the fact that PBF projects were embedded within agencies' programmes to enable scalability, research and catalytic effects. ¹⁶³ The JSC did not meet to execute its overview function in 2011. This was partially due to the fact that implementation of the programmes was delayed. The JSC convened again in February 2012 to consider the results of the Mid-Term Review and the delays in programming. It established more detailed expenditure review mechanisms, and in April decided on the no-cost extension of 3 months. ¹⁶⁴ The JSC met for the final time in September 2012 and discussed the closure of the programmes and tentative future plans. ¹⁶⁵

¹⁵² Interview RCO, 14 November 2012

¹⁵³ RM Matrix_JP1-OHCHR 170412

¹⁵⁴ Interview OHCHR, 1 November 2012 ; interview UHRC, 12 November 2012

¹⁵⁵ interview National Memory & Peace Documentation Centre, 8 November 2012

¹⁵⁶ Interview JRP, 8 November 2012

¹⁵⁷ Interview with JP2 staff and IPs, 2 November 2012

¹⁵⁸ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

¹⁵⁹ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

¹⁶⁰ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

¹⁶¹ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012

¹⁶² Minutes JSC meeting 27 October 2010

¹⁶³ Final Peacebuilding Priority Plan Uganda, October 2010

¹⁶⁴ Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012 ; Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

¹⁶⁵ Minutes JSC 28 September 2012

	Implementation agencies	Some adjustments were made to the funding arrangements. UNDP, which implemented under both JP1 and JP3, utilised 90.000 USD of unspent funds from JP3 for JP1 and provided this to AYINET as an additional grant. ¹⁶⁶
Recommendations, lessons learnt	<p>Although JP1 contributed to addressing some of the conflict drivers as outlined above, it was not designed as a comprehensive, maximally focused peace building programme. To a certain extent, the interventions built on existing or planned programmes of the agencies involved, without making significant adjustments to target better peace building outcomes. Better peace building practice involves two further steps, above and beyond contributing to the addressing of conflict drivers.</p> <p>Firstly, peace building programs need to include a comprehensive focus on strengthening conflict resolution capacities and peace processes in society. With regard to JP1, this could have incorporated :</p> <p><i>1. A more comprehensive focus on dispute resolution and mediation mechanisms ranging from the community level through informal processes to formal mechanisms, including those related to land</i> (contributing to PMP indicator 2.1 National Reconciliation: # of PBF supported sector programmes with effective partnerships and procedures in place that maintain regular inclusive policy dialogue to address issues of conflict, instability and political participation). This in turn would have enhanced the alignment to PRDP strategic objective 4, as was the intention of JP1. Strategic objective 4 states that the primary aim « is to address the social challenges in Northern Uganda that have arisen as a result of fractured social relationships in order to resuscitate the peace building and reconciliation processes »¹⁶⁷.</p> <p><i>2. A focus on supporting mechanisms to continue the abrogated peace process related to the conflict between the LRA and the Government of Uganda</i> (contributing to PMP indicator 1.4 Political dialogue for peace agreements : # of PBF supported sector programmes with evidence that inclusive dialogue drives the implementation process of peace agreements).</p> <p><i>3. A more specific focus on the empowerment of women specifically as actors in peace relevant sectors and functions</i> (contributing to PMP indicator 2.4 Empowerment for Women : # of PBF supported sector programmes with evidence of women formally assuming leadership / responsibilities in peace relevant sectors and functions)</p> <p>A second and crucial step towards better peace building outcomes involves the incorporation of Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity principles into programming. In conflict affected and fragile contexts, it is crucial that interventions are based on an in-depth analysis of risks, not just in terms of potentially negative consequences of the context for the programme, but also vice versa to ensure that negative impacts of programming on the context are minimized. In this respect, DNH involves a focus on HOW interventions are implemented as much as WHAT they aim to achieve. Throughout the PBF programmes, understanding of Do No Harm principles was generally weak, and they were not systematically incorporated into design or monitoring.</p>	

¹⁶⁶ Interview with UNDP, 15 November 2012

¹⁶⁷ Government of Uganda Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda

Annex B: JP2 Programme assessment sheet

Project Title Peacebuilding and enhancing protection systems¹⁶⁸		
Project Number: 00076965		
UN Agency: UNICEF, UNFPA	Priority Area (PMP strategic result): See below	
National counterpart: American Refugee Committee (ARC) ; ANPPCAN ; CCF Pader ; Children as Peacebuilders ; Church of Uganda ; GUSCO ; KICWA ; Muslim Supreme Council ; UCRNN ; Uganda Catholic Secretariat ; UTL ; War Child Holland; ACORD; Food for the Hungry; Victim's Voice (VIVO); ICON		
Project Number	76965	
Project Title	Peace building and enhancing protection systems	
Project Scope	Acholiland	
Project Budget	UNICEF: 1,200,000 USD (PBF) UNFPA: 1,300,000 USD (PBF)	
Execution rate at 20/11/12	Final updates to funds disbursement rates had not yet been logged at the time of the evaluation. Financial closure for the programme is 31 December 2012. Funds disbursement rates up to 30 September (operational programme closure) were: UNFPA: 99% UNICEF: 100%	
Duration	Months foreseen: 18 months Actual: 21 months	
Date approved by SC : 04 November 2010	Start Date : 1 January 2011	End Date : 30 September 2011 for operational closure; 31 December for financial closure
<p>Project Description : Focusing on Acholiland, this programme has focused on protection of women and children from all forms of violence, in particular gender based violence and protection from all forms of harm and abuse for children.</p> <p>Overall goals and expected outcomes: Overall objective (UNPRAP Outcome 1): Strengthened human rights, accountability and good governance capacity of key government, civil society institutions and mechanisms including traditional structures contribute to improved security, protection, access to justice and reconciliation for all people in Northern Uganda.</p> <p>Expected outcomes: The original Prodoc lists the outcome for JP2 as (UNPRAP) Program outcome 1.4: Recovery, reintegration, protection services, systems and structures established and accessible to vulnerable groups/affected populations groups. The End-of-programme report lists the outcome for JP2 as “Women and children are empowered to overcome specific post-conflict hardship (e.g. physical and economic security, political participation) and to end gender-based violence and discrimination).</p> <p>Key Outputs: The program had 6 outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Psychosocial care and support services for women and children victims of GBV and abuse provided in all target districts 2. Community dialogues on GBV, gender equality, non-discrimination and child protection conducted in target districts 3. District mechanisms for regular collection and documentation of reported incidents of GBV and child protection established and functional 4. Increased capacity of district authorities to plan and budget for addressing GBV, child protection and human rights violations 5. Case management and referral pathways for children and GBV survivors enhanced in all target districts 6. Children formerly associated with armed groups and other children affected by conflict are supported through 		

¹⁶⁸ This assessment has relied on the JP2 end-of-programme report as of 20 November 2012 for the majority of information related to reported results

reception, interim care and/or reunification with families/communities of origin.

Pg 2 Project Evaluation Sheet

Global Assessment:	Overall outcome achievements (with reference to PMP indicators and planning targets)	<p>The JP2 programme focused on protection of women (UNFPA) and children (UNICEF). The agencies implemented interventions linked to already on-going activities within the broader context of their five year country programmes.¹⁶⁹</p> <p>These interventions have contributed to the creation of an enabling environment for sustainable peace, by strengthening protection from violence. In addition, and even more directly relevant for peace building in Acholiland, through its focus on GBV and child protection at the community level and inclusion of psychosocial support, the programme has contributed to the strengthening of social cohesion and conflict resolution capacities at the household and community level.¹⁷⁰</p> <p>JP2 contributed to the following PMP results areas/indicators¹⁷¹:</p> <p>Results area 2 : Conflicts resolved peacefully and in a manner that supports the coexistence of all relevant actors/groups that were involved in conflicts that undermine peace building efforts</p> <p>JP2 focused on strengthening the protection of women and children from violence. Through its focus on GBV and child protection at the community level, the programme has contributed to strengthened social cohesion/conflict management capacities at the household and community level. There were however some challenges in achieving results. For example, peace clubs and Child Protection Committees were established in communities to help with community level conflict resolution. Although these have generated some good results, their methods have also raised some questions, as many approaches to conflict resolution at the household level are focused on keeping families together, with some potential negative consequences for women. There is also a need to clarify the roles of these community based conflict resolution mechanisms viz-a-viz state institutions like the Local Council Courts.¹⁷² Furthermore, questions can be raised to what extent community dialogues contributed to peace building, as they were sometimes conflated with awareness raising on various issues¹⁷³ and can sometimes lead to a lack of focus and raising of unrealistic expectations.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, JP2 contributions to this results area can be said to be <u>relevant/on track</u>.</p> <p>Results area 3 : Youth, women and other marginalized members of conflict affected communities act as a catalyst to prompt the peace process and early economic recovery ,</p> <p>indicator 3.2 : Sustainable livelihood : # PBF supported sector programmes generating sustainable livelihood opportunities to IDP, refugees, victims of war and others in need in conflict affected communities.</p> <p>Although it was not highlighted in the original design of the programme, JP2 extended some of its interventions related to GBV, child protection, and interventions originally focused on the reintegration of children affected by conflict, into livelihood support. This meant that support related to sustainable livelihoods was only provided by one IP, and that intervention included some challenges in sustainability.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, the contribution of JP2 to this results area and indicator can be said to be <u>weak</u>.</p>
	Positive Results	Incorporated in the section above

¹⁶⁹ JP2 Prodoc

¹⁷⁰ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

¹⁷¹ It should be noted that, although the evaluation was directed to evaluate against the PBSO PMP results areas and indicators, the PMP dates from October 2011 had not yet been established at the time when the Uganda PBF interventions were being designed.

¹⁷² Report of JP1&2 JMV December 2011

¹⁷³ Report of the JP1&2 JMV March 2012

¹⁷⁴ Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012

¹⁷⁵ Interview with UNICEF, 29 October 2012 ; Interview with CCF, 9 November 2012 ; Interview with Pader Girls School, 9 November 2012

	NegativeResults	None
Relevance	Relevance in terms of PP , national priorities and underlying conflict dynamics (theory of change?)	JP2 was designed to be directly aligned to the United Nations Peace building and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP) programme outcome 1.4: <i>Recovery, reintegration, protection services, systems and structures established and accessible to vulnerable groups/affected populations groups</i> . According to the Priority Plan, this outcome is in turn aligned to PRDP strategic objective 4 on peace building and reconciliation : « putting in place mechanisms for rehabilitating victims of war and facilitating their reintegration into the communities while strengthening the local conflict resolution mechanisms and the relationship between civilians and government/public administration ». ¹⁷⁶ However, the argument in the JP2 Prodoc is that it responded to a gap in the Government of Uganda Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) which included few responses specific to the needs of women, and aligns the programme to PRDP strategic objective 2 on rebuilding and empowering communities. ¹⁷⁷ In fact, JP2 can be said to have contributed to both PRDP strategic objectives 2 and 4. The theories of change informing the programme design are articulated in the project description in the Prodoc : by strengthening protection from and stronger responses to GBV, the programme was aiming to contribute to facilitating an enabling environment for women’s participation in peace building, and by strengthening the protection of children, the programme aimed to address children’s vulnerability to violence. However, interviews with agency staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries made it clear that during the course of implementation, this theory of change had shifted. Instead, peace building related outcomes were seen to lie in the strengthening of social cohesion and conflict resolution capacities at the household and community level (“peace from the heart, from the home), through its focus on GBV and child protection at the community level and inclusion of psychosocial support. ¹⁷⁸
	PBF responding to an urgent financial and/or PB gap ?	JP2 responded to a funding gap in the UNPRAP. The results of the programme contributed to the strengthening of social cohesion and conflict resolution capacities at the community and household level, but this was not the stated objective of the programme. The extent to which the programme responded to a peace building gap could have been enhanced through better targeted peace building design (see section on recommendations below)
Effectiveness	Attainment of -peace relevant outcomes? -cost effectiveness?	The main results of the interventions under JP2 are as follows : JP 2 provided psychosocial support to 8826 child survivors and 3926 GBV survivors. Psychosocial support is important in that it underlies the strengthening of social cohesion. The programme facilitated 842 community dialogues through various methods, including a focus on GBV and child protection. Some dialogues included a specific focus on conflict resolution through discussions on land dispute resolution. ¹⁷⁹ Data collection mechanisms on child protection and GBV reporting were extended from 4 to all 7 districts in Acholiland. The availability of district councillors and officials trained in budgeting related to child protection, gender mainstreaming and GBV was also extended from 4 to 7 districts, although it was noted that such training did not automatically translate into practice without further support. ¹⁸⁰ The number of cases of child violence were increased from 3000 to 5000, and referral pathways for child protection and GBV were updated (although the latter not across 7 districts as planned). Finally, support was provided for the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups, but when the number of returnees dwindled, support was extended to previously returned children, which also saw UNICEF stretch its mandate to support young, previously abducted mothers. ¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁶ Uganda PBF Priority Plan final October 2010; United Nations Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP) ; Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP)

¹⁷⁷ JP2 Prodoc

¹⁷⁸ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012; interview with ACORD beneficiaries, 9 November 2012

¹⁷⁹ JP2 end-of-programme report RBM output 2

¹⁸⁰ Report of the JP1&2 JMV March 2012

¹⁸¹ JP2 end-of-programme report ; interview with UNICEF 29 October 2012

<p>Efficiency</p>	<p>Project management performance</p>	<p>Design</p> <p>The programme was designed comprehensively with a view to its main stated focus on enhancing protection mechanisms, but did not include a comprehensive focus in terms of other key peace building results in the area of strengthened social cohesion/conflict management capacities. As noted above, the outcome statement was changed from the original Prodoc in the final RBM. It is not clear when and by whom this was approved.¹⁸²</p> <p>Implementation</p> <p>Some delays were caused by a lack of capacity of some IPs, and due to country strategy adjustments to revised global plans.¹⁸³ UNFPA implemented through a consortium model, which meant that it contracted two Lead Agencies who were then in turn tasked to contract the remainder of the IPs. Although UNFPA attributed an increase in efficiency to this model,¹⁸⁴ IPs reported some communication challenges, which may also have been related to staff turnover.¹⁸⁵ Despite these challenges, agencies and their IPs were able to achieve the large majority of the targets they had established.</p> <p>Coordination</p> <p>In 2011, JP1 and JP2 agencies decided to collapse their joint JP level meetings and joint monitoring visits.¹⁸⁶ JP1&JP agencies met regularly in 2011, but less so in 2012. During 2011, the meetings included discussion on cooperative planning of joint activities, information sharing and the need for an M&E plan (including adjustments to the RBM).¹⁸⁷ After the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in October 2011 indicated a low level of implementation progress, agencies met to focus on strategies for implementation acceleration. During the remainder of 2012, JP1&2 implementing agencies met less frequently.¹⁸⁸ It was not possible to achieve the joint data collection on GBV and CP as had originally been planned¹⁸⁹, and agencies decided to split indicators that had originally been joined.¹⁹⁰</p> <p>Monitoring</p> <p>Implementing agencies each had their own internal monitoring mechanisms.¹⁹¹ In addition, joint monitoring visits for JP1&2 were organised in December 2011 and March 2012. The JMV's resulted in many good ideas related to improvements on synergies and advocacy for the programmes. However, many of these ideas were then not followed up in subsequent TAP meeting discussions¹⁹², and agencies faced systemic constraints (different timelines, different geographic focus, different IPs) to the practical enhancement of synergies.</p> <p>Reporting</p> <p>Reporting arrangements to PBSO were facilitated through an electronic system that was established by the RCO office for all joint programming (also covering joint programs other than the PBF) with funds from the PBF under P4.</p> <p>Although the electronic system has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, the mechanisms for tracking output and outcome related achievements faced challenges. Agencies were asked to put achievement percentages next to the output and outcome indicators when reporting on a quarterly basis. In the end-of-programme report, these are all listed and their achievement percentages added up per indicator. For certain outputs, there are discrepancies between the total achievement rate in terms of percentages when held against the targets set for the indicators.</p> <p>The end-of-programme report lists cumulative percentages under section IV A on "summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs", instead of a qualitative, narrative overview of how project achievements link to the planned outputs and outcomes. This presents a missed opportunities to clarify the programme logic (and thus Theories of Change) at the end of the programme.¹⁹³</p>
--------------------------	---------------------------------------	--

¹⁸² Although a note to file was signed on other changes, it did not include an explanation for this change. UNICEF and UNFPA, Note to File, 18 October 2012

¹⁸³ End-of-programme report section IV C

¹⁸⁴ End-of-programme report section IIIA

¹⁸⁵ Interview with JP1&2 IPs, 30 October 2012

¹⁸⁶ Minutes TAP meeting 14 April 2011

¹⁸⁷ Minutes of joint meetings JP1 and 2, 6 May, 25 May, 10 June, 12 September 2011

¹⁸⁸ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012

¹⁸⁹ Interview UNICEF, 29 October 2012

¹⁹⁰ UNICEF and UNFPA, Note to File, 18 October 2012

¹⁹¹ JP2 End-of-programme report section IIIC

¹⁹² This lack of discussion in TAP meeting does not preclude the possibilities that some ideas were followed up by agencies separately.

¹⁹³ Although the end-of-programme report includes a narrative section on summary of qualitative achievements, these are not directly linked to the program RBM.

Economy	Cost of local services/goods?	The MPTFO requests that implementing agencies provide financial information according to the following categories: supplies, commodities, equipment and transport; personnel (staff consultants and travel); training of counterparts; contracts; other direct costs and indirect support costs. This means it is not possible to assess in detail the value-for-money of procurement of goods and services per activity, output or outcome, as each incorporates the interventions of different agencies. Agencies have not been asked to report financially against outputs or outcomes. Each recipient agency has stated that it has utilised its own internal checks, guidelines and processes to ensure the transparency and accountability of expenditure. ¹⁹⁴
Sustainability/national ownership	Capacity to national institutions to sustain project results	Generally, the sustainability of JP2 interventions was enhanced due to the fact that to a large extent they were linked to on-going agency programmes within the broader context of their five year country programmes. In April 2012, all JPs were asked to put together exit strategies investigating the sustainability of their activities, outlining which activities would be discontinued/were completed and which ones would be picked up by other programs. It showed that UNICEF was planning to continue working on most of the JP2 outputs through other programmes, except on district level budgeting for child protection and referral pathways for child protection. UNFPA likewise made plans to integrate further support under a different Joint Programme on GBV and by shifting some planned activities to UNWomen. ¹⁹⁵ Local level government authorities were involved in project implementation, enhancing the prospects for sustainability of some of the interventions, although the capacity of government to budget for and deliver protection services, including psychosocial care, remains weak. The sustainability of the support provided to young mothers formerly associated with armed conflict through their enrolment in the Pader Second Chance Girls school was diminished because the girls could only be provided with 6 months instead of the usual 9 months training, due to a lack of capacity of the school. ¹⁹⁶
	Catalytic leverage (financial leverage, unblocking political processes?)	As noted below in the section on recommendations, the programme could have been better targeted to add value to its results to achieve better peace building outcomes. Small catalytic effects were noted from the support provided by ACORD due to its combination of awareness raising/training with practical follow up support. ¹⁹⁷
Transparency, accountability	Decision making at JSC level	On 27 October 2010, the Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the UN RC and the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister, met for the first time and approved the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (with amendments), and referred the four project documents to the PS for signing. ¹⁹⁸ According to the process established by the PBSO, there should be time between the approval of the Priority Plan and the submission of projects to the Joint Steering Committee for approval. In the case of Uganda, the four project documents were ready at the same time as the final priority plan. Implementing agencies were partially selected based on the fact that PBF projects were embedded within agencies' programmes to enable scalability, research and catalytic effects. ¹⁹⁹ The JSC did not meet to execute its overview function in 2011. This was partially due to the fact that implementation of the programmes was delayed. The JSC convened again in February 2012 to consider the results of the Mid-Term Review and the delays in programming. It established more detailed expenditure review mechanisms, and in April decided on the no-cost extension of 3 months. ²⁰⁰ The JSC met for the final time in September 2012 and discussed the closure of the programmes and tentative future plans. ²⁰¹
	Implementation agencies	

¹⁹⁴ JP2 End-of-programme report section IIB. The verification of detailed expenditure procedure was beyond the scope of this evaluation with the financial information available, and could be taken up in a subsequent audit of the programme.

¹⁹⁵ PBF exit strategies for UNFPA implementing partners ; JP2 RM matrix

¹⁹⁶ Interview with CCF and Pader Second Chance Girls school, 9 November 2012

¹⁹⁷ Interviews with ACORD beneficiaries, 9 November 2012 ; Interview with ACORD, 9 November 2012

¹⁹⁸ Minutes JSC meeting 27 October 2012

¹⁹⁹ Final Peacebuilding Priority Plan Uganda, October 2010

²⁰⁰ Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012 ; Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

²⁰¹ Minutes JSC 28 September 2012

<p>Recommendations, lessons learnt</p>	<p>Although JP2 contributed to addressing some of the conflict drivers and to strengthening social cohesion/community level conflict management capacities, including through psychosocial support, as outlined above, it was not designed as a comprehensive, maximally focused peace building programme. The interventions mostly built on work that was already being done or fell within the mandate of the agencies involved, without making significant adjustments to target better peace building outcomes. Better peace building practice involves two further steps, above and beyond contributing to the addressing of conflict drivers.</p> <p>Firstly, peace building programs <i>need to include a comprehensive focus on strengthening conflict management capacities and peace processes in society</i>. With regard to JP2, this could have incorporated :</p> <p><i>1. A more comprehensive focus the strengthening of conflict management capacities at the community level, through the adjustment of standard GBV, child protection and psychosocial support interventions to extend these to support for broader conflict management capacities at the community level. This would include a more specific focus of community dialogues on conflict resolution.</i></p> <p>JP2 included a good example of such an approach through the work of ACORD. ACORD used its Community Social Peace and Recovery model, developed through work in Burundi and West Africa, in Kitgum and Lambwo with PBF funds from UNFPA. ACORD chose 4 sub-countries where land conflict and GBV prevalence were high, in consultation with local government. Contact was then made through local government mechanisms. Through a series of community dialogue meetings, consensus was built on the main “peace threats” in the community. Existing community peace committees and other community members received additional training in peace building and GBV, including in the use of drama in GBV prevention. Some psychosocial support was also provided. Meanwhile the community drew up a social contract with pledges related to what they considered peace building priorities. Next, a small scale micro project was introduced that brought conflicting communities together, e.g. the clearing of a road between two communities in land dispute, and the refurbishment of the roof of a school building located near a disputed land boundary between two communities. In the first instance, the community reported a reduction in the violence associated with the conflict. In the second case, the land boundary dispute has been resolved and the community can now progress to the building of teachers’ huts to increase the capacity of the school.²⁰²</p> <p><i>2. A more specific focus on the empowerment of women specifically as actors in peace relevant sectors and functions (contributing to PMP indicator 2.4 Empowerment for Women : # of PBF supported sector programmes with evidence of women formally assuming leadership / responsibilities in peace relevant sectors and functions)</i></p> <p>Although the programme’s theory of change linked its interventions to the strengthening of women’s participation in peace building, this link was not followed up through interventions more explicitly targeted towards this outcome.</p> <p>A second and crucial step towards better peace building outcomes involves the incorporation of Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity principles into programming. In conflict affected and fragile contexts, it is crucial that interventions are based on an in-depth analysis of risks, not just in terms of potentially negative consequences of the context for the programme, but also vice versa to ensue that negative impacts of programming on the context are minimized. In this respect, DNH involves a focus on HOW interventions are implemented as much as WHAT they aim to achieve. Throughout the PBF programmes, understanding of Do No Harm principles was generally weak, and they were not systematically incorporated into design or monitoring. However, there is some evidence of conflict sensitive programming. With regards to interventions that aim to focus on women, an important consideration is to ensure that such a focus does not contribute to the disempowerment of men. Several IPs showed an understanding of this dynamic and had incorporated it into their programming.²⁰³</p>
--	---

²⁰² « Good Practice in ACORD Uganda Area Program, Kitgum Field Office », 12 September 2012 ; Interviews with ACORD beneficiaries, 9 November 2012 ; Interview with ACORD, 9 November 2012

²⁰³ « Good practice in Food for the Hungry GBV Prevention », 13 September 2012. Interview with ARC CBO, 6 November 2012

Annex C: JP3 Programme assessment sheet

Project Title: Livelihoods and Local Economic Recovery²⁰⁴		
Project Number: 00076967		
UN Agency: UNDP, UNCDF, WFP, FAO, IOM	Priority Area (PMP strategic result): Results areas: see below	
National counterpart : Acholi Private Sector Development Company ; Action Contre Faim International ; Agency for Technical Cooperation and development ; Association of Micro Finance Institutions of Uganda ; CESVI ; District local governments ; Enterprise Uganda ; Gulu University ; International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) ; Ministry of Local Government ; Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry		
Project Number	76967	
Project Title	Livelihoods and Local Economic Recovery	
Project Scope	Acholiland	
Project Budget	UNDP: 990,000 (PBF) UNCDF: 760,000 (PBF) WFP: 1,200,000 (PBF) FAO: 1,550,000 (PBF) IOM: (500,000) (PBF)	
Execution rate at 20/11/12	Final updates to funds disbursement rates had not yet been logged at the time of the evaluation. Financial closure for the programme is 31 December 2012. Funds disbursement rates up to 30 September (operational programme closure) were: UNDP: 92% UNCDF: 100% WFP: 87% FAO: 89% IOM: 100%	
Duration	Months foreseen: 18 months	Actual: 21 months
Date approved by SC : 04 November 2010	Start Date : 1 January 2011	End Date : 30 September 2011 for operational closure; 31 December for financial closure
Project Description : Focusing on Acholiland, this programme has supported the revitalisation of agriculture based economic activity		
<p>Overall goals and expected outcomes: Overall objective (UNPRAP Outcome 4): Rural communities in the north have improved gender responsive sustainable livelihoods, diversified economic opportunities and basic social protection. Expected outcomes: The overall outcome for JP3 was (UNPRAP) Program outcome 4.3: Livelihoods of rural households diversified. Key Outputs: The original Prodoc had 7 outputs. This was later adjusted to 13 outputs in the revised RBM. Key outputs can be summarized as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Value addition skills training for youth, women and men (UNDP) 2. Capacity development of microfinance institutions (UNDP) 3. Cross border trade assessment and trade promotion strategy (UNDP) 4. Institutionalisation of Local Economic Development strategies and practices (UNCDF) 5. Enhanced agricultural knowledge, skills, crop production levels, saving skills, entrepreneurial skills and market access for 232 new Farmer Field Schools (FAO) 6. Cassava value addition and market analysis, access and linkage developed (WFP) 7. Support to reintegration of female IDP/returnee/ex-combatant – headed households (IOM) agricultural knowledge, skills, crop production levels, saving skills, entrepreneurial skills and market access 		

²⁰⁴ This assessment has relied on the JP3 end-of-programme report as of 20 November 2012 for the majority of information related to reported results

Pg 2 Project Evaluation Sheet		
<p>Global Assessment:</p>	<p>Overall outcome achievements (with reference to PMP indicators and planning targets)</p>	<p>The JP3 programme focused on the recovery of livelihoods, with a focus on agriculture. Many of the interventions built on existing programs of the separate implementing agencies.²⁰⁵</p> <p>Although in a broader sense, inclusive economic growth is an important contributing factor to post-conflict stability, poverty is not a direct driver of conflict.²⁰⁶ The focus of the programme on livelihoods in and of itself may have contributed to providing some peace dividends, but this is not the same as contributing substantially to peace building outcomes. The programme was not designed to leverage these outputs to contribute to enabling youth, women and other marginalized groups to act as catalysts to prompt further peace building (see PMP results area 3 below). Although the Prodoc makes reference to the potential role of unemployed and frustrated youth as drivers of conflict, the programme design has not incorporated a specific focus on youth, nor has the RBM set targets related to number of youth reached through interventions. Nevertheless, the programme did include youth amongst the beneficiaries of livelihood recovery interventions²⁰⁷ and therefore can be said to have made a contribution to addressing this conflict driver. The programme also included a focus on support to the reintegration of female-headed households. However, the sustainability of many of the livelihood interventions is questionable, mostly due to the short timeframe of the programme (see section on sustainability below). Furthermore, livelihood support, in particular where it includes the provision of free resources, involves risks in terms of Do No Harm. The program did not mitigate against these risks in a comprehensive manner (see more on Do No Harm in the section on recommendations below)</p> <p>Therefore, the contribution of JP3 to this results area can be said to be <u>weak</u>²⁰⁸:</p> <p>Results area 3 : <i>Youth, women and other marginalized members of conflict affected communities act as a catalyst to prompt the peace process and early economic recovery</i> ,</p> <p>indicator 3.2 : <i>Sustainable livelihood : # PBF supported sector programmes generating sustainable livelihood opportunities to IDP, refugees, victims of war and others in need in conflict affected communities.</i></p>
	<p>Positive Results</p>	<p>Incorporated in the sections on outcome achievements and effectiveness</p>
	<p>Negative Results</p>	<p>None</p>

²⁰⁵ JP3 Prodoc.

²⁰⁶ The JP3 Prodoc also notes that « While the current weak economy and youth in Acholi are not immediate drivers of conflict, they would contribute to rapid escalation of conflict if other factors contribute. (...) the poor economic condition of the North and high youth unemployment constitute « kindling » for conflict and should be addressed. »

²⁰⁷ For example, FAO reported that one of the reasons they had decided to work with new FFS, was the fact that this way, they could focus better on youth and ex-combatants. Their aim was to target 50% youth. However, the 4 FFS present at the focus group discussion reported numbers of youth as (out of 30) 8, 10, 12 and 15. Interviews with FAO and FFS beneficiaries, 9 November 2012. A JMV in August 2011 also noted few youths in FFS.

²⁰⁸ It is worth emphasizing that the assessment of JP3 contribution to peace building as weak does not mean that its separate interventions, e.g. the Farmer Field Schools, LED processes, business and entrepreneurship skills trainings and peer support groups of female headed households have not achieved some good results in terms of livelihoods diversification. However, the focus of this evaluation is on how such livelihoods diversification has contributed to peace building.

Relevance	Relevance in terms of PP, national priorities and underlying conflict dynamics (theory of change?)	JP3 was designed to be directly aligned to the United Nations Peace building and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP) outcome 4: Rural communities in the north have improved gender responsive sustainable livelihoods, diversified economic opportunities and basic social protection, with its outcome stated as UNPRAP programme outcome 4.3: Livelihoods or rural households diversified. This outcome is in turn aligned to PRDP strategic objective 2 on rebuilding and empowering communities. The theory of change informing the programme design is articulated most clearly in the project justification section of the Prodoc : « providing immediate economic opportunities to rural households, youth and particular women and girls, boosting agricultural productivity and strengthening livelihoods diversification, and promoting market linkages/trade, will ensure that idleness, post-harvest losses etc. and associated frustration does not lead to social disintegration, violence ». However, as noted above in the section on overall outcome achievements, a focus on livelihoods may have contributed to providing some peace dividends, but this is not the same as contributing substantially to peace building outcomes. The provision of peace dividends will not in and out of itself ensure a prevention of social disintegration or conflict, without further, more specific peace building targeted focus in interventions.
	PBF responding to an urgent financial and/or PB gap ?	JP3 responded to a funding gap in the UNPRAP and in the PRPD. ²⁰⁹ As noted above, the contribution of JP3 to peace building gaps was assessed to be weak.
Effectiveness	Attainment of -peace relevant outcomes ? -cost effectiveness?	<p>The main results of the interventions under JP3 are as follows²¹⁰ : Value addition training was provided in 7 districts, with some evidence of good results in terms of small business start ups at the community level.²¹¹ The capacity of microfinance institutions was assessed and some initial support provided to capacity development. A cross border trade assessment was conducted along with the development of a trade promotion strategy. Local Economic Development (LED) strategies were developed through consultative processes with local level government. Although LED strategies normally involve the establishment of public-private partnership, this did not eventuate in most of Acholiland due to the weakness of the private sector.²¹² Although the manual for the development of LED strategies incorporated a section on peace building, this was focused on an overview of overly academic concepts related to peace building and conflict resolution, without a clear indication of how these were to be integrated into the strategies.²¹³ 232 new Farmer Field Schools were established and supported in agricultural knowledge, skills, crop production levels, saving skills, entrepreneurial skills and market access. Fourteen farmer processor groups were assisted with equipment, and trainings were provided on cassava-based baking products, the production of High Quality Cassava Flour and on village savings methods. Further trainings supported 8750 farmers to use satellite collection points to sell their produce. 46 peer support groups made up of 820 female household heads received reintegration case management assistance, capacity-building in sustainable agriculture and integrated animal management focusing on seed multiplication, animal management and animal traction. There is no doubt that these interventions have led to some good results in terms of livelihoods recovery. But because JP3 was not designed to provide a more specific focus on peace building outcomes (either in terms of focusing on youth, or in terms of contributing to social cohesion/conflict management capacities) it is not possible to assess achievements in these more peace building related areas against planned targets.</p> <p>Comments related to cost effectiveness of separate projects can be found in the economy section below. With regards to overall cost effectiveness, questions can be raised as to the effectiveness of the overall implementation of JP3. Although the programme was designed as one, it was implemented by each agency separately. For the most part, each agency worked with its own counterparts and IPs to implement its own activities. From a programme-wide viewpoint, questions can be asked regarding the cost effectiveness of</p>

²⁰⁹ JP3 Prodoc

²¹⁰ Due to some reporting weaknesses (see section on reporting below), it is difficult to ascertain for some interventions whether and to what extent quantitative targets have been achieved.

²¹¹ JP3 end-of-programme report; interviews with beneficiaries, 6 November 2012

²¹² Interview with Ministry of Local Government, 7 November 2012. There were some exception, for example in Nwoya, where Delight Uganda invested in supporting fruit processing (JP3 JMV 25 August 2011)

²¹³ Ministry of Local Government (2011) Training Manual for Peacebuilding, Conflict resolution and Local Economic Development

		this approach.
Efficiency	Project management performance	<p>Design</p> <p>After the Prodoc was written and signed off by the JSC in October 2010, the more detailed design of interventions took a number of months and resulted in delays for some parts of the programme. The original Prodoc lists Implementing Partners as to be decided. Despite good attempts at finding synergies between the different programme components once implementation had started, the programme was essentially not designed to be jointly implemented, which hampered synergies.²¹⁴ Changes were made to the original RBM by adding more detailed outputs. It is not clear whether these changes were approved by the JSC.</p> <p>Implementation</p> <p>Some further delays were caused by a lack of capacity of some IPs²¹⁵, and the time required to develop and approve farmer group business plans.²¹⁶ Discussions with the Ministry of Finance as a potential partner lasted a few months, after which it was decided to implement through Enterprise Uganda instead.²¹⁷ WFP transferred 100,000 USD to PBF P4 when its expenditure was delayed in 2012. Despite these challenges, agencies and their IPs were able to implement most of their planned activities. However, many noted the short timeframe for the planned interventions, making it difficult to link the various outputs/agency project results to the outcomes aimed for.²¹⁸</p> <p>Coordination</p> <p>JP3 agencies met regularly. In a March 2011 meeting, agencies discussed their work plans, not all of which were ready at the time. It was noted that some work plans had deviated from the original Prodoc, and that substantive changes would need to be approved by the JSC. It is not clear from JSC minutes whether this took place. One agency (IOM) had already started implementation at this time.²¹⁹ Further regular JP3 coordination meetings discussed implementation updates, planning of Joint Monitoring Visits, and the identification of synergies between the different project components, and ways to strengthen these. In 2012, more attention was paid to implementation progress and the formulation of exit strategies.²²⁰ Overall, agencies made serious attempts to increase the synergies between their interventions with some good, small scale results, but were hampered by systemic constraints (different IPs, different timelines, different geographic focus) in doing so more systematically. Despite good attempts at finding synergies between the different programme components once implementation had started, the programme was essentially not designed to be jointly implemented, which hampered synergies.²²¹ It also lead to some ostensible duplication of efforts e.g. three different interventions (implemented by three different agencies) developed market information systems (WFP's Purchase for Progress; FAO's Farmer Field School marketing networks; and UNCDF's LED strategies).</p> <p>Monitoring</p> <p>Implementing agencies each had their own internal monitoring mechanisms.²²² In addition, joint monitoring visits were organised in August 2011, February 2012 and July 2012. The JMV's resulted in many good ideas related to improvements on synergies and lessons learnt.²²³ However, many of these ideas were then not followed up in subsequent TAP meetings, and agencies faced systemic constraints (different timelines, different geographic focus, different IPs) to the practical enhancement of synergies.</p> <p>Reporting</p> <p>Reporting arrangements to PBSO were facilitated through an electronic system that was</p>

²¹⁴ Interview with FAO, 31 October 2012; interview with UNDP, 31 October 2012, interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012

²¹⁵ Interview with WFP, 7 November 2012

²¹⁶ JP3 End-of-programme report section IV C

²¹⁷ Interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012; Interview with UNDP, 31 October 2012

²¹⁸ WFP Gulu Sub office: Peace building programme – cassava value addition project brief, November 2012; interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012

²¹⁹ Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 28 March 2011

²²⁰ Minutes of JP3 coordination meetings, 11 May 2011, 14 July 2011, 25 August 2011, 2 March 2012, 31 May 2012, 16 July 2012

²²¹ Interview with FAO, 31 October 2012; interview with UNDP, 31 October 2012, interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012, interview with WFP 1 November 2012

²²² JP3 End-of-programme report section IIIC

²²³ Reports of JP3 JMV August 2011, March 2012, July 2012 (also including OHCHR and UNICEF)

		<p>established by the RCO office for all joint programming (also covering joint programs other than the PBF) with funds from the PBF under P4.</p> <p>Although the electronic system has facilitated the tracking of rate of expenditure, the mechanisms for tracking output and outcome related achievements faced challenges. Agencies were asked to put achievement percentages next to the output and outcome indicators when reporting on a quarterly basis. In the end-of-programme report, these are all listed and their achievement percentages added up per indicator. For certain outputs, there are discrepancies between the total achievement rate in terms of percentages when held against the targets set for the indicators.</p> <p>The end-of-programme report lists cumulative percentages under section IV A on “summary of programme progress in relation to planned outcomes and outputs”, instead of a qualitative, narrative overview of how project achievements link to the planned outputs and outcomes. This presents a missed opportunities to clarify the programme logic (and thus Theories of Change) at the end of the programme.²²⁴</p>
Economy	Cost of local services/goods?	<p>The MPTFO requests that implementing agencies provide financial information according to the following categories: supplies, commodities, equipment and transport; personnel (staff consultants and travel); training of counterparts; contracts; other direct costs and indirect support costs. This means it is not possible to assess in detail the value-for-money of procurement of goods and services per activity, output or outcome, as each incorporates the interventions of different agencies. Agencies have not been asked to report financially against outputs or outcomes. Each recipient agency has stated that it has utilised its own internal checks, guidelines and processes to ensure the transparency and accountability of expenditure.²²⁵</p>
Sustainability/national ownership	Capacity to national institutions to sustain project results	<p>Generally, the sustainability of JP3 interventions could have been enhanced due to the fact that to a large extent they were linked to on-going agency programmes. Local level government authorities were involved in project implementation, enhancing the prospects for sustainability of some of the interventions. In April 2012, all JPs were asked to put together exit strategies investigating the sustainability of their activities, outlining which activities would be discontinued/were completed and which ones would be picked up by other programs.²²⁶ However, questions can be asked as to whether the short timeframes of the PBF funding (further shortened due to delays in the design of detailed implementation) were suited to the livelihood recovery activities supported under JP3. For example, the FFS were implemented under the PBF with half the timeframe of FFS implemented under the longer term Agricultural Livelihood Recovery Project (ALREP) for Northern Uganda, funded by the EU.²²⁷ At the time of evaluation, there was no further funding support available to the 232 newly established FFS, although attempts were being made to link the FFS to other support mechanisms.²²⁸ Many other livelihood support activities had only just begun to generate results and were still facing significant challenges, raising questions about their future sustainability.²²⁹</p>
	Catalytic leverage (financial leverage, unblocking political processes?)	<p>The end-of-programme report noted catalytic effects of the value addition skills training, with another donor and a private company taking an interest in supporting this training further in Northern Uganda.²³⁰</p>

²²⁴ Although the end-of-programme report includes a narrative section on summary of qualitative achievements, these are not directly linked to the program RBM.

²²⁵ JP3 End-of-programme report section IIB. The verification of detailed expenditure procedure was beyond the scope of this evaluation with the financial information available, and could be taken up in a subsequent audit of the programme.

²²⁶ JP3 Exit strategies document (including only IOM, UNCDF and UNDP)

²²⁷ Interview with ALREP, 5 November 2012; interview with FAO, 9 November 2012

²²⁸ Interview with FAO, 9 November 2012

²²⁹ Interview with JP3 IPs, 30 October 2012 ; WFP Gulu Sub office: Peace building programme – cassava value addition project brief, November 2012; Reports of JP3 JMV August 2011, March 2012, July 2012; IOM exit strategy brief in the JP3 exit strategies document

²³⁰ JP3 End-of-programme report

Transparency, accountability	Decision making at JSC level	<p>On 27 October 2010, the Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the UN RC and the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister, met for the first time and approved the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (with amendments), and referred the four project documents to the PS for signing.²³¹ According to the process established by the PBSO, there should be time between the approval of the Priority Plan and the submission of projects to the Joint Steering Committee for approval. In the case of Uganda, it seems that the four project documents were ready at the same time as the final priority plan. Implementing agencies were partially selected based on the fact that PBF projects were embedded within agencies' programmes to enable scalability, research and catalytic effects.²³² The JSC did not meet to execute its overview function in 2011. This was partially due to the fact that implementation of the programmes was delayed. The JSC convened again in February 2012 to consider the results of the Mid-Term Review and the delays in programming. It established more detailed expenditure review mechanisms, and in April decided on the no-cost extension of 3 months.²³³ The JSC met for the final time in September 2012 and discussed the closure of the programmes and tentative future plans.²³⁴</p>
	Implementation agencies	
Recommendations, lessons learnt		<p>JP3 was not designed as a comprehensive, focused peace building programme. The interventions mostly built on work that was already being done or planned, without making significant adjustments to target better peace building outcomes. Firstly the conflict driver of youth unemployment/idleness could have been better targeted in the design and implementation of the project. In addition, better peace building practice involves two further steps, above and beyond contributing to peace dividends or conflict drivers.</p> <p>Firstly, peace building programs <i>need to include a comprehensive focus on strengthening conflict management capacities and peace processes in society</i>. With regard to JP3, this could have incorporated a more comprehensive focus the strengthening of social cohesion/conflict management capacities at the community level, through the adjustment of standard livelihood recovery interventions to leverage these to strengthen social cohesion and broader conflict management capacities at the community level. Many of the interventions under JP3 were based on work with small groups of farmers/people. This represented an opportunity to leverage the support targeted towards livelihood recovery for added value in terms of strengthening social cohesion/broader conflict management capacities. The value addition skills training could have incorporated a focus on the sharing of what was learned back in the communities. The strengthening of social cohesion is also related to the provision of psychosocial support. The fragility of beneficiaries in this respect was not always taken into account in the interventions, despite some evidence of it having an impact.²³⁵</p> <p>A second and crucial step towards better peace building outcomes involves the incorporation of Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity principles into programming. In conflict affected and fragile contexts, it is crucial that interventions are based on an in-depth analysis of risks, not just in terms of potentially negative consequences of the context for the programme, but also vice versa to ensure that negative impacts of programming on the context are minimized. In this respect, DNH involves a focus on HOW interventions are implemented as much as on WHAT they aim to achieve. Throughout JP3, understanding of Do No Harm principles was generally weak, and they were not systematically incorporated into design or monitoring. The LED interventions did incorporate some Do No Harm considerations in that lower levels of trust were noted, and an attempt was made to find micro-projects that maintain social harmony.²³⁶ On the other hand, some evidence was found of tension within communities related to the selection of some and exclusion of others in particular where</p>

²³¹ Minutes JSC meeting 27 October 2012

²³² Final Peacebuilding Priority Plan Uganda, October 2010

²³³ Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012 ; Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

²³⁴ Minutes JSC 28 September 2012

²³⁵ Interview with beneficiaries of support to female-headed households, 12 November 2012. One group leader in one of the targeted communities, a former abductee who spent 6 years with the LRA, had succumbed to serious mental illness where she was no longer speaking, even though the project provided access to psychosocial support. See also interviews with WFP, 1 November 2012, and with DFID conflict advisor, 16 November 2012, in which the potential impacts of these issues on livelihoods recovery were acknowledged. See also WFP Gulu sub office peace building programme – cassava value addition project brief, November 2012, which listed this lesson learnt: “Stemming from the group cohesion issues and the need to build harmony in the communities, one lesson learnt is that integrating capacity building in group dynamics improves participation/cohesion and general implementation of the project”.

²³⁶ Interview with Ministry of Local Government, 7 November 2012

²³⁷ Interview with beneficiaries of value addition skills training, 5 November 2012; interview with beneficiaries of Farmer Field Schools, interview with beneficiaries of Farmer Field Schools marketing access network, 12 November 2012

²³⁸ WFP Gulu Sub office: Peacebuilding programme Pader/Agago Purchase for Progress Brief, October 2012.

²³⁹ Interview with CESVI, 12 November 2012

	<p>livelihoods support included the provision of free resources.²³⁷ In one project, the opening up of a road between Agago and Karamojong was listed as supporting peace reconciliation between these areas,²³⁸ whereas it was pointed out by others that the peace building outcome of the road was the fact that it enabled the military's anti-stock theft units better access for military control.²³⁹</p>
--	---

Annex D: Evaluation inception report

UN Peacebuilding Fund programmes in Uganda Final evaluation Inception report (draft 29 October 2012)

Evaluation objectives

The objective of the evaluation is to assess the added value of the PBF within the overall peace building programmes and process in Uganda. The evaluation will cover two levels:

- i. Project/implementation
- ii. Outcomes and contributions to peace building

Special attention will be paid to the following cross-cutting issues:

- i. gender
- ii. youth
- iii. conflict sensitivity (Do No Harm)

Methodology

Evaluation criteria

Two sets of criteria will be used for the evaluation:

1. *Applicable* PBF Performance Management Plan results and indicators
2. OECD/DAC criteria of relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; sustainability of results and catalytic effects; national ownership; transparency and accountability

Sources for data collections (*a more detailed list of documents collected will be drafted and circulated amongst the agency focal points for checking*)

1. Project documentation review
 - Project documentation
 - UNDAF
 - UNPRAP
 - Relevant Government of Uganda documentation
 - UNRCO conflict analyses and peace building strategies
 - Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan

- Project documents
- Annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports (focus on quantitative data)
- Financial reports
- Joint monitoring reports (focus on quantitative data)
- Relevant RUNO monitoring and evaluation reports
- Mid-term evaluation report
- Coordination process documentation
 - Minutes of JC/TAP meetings
 - Minutes of JP coordination meetings
 - Other relevant coordination documentation

2. Secondary data collection (focusing on qualitative data)

- Research commissioned by PBF
- Third party research
- Documentation resulting from the implementation of the PBF projects (local government plans; training manuals, etc.)

3. Primary data collection

- Interviews with recipient agencies
- Interviews with relevant RCO staff
- Interviews with government stakeholders
- Interviews with implementing partners
- Interviews with beneficiaries
- Interviews with non-beneficiary peace building actors

Methods of data collection

Data will be collected according to an investigation matrix ([annex A](#)), derived from the evaluation criteria. Interviews will be semi-structured according to questions derived from the investigation matrix, and will be adjusted for each interview depending on the interviewee(s) and the time available. Interviews will also include focus groups. Data will be triangulated to the extent feasible, including between secondary and primary sources.

The evaluation team will rely on the RUNO staff for the organization of site visits and interviews. The evaluation team will consult with RUNO staff to ensure, as much as is feasible, an independent approach for the evaluation team. The evaluation team, in consultation with RUNO staff, will ensure that women, youth and vulnerable groups are covered as beneficiaries and stakeholders interviewed. The evaluation team will ensure that approaches to interviews with conflict affected people are sensitive to potential trauma. Before commencing interviews, the team will clarify that interviews are anonymous, that notes taken will be held in confidence, and that it is as yet unknown whether or not the evaluation will be made public.

A Program of interviews and project site visits has been drafted and is attached as a separate document in annex B. The program will be modified and updated as a live document as the field work progresses.

Final report outline

The final report will be structured as follows:

- i. Executive summary
- ii. Background
- iii. Assessment of conflict drivers
- iv. Theories of change and expected results
- v. Outcomes as strategic entry points in the peace building process
- vi. Key achievements areas
 - A Relevance and effectiveness
 - B Sustainability and catalytic effects
 - C National ownership
 - D Coordination (country level and PBSO)
 - E Efficiency of project management
- vii. Challenges and lessons learnt
- viii. Recommendations on how to improve programme effectiveness
- ix. Annexes: Project Fact Sheets containing project based assessments

Evaluation parameters (constraints)

- i. Due to time constraints, the evaluation team will not be able to visit all project sites and speak to all implementing partners.
- ii. The reality of community visits may limit the extent to which the evaluation can maintain an independent approach.
- iii. Weather, geographic or security related constraints may limit the number of sites visited/interviews held, including last minute cancellations.
- iv. Due to the limited amount of field visits and interviews possible within the timeframe, data will be triangulated to the extent possible. The evidence underpinning the evaluation will be based on a combination of triangulation and expert assessment.
- v. The review of third party research will be limited by the time available for the evaluation.

Evaluation team division of labour

The Team Leader is responsible for overall data collection and the final report. The national consultant will focus on the assessment of conflict drivers, and on the assessment of results related to youth and gender as cross-cutting issues. The UGA RCO and PBSO are jointly responsible for the initial drafting of the Project Fact Sheets.

Evaluation timeline

Dates	Deliverables
24-25 October 2012	Desk review (home based)
29 Oct - 4 Nov	Inception reported drafted Inception report shared with PBSO and recipient agencies Meetings with agencies, PBF coordination mechanism
5 Nov - 11 Nov	Field work, including travel to Acholi
12 Nov - 17 Nov	Field work Debriefing note and presentation in-country Preliminary debrief (skype) with PBSO
Between 19 Nov - 30 Nov (deadline)	Preparation draft report
6-7 Dec	Finalisation report after feedback received
7 Dec	Final debrief with PBSO NY (via skype)

Annex A (of the inception report): UN PBF UGA Final evaluation inception report

Investigation matrix

Key achievement areas (OECD/DAC criteria)	Investigation questions	Process related PBF PMP criteria	Content related PBF PMP criteria
E. Efficiency of project management	Compliance with PBF rules and regulations	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards	
	Speed of funds approval and transfers	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field	
	Management capacities for planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards - quality of results matrix and M&E design 5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field	
	Efficiency of adjustment following reviews		
	Efficiency and transparency of selection processes		
	Value for money	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field	

Key achievement areas (OECD/DAC criteria)	Investigation questions	Process related PBF PMP criteria	Content related PBF PMP criteria
D. Coordination (country level and PBSO)	Strategic guidance provided by PBSO	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field 6.4: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on level of expertise of PBSO in PB	
	Improved coordination, M&E, enhanced UN coherence, communications and resource mobilization due to M&E support	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field 5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards - quality of results matrix and M&E design	
	Transparency of funding and approval decisions at national level		
	JSC, TAP, JC leads, UNAC roles in strategic decision-making; funding decisions; oversight; monitoring and reporting of results; LL & BP	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field 5.2: PP approved complaint to PBF quality standards	
	Reporting structures between RUNOS and RCO and PBSO	5.3: Timely and cost effective delivery to the field 6.4: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on level of expertise of PBSO in PB	

Key achievement areas (OECD/DAC criteria)	Investigation questions	Process related PBF PMP criteria	Content related PBF PMP criteria
C. National ownership	National ownership in JSC and its roles in strategic decision-making; funding decisions; oversight; monitoring and reporting of results; LL & BP	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness - national ownership	
	Alignment of priorities with broader national strategic frameworks	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards - coherence to national planning frameworks	
	Engagement of relevant national actors with the RUNOs for implementation		
	Reporting structures between RUNOs and RCO and PBSO		
	Results sharing with national stakeholders		
B. Sustainability and catalytic effects	Additional funding commitments from donors or government attributable to PBF Other catalytic effects, unexpected results	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards - catalytic effects/leverage of PBF	
	Sustainability of results including national institutions	Cross-cutting for results 1-4 (see under A. Relevance)	

Key achievement areas (OECD/DAC criteria)	Investigation questions	Process related PBF PMP criteria	Content related PBF PMP criteria
	Choice of national vs. international implementing partners		
A. Relevance and effectiveness	Most significant results achieved and relevance for peace building process	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness	1.1: SSR 1.2: RoL (transitional justice ensuring Human Rights) 1.3: DDR
	Evidence of institutional, behavioural and political changes and perceptions of conflict affected groups		1.4: Implementation of peace processes 2.1: Partnerships for inclusive policy dialogue on conflict, instability and political participation 2.2: Democratic institutions to address HR abuse legacy including corruption
	Impact of achieved results on conflict dynamics	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards - programme design consistent with conflict analysis	2.3: Land dispute resolution mechanisms 4.1: functional local level administrations to assume basic services 4.2: evidence that the delivery of peace dividends of a good quality enhances the credibility and legitimacy of local state representatives
	Political environment effect on project efficiency		
	Responses to gaps (financial and non financial)	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness	
	Value for money	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness	
	Risk taking	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness	

Key achievement areas (OECD/DAC criteria)	Investigation questions	Process related PBF PMP criteria	Content related PBF PMP criteria
	Right moment of intervention	6.1: Perceptions of stakeholders and partners on programme effectiveness	
	Conflict sensitivity (unexpected negative or ambiguous side effects)		
	Contribution to increased UN coherence and synergy	5.2: PP approved compliant to PBF quality standards	
	Gender		2.4: Evidence of women assuming leadership roles in peace relevant sectors
	Youth		3.1: Youth acknowledge job opportunities as peace dividends, increasing trust in state legitimacy 3.2: Sustainable livelihood opportunities addressing supply/demand of labour market 3.3: Youth play an active role in strengthening cohesion between potentially conflicting groups

Annex E: List of documents reviewed

PMP Programming documents

JP1 Programme document
JP2 Programme document
JP3 Programme document

GANTT chart JP1
GANTT chart JP2
GANTT chart JP3
GANTT chart JP4

Minutes stakeholder meeting JP1&2, 5 April 2011

Minutes JSC meeting 14 February 2012
Minutes JSC meeting 2 November 2010
Minutes JSC meeting 28 September 2012

Minutes TAP meeting 9 February 2011
Minutes TAP meeting 5 March 2012
Minutes TAP meeting 14 April 2011

JP1 end-of-programme report
JP2 end-of-programme report
JP3 end-of-programme report
P4 end-of-programme report

Report of JP1&2 JMV March 2012
Report of JP1&2 JMV, December 2011

Report of JP3 JMV August 2011
Report of JP3 JMV March 2012
Report of JP3 JMV July 2012

JP1&2 : Key action points to accelerate implementation of peace building programmes
PBF exit strategies for UNFPA implementing partners
RM Matrix_JP1-OHCHR 170412
JP2 RM matrix (including UNICEF)
JP3 exit strategies document

Joint Monitoring template for UN Joint Programmes in Uganda

Minutes of joint meetings JP1&2, 6 May 2011
Minutes of joint meetings JP1&2, 25 May 2011
Minutes of joint meetings JP1&2, 10 June 2011
Minutes of joint meetings JP1&2, 2 September 2011
Minutes of joint meetings JP1&2, 6 February 2012

Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 28 March 2011
Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 11 May 2011
Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 14 July 2011
Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 25 August 2011
Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 2 March 2012

Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 31 May 2012

Minutes of JP3 coordination meeting, 16 July 2012

OHCHR document « Changes made to the initially approved main activities »

OHCHR document “Budget changes NTF to JSC, 28 September 2012”

OHCHR annual work plan draft 7 November 2011

Note to file from UNFPA and UNICEF

Uganda eligibility decision letter from UN ASG peace building support to UNRC Uganda, 4 June 2010

UNDP (2011-2) Various emails of synergies discussions

UNRCO, PowerPoint on Conflict drivers in Northern Uganda - A focus on Acholiland. PBF retreat Feb 2011

UNRCO, Analysis of Uganda PBF Programmes’ Contribution to the PBF PMP

Correspondence between UN RC and Executive Coordinator MPTFO on no-cost extension, 3 April 2012

Consolidated comments on the draft PPP Uganda, email correspondence between PBSO and UNRC, 26 August 2010

Other references

ACORD (2011) Social Contract for the Advancement of Cohabitation and Peaceful

Annan (2010) The risk of return: Intimate partner violence in Northern Uganda’s armed conflict. *Journal for Social Science & Medicine* 70

Annan, Blatman, Horton (2006) The state of youth and youth protection in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey for War Affected Youth – report for UNICEF

Tim Allen (2010) Bitter roots: the ‘invention’ of Acholi traditional justice. In Allen & Vlassenroot (eds) *The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*

Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (2010) *The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*

Ronald R. Atkinson & Julian Hopwood (2012) Integrating the land conflict monitoring tool with new initiatives on land in Acholi

Coalition for Peace in Africa (2012) Report of the linking policy and practice training held for UN partners in Northern Uganda

Coalition for Peace in Africa (2011) Local capacities for peace training for UNFPA, UNICEF, OHCHR and partners in Northern Uganda

Conciliation Resources (2010) Initiatives to end the violence in Northern Uganda: 2002-09 and the Juba peace process. *Accord*, update issue 11

Conciliation Resources (2012) Regional Civil Society Task Force Meeting, Bangui, CAR, 6 September 2012

Conciliation Resources (2012) *The Voice of Peace*, March-May 2012

Conciliation Resources (2012) *The Voice of Peace*, Feb 2012

Conciliation Resources (2011) ‘When will this end and what will it take?’. People’s perspectives on

addressing the Lord's Resistance Army conflict

CSOPNU (2004) Land matters in displacement. The importance of land rights in Acholiland and what threatens them

Annette Englert & Joseph Okumu (2011) Midterm Review of the UN Peacebuilding Programme in Uganda: Evaluation Report

Government of Uganda (2006) PRDP

Government of Uganda (2012) PRDP2 Grant guidelines for local governments

GOU Amuru District Local Government/UN 5 years LED & peacebuilding strategy (2011)

GOU/Ministry of Local Government (2011) Report on the orientation and planning workshop on LED governance in Amuru district held on 19-11 April

GOU Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP)

GOU Amuru District Local Government/UN 5 years LED & peacebuilding strategy (2011)

Human Rights Focus (2007) Fostering the transition in Acholiland: From War to Peace, from Camps to Home

Human Rights Focus/United Nations Peacebuilding Program (2012) Land conflict monitoring and mapping tool for the Acholi sub-region

ICTJ Uganda (2012) Reparations for Northern Uganda. Briefing, September 2012

ICTJ Uganda (2012) Confronting the past: Truth telling and reconciliation in Uganda, September 2012

ICTJ JRP (2011) We can't be sure who killed us: Memory and Memorialization in Post-conflict Northern Uganda

International Crisis Group (2012) Uganda: No resolution to growing tensions. Africa report 187

International Crisis Group (2010) LRA: A regional strategy beyond killing Kony. Africa report 157

International Crisis Group (2011) The Lord's Resistance Army: End Game? Africa report 182

Justice & Reconciliation Project (2012) Mucwini Mediation annual report

Justice & Reconciliation Project (2012) Project Proposal for stakeholder intervention to support the Mucwini mediation process

KICWA (2012) Final report to UNICEF

Andrew Mwenda (2010) Uganda's politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA rebellion

RLP (2008) Is the PRDP Politics and Usual? Briefing Note No.2

RLP (2009) Breeding Fragmentation? Issues in the policy and practice of decentralisation in Uganda. Issue paper No.1

Refugee Law Project (2004) Behind the violence: causes, consequences and the search for solutions to the war in northern Uganda. Working paper No.11

Refugee Law Project (2012) NM&PDC: Community documentary screening of Kwoyelo trial in Acholi sub-region

Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (2012) Action research on juvenile justice

NRC/United Nations Uganda (2012) Report on drivers, trends and patterns of land conflict in the Acholi sub-region

OHCHR, UNICEF, UNFPA, Human rights, GBV and child protection: A trainers' guide for Uganda Police Force

OHCHR (2012) ADR - mediation. PPP for land conflict mitigation techniques training for Amuru

OHCHR (2012) Land conflict mitigation techniques overview prepared for DRPT in Amuru, 26-7 September 2012

OHCHR (2012) Mediation fact sheet

OHCHR (2012) Nwoya DRPT training programme, October 11-12 2012

OHCHR (2012) Overview of trainings under PBP

(OHCHR 2010) PBF project proposal version 14 February 2010

OHCHR (2012) PPP on concepts of conflict resolution mechanisms and peace building. JLOS institutions workshop for Kitgum and Lamwo districts, 7 May 2012

OHCHR (2012) PPP on peace building and transitional justice, 27 September 2012

OHCHR/UHRC (2012) Uganda: Principles, procedures and tools for investigation and documentation of war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, violations of the laws and customs of war, and human rights violations and abuses

Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Ziliboti (2011) Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda. University of Zurich Department of Economic, Working Paper No.54

UNCDF/MOLG (2012) Amuru honey project

USAID (2007) Land matters in Northern Uganda: Anything grows, anything goes: Post-conflict "conflicts" lie in land

UNICEF (2012) UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme

Uganda Human Rights Commission (2012) Picking up the pieces in Acholi sub-region

Uganda Human Rights Commission and OHCHR (2011) "The dust has not yet settled: Victims' views on the right to remedy and reparation: A report from the greater north of Uganda

UHRC/UN Uganda (2011) Human rights baraza: a handbook on conducting community public meetings

UHRC/OHCHR (2012) Clearing the ground: Housing, Land and Property Rights in post-conflict Northern Uganda

UHRC (2010) Land or else: Land based conflict, vulnerability and disintegration in Northern Uganda

UHRC/UN Uganda (2012) A pocketbook for police on basic human rights standards

UNFPA (2012) Good practice in Food for the Hungry GBV Prevention

UNFPA (2012) Good Practice in ACORD Uganda Area Program, Kitgum Field Office

UNICEF (2012) Report of the validation workshop on action research for juvenile justice in northern Uganda

UNICEF (2012) Diverting juvenile cases: a challenge in Acholi districts. Research and evaluation summary

UNICEF (2012) Review meeting: diversion of children in conflict with the law. Organized by Northern Police Commander, 24 September 2012

UNICEF Uganda PCA Quarterly Review of GUSCO, 8 August 2012

UNICEF (2005) Report on the situation of children and women in the Republic of Uganda

Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, October 2010

UN Uganda (2012) Report on Drivers, Trends and Patterns of Land Conflict in the Acholi sub-region

UN Uganda (2012) Mental health and peace building in Acholiland

United Nations Uganda (2011) Identification of good practices in land conflict resolution in Acholi

United Nations Uganda (2012) Policing Post-conflict Acholi sub-region: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities.

United Nations Uganda (2009) UN Peacebuilding and Recovery Assistance Programme for Northern Uganda 2009-2011 (UNPRAP)

United Nations Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Northern Uganda (UNPRAP)

United Nations Uganda (2011) Mental Health and Peacebuilding in Acholiland

United Nations Uganda (2012) UNJPIII End of Programme narrative report summary

UNPBF, Application guidelines for the UN PBF, UN Peacebuilding Fund website

UNPBF, UN PBF ToR and Rules of Procedure for the PBF JSC (template)

UNICEF (2012) Uganda conflict analysis: UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme

Uganda Peacebuilding Priority Plan, final October 2010

UNDAF 2010-2014

World Bank (2008) Northern Uganda Land Study

WFP Gulu Sub office (2012) Peacebuilding programme Pader/Agago Purchase for Progress Brief

WFP Gulu Sub office (2012) Peace building programme – cassava value addition project brief

Annex F: List of interviews

Date	Interview/Focus Group Discussion
29 October 2012	RCO initial debrief
	PBF focal points
	UNICEF
30 October	JP1&JP2 IPs
	JP3 IPs
	RC
31 October	UNDP
	UNCDF
	Uganda Police Force
	FGD UN Heads of Agencies
	FAO
1 November	OPM
	WFP
	OHCHR
	former RCO
2 November	JP1 agency staff Gulu JP122
	JP IPs
	UHRC
	JP2 agency staff and IPs
	JP 3 agency staff and IPs JP32
	JP3 IPs
	P4 IPs (RA2)
3 November	RLP (SO3)
5 November	RCO
	TA District Chairman Gulu
	NRC

Date	Interview/Focus Group Discussion
	ALREP
	OPM
6 November	UNDP, UNFPA. UNICEF debrief
	BFs value addition skills training (Odek sub county)
	BFs ARC
	UNICEF
	BFs youth centre (Gulu district)
	Enterprise Uganda
	RCO
7 November	Local government LED (Pabbo)
	BFs LED beekeepers association (Pabbo)
	WFP
	BFs cassava value addition
8 November	OHCHR
	Justice & Reconciliation Project
	BFs Mucwini massacre mediation support
	AYNET
	LC5 Kitgum
	RLP
9 November	UNFPA & ACORD
	BFs ACORD
	FAO
	BFs Farmer Field Schools (Rackoko dub county)
	Pader Girls Academy & CCF
10 November	WFP
	BFs Purchase for Progress (Paimol)
	WFP P4P IP

Date	Interview/Focus Group Discussion
	OHCHR/UHRC
	Mediation team Patong (BFs OHCHR/UHRC)
	UHRC
	IOM
	BFs female headed households support (Agago)
13 November	JP1&2 agency staff
	JP3 agency staff
	UNAC & RCO
	Resident State Attorney, Gulu
14 November	UNFPA
	UNDP CO
15 November	UNDP
	OHCHR
	UNICEF
	JLOS
	DFID
16 November	Debriefing of field work - preliminary observations
	USAID
	Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development

Annex G: Comments of PBF recipient UN agencies on the draft final evaluation report

CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS ON THE PBP FINAL EVALUATION DRAFT REPORT

UNFPA Comments

UNFPA appreciates very much the detailed analysis and assessment of the PBP project and consolidation of the findings of the four JPs into one report with annexes of four detailed assessment reports for each of the JPs. The inclusion of the Do NO Harm principle in the evaluation helps in institutionalizing of peace building in programming in conflict and post conflict contexts.

UNFPA wishes to submit comments, some of which are clarifications for considerations by the evaluation team.

Page 10 (and many other instances):

"... the tensions between the GOU and Northern Uganda continue to simmer.¹⁶"

UNFPA notes the citation which gives insight to the development context in Northern Uganda. While there is unquestionably a regional and development divide between the Central and Northern Uganda that is both historic and political, the references made to tensions between Government of Uganda and Northern Uganda are misleading because not only has the context changed dramatically through Peace Building Program (PBP) and other development interventions in Northern Uganda, but it also discounts district local government and regional representation in central government. The issue is related to tensions over decentralization and regionalism that still dominate perceptions and power dynamics between central government and Northern Uganda, and inherent accountability issues.

Page 16 (and other instances):

"With regards to GBV work, an important consideration is to ensure that GBV interventions focusing on women do not contribute to the (further) disempowerment of men."

Particularly when addressing critical protection needs of vulnerable, conflict-affected populations, do-no-harm principles are of critical importance. However, no justification and or example have been presented to explain the contention that GBV interventions can "disempower men." It is true that poorly communicated messages on women's rights can be ineffective and even harmful in challenging male dominance, often creating a backlash. However, this does not equate to "disempowering men." Furthermore, the harm that it does is to women and not men. UNFPA's work on GBV through PBP engaged men as partners, promoting women's rights alongside other human rights, encouraging healthy family and relationship models, and advocating for non-violence are key GBV prevention interventions. The PBD interventions on engaging men as part of GBV prevention focus on do-no-harm principles in peace-building. The issue of (further) disempowerment of men does not arise in the course of PBP interventions in Northern Uganda.

Page 19 paragraph 3 on inefficiencies with regard to community dialogues:

"... Agencies also noted such inefficiencies, for example with regard to community dialogue work, where each agency contracted different IPs to include community dialogue on a different topic, resulting in many IPs covering a certain area, while leaving out other areas.⁵⁵"

The evaluation report cites the Joint Monitoring Visit (JMV) report stating that dialogues were concentrated in certain areas whilst leaving out others. The said monitoring visit only observed 3 community dialogue activities in different sub-counties and the JMV report did not state that community dialogues were concentrated in one area only.

While UNFPA agrees that concentration of IPs in one area at the expense of other areas potentially creates duplications and inefficiencies, the focus of the community dialogues depended on the challenges that the sub-counties faced. This is alluded to in the evaluation report, page 12, under JP2 paragraph 3

"...JP2 included a good community-based example of such a comprehensive approach at community level.... Through a series of community dialogue meetings, consensus was built on the main "peace threats" in the community."

16.4 Changes in approved programme RBM should be discussed and approved expeditiously and during implementation.

Page 29, last sentence in the first paragraph that states

"... Although UNFPA attributed an increase in efficiency due to its consortium model of implementation, IPs reported that they had been notified late of this set-up, and that the roles and responsibilities were not sufficiently clarified in letters of agreement. IPs were notified late of the approval of the project time frame extension."

While the opinions of IPs are noted, this notwithstanding, it would important for such opinions to be verified on the ground and triangulated with relevant documents for more informed conclusions. A no-cost project extension approval written communication was received from the RCO's office at the beginning of May and the Lead Implementing Agencies were informed of the no cost extension by email (formal letter sent after e-mail communication) and requested to inform their sub-contractees on May 9th 2012. Sub-contractees and Lead Agencies shared no-cost extension work plan with UNFPA by June 30th 2012, an indication that they received the communications immediately it was shared. It should be noted that process for no-cost extension negotiation was participatory with rationale for the no cost extension adduced in April 2012 to inform the approval process.

The consortium formulation process was a consensus agreement for UNFPA, IP management and partners. Such arrangements and the way of working are not detailed in and LOU/ MOU. There were consultations with all partners at the startup of the programme in 2010. The detailed roles and responsibilities is part of a bigger monitoring and evaluation framework that informs program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The roles and responsibilities are regularly reviewed during the quarterly and annual review meetings that UNFPA holds with its implementing partners and contractees.

The comment on roles and responsibilities could have arisen out of staff turnover, transition management and institutional memory related challenges. For example, in one of the PBP IPs, between 2010 and 2012, it had changed senior management three times! UNFPA continuously oriented the new IP management team on their specific roles.

Page 29 Monitoring:

"... However, many of these ideas were then not followed up in TAP meetings, and agencies faced systemic constraints (different timelines, different geographic focus, different IPs) to the practical

enhancement of synergies.”

Page 29, paragraph on monitoring, while it is stated in the report that ideas deriving from Joint Monitoring Visits were not followed up in the subsequent TAP meetings; UNFPA did follow up on specific recommendations with the IPs. For instance, in the second Joint Monitoring Visit for JP 1 and 2 the team recommended that UWONET simplify the tool for monitoring implementation CEDAW recommendations on GBV. UWONET did simplify the tool. The same applies to the activity on gender budgeting, in the second training workshop on gender budgeting, a session was included to build capacity of the participants from both JP1 & JP 2 on how to review a local government budget framework paper to ensure a gender perspective was taken into account.

ANNEX A JP1 Programme Assessment Sheet

Page 33, paragraph 2, National Counterpart:

The listed national counterparts did not include Refugee Law Project and UWONET yet they implemented JP1. This needs to be corrected for the list to be complete.

Project end date for JP1 (stated the same for JP2 and JP 3) programme assessment sheets is stated as 30 **September 2011** instead of **30 September 2012** for operational closure. This needs to be corrected for accurate representation of the project period.

ANNEX B JP2 Programme Assessment Sheet

Page 41 Paragraph 2, National Counterpart

The following national counterparts ACORD, Food for the Hungry, Victim’s Voice (VIVO) and iCON were not mentioned yet they implemented JP2 and their contributions included in the reports. These national counterparts need to be included for the report to be complete. While UWONET is reported as JP2 IP yet it is a JP1 national counterpart.

Page 45: Paragraph 2 on Coordination:

“... and in October 2012, the agencies decided to split indicators that had been originally joined.” Ref to Note to File, 18th October 2012.

The Note to File clearly articulates that the changes were made earlier after project documents were signed. This is not unusual in RBM efforts to improve measurement of results, project attribution and precision as contextual realities emerge. The project data entered into EMIS already had the compound indicators broken down. The Note to File of October 18th 2012 was documentation for retroactive approval for changes made earlier in the course of project implementation. The evaluation report also alludes to these changes repeated in the report on page 27, paragraph 2 & on page 37, last paragraph below:

Coordination Page 37:

“... During 2012, the meetings included cooperative planning of joint activities, information sharing and the need for an M&E plan including adjustments to the RBM^{108 & 141}”.

This statement acknowledged changes made in JP coordination meetings in 2011, and the note to file of October 18th is documentation for retroactive approval. The note to file of October 18th is not a decision point, but a documentation of decisions made earlier in 2011 that guided program implementation.

Page 38: Paragraph 5:

"... There are additional irregularities in reporting. For example, the work done by UWONET on the prioritization of GBV in the law and justice sector through a focus on CEDAW recommendations, is listed in various sections of the end of programme, but is not included in the final RBM at the end of the report..."

While concerns on EMIS reporting format not addressing higher level results is acknowledged, presenting it as "additional irregularities" creates impression of inconsistencies and departures from agreements. The term "irregularities" should be removed and replaced with appropriate word with accurate representation of the evaluation finding. Otherwise the quoted text admits that work was done and reported against in the various sections of the end of programme report.

Page 46: Sustainability/ National ownership, capacity to national institutions to sustain project results:

"UNFPA likewise made plans to integrate further support under a different Joint Programme on GBV and by shifting some activities to UNWomen."

The comment is noted, though noted as having inconsistencies. There was no shifting of activities. There was internal agreement within the context of UN Division of Labour that certain activities would be led by UNWomen. The exit strategies indicated that CEDAW activities fall within UNWomen mandate and recommended that UNWomen takes this forward.

UNICEF Comments

Page 39, in the table, under transparency , accountability column, row Implementation agencies it is mentioned that "OHCHR relinquished 43,000 USD of unspent funds to UNICEF for its initiative related to diversion"²² Though the issue has been discussed in the TAP at the beginning of 2012, this did not push through because OHCHR decided that they could (and did) spend all the money when the request for no-cost extension was approved by PBSO.

Comments by JP3 Agencies -UNCDF, IOM, UNDP, and FAO

General Comments:

- iii. The evaluation lacks a deeper analysis of actual JP3 results achieved; rather it focuses only on the linkages between livelihoods and peace building. In addition, the evaluation did not consider the achievements in the areas of FFS, business and entrepreneurship skills trainings impact, LED processes and catalytic projects initiated, or peer support groups comprised of female headed households. (This is probably because the report was mostly based on a process monitoring report (footnote 203, pg 48) rather than on discussions with beneficiaries in the field.);
- iv. Perhaps deeper knowledge of livelihoods was needed in order to conduct the evaluation of the Peace Building Programme;
- x. It's not clear whether the evaluators examined for example the FFS, LED forums as participatory methodologies which specifically address the peace building needs especially conflict management, social cohesion and "Do no harm" (self-selection of FFS beneficiaries vis-à-vis deliberate targeting/*positive discrimination* for certain groups e.g. women and youths. The targeted youth were mostly those that are idle, the roles of beneficiaries of JP3 now compared to what they were before the Peace building programmes etc.

Specific comments;

- vi. Page 10: The understanding of the conflict drivers by the consultant deferred slightly from original programme inception. For example, mental health and GBV were not considered as major conflict drivers originally. The conflict drivers that were considered during programme design were land, youth unemployment, weak economic recovery with wealth disparity/inequality, land tenure and wrangles, oil and other natural resources as well as regional concerns of LRA/South Sudan or DRC spill over. (The conflict drivers could have changed over the course of the program – as the effects of time and program interventions altered the situation);
- Page 13, 2nd paragraph and footnote 31. : The JP3 team is of the opinion that the evaluators did not contextualize the link between peace building, conflict resolution and poverty/economic recovery. The PRDP is the GoU framework for addressing conflict and fostering peace efforts and this has to be recognized clearly. Furthermore the weak economic recovery, wealth disparity and youth unemployment were identified at the beginning of the programme to which JP3 livelihoods and economic recovery component hinges on. This guided the interventions in JP3 (Reference - presentation made in Chobe and inception meeting of PBP, February 2011);
 - Executive Summary, page 4. More analysis and clarity is needed on how the evaluators concluded that women and youth beneficiaries were not catalysts in peace building;
 - Page 51 and 52. The statement *“UNDP discussions with the Ministry of Finance took more than a year, after which it was, clear this would not work and UNDP decided on implementation through Enterprise Uganda instead”* does not appear to be true. UNDP had discussions with “Ministry of Trade” for their possibility of being an implementing partner and not “Ministry of Finance”. The discussions were held between March 2011 and May 2011 (3 months) and not over a year as stated in the draft evaluation report. By June 2011, Enterprise Uganda was then selected and engaged as the UNDP IP for JP3. Implementation commenced right away. (Reference is made to LOA between UNDP and Enterprise Uganda, dated 9th June 2011).
 - The way recommendation 3.2 is written makes it seem like livelihood/economic recovery was not articulated properly to peace building outcomes. JP3 believes peace building outcomes were integrated into the livelihood component. For example, FFS integrates conflict management approach (e.g. group cohesion) and the “do no harm principle” (e.g. self-selection of members).
 - Page 13. The following paragraph (46 peer support groups made up of female household heads received reintegration case management assistance, including capacity building in seed multiplication and animal traction (all proceeding in JP3). Should read as follows:
“46 peer support groups made up of 820 female headed household heads received reintegration case management assistance, including capacity-building in sustainable agriculture and integrated animal management focusing on seed multiplication, animal management and animal traction (all proceeding in JP3).”
 - Page 5. JP3 believes that there was indeed peace building expertise during the design of the programme. It is not clear whether the evaluator assessed, in detail, the profiles of the team members who designed the programme). If this factor was assessed, perhaps a footnote would be useful.

Comments by JP3 Agency – WFP

The overall finding of a 'weak' contribution by JP3 to peace-building is noted. I don't though take this to mean that we did not implement quality or worthwhile livelihood interventions (I believe that we did). Rather, I understand that the evaluators feel that 'livelihoods' generally do not necessarily improve peace outcomes. A livelihoods programme could support peace outcomes when, for example, it takes steps to ensure that support to some people contributes to social cohesion in their broader communities. So the way I understand the evaluation finding is that improved livelihoods may equate to a 'peace dividend', but that this is not necessarily the same thing as a durable 'peace outcome'. I also understand that the evaluators question whether economic growth reduces conflict drivers (there is a statement that economic growth contributes to post-conflict stability but that poverty is not a direct driver of conflict). While I understand these arguments and think they are interesting, I find them a bit philosophical in the context of a single-country evaluation. If the link between economic opportunities and peace in a chronically marginalized and high-poverty area is questioned, then this goes beyond the JP3 and becomes a criticism of the UNPRAP and indeed the PRDP. It also becomes an argument for greater specificity in the concept of 'peacebuilding' itself.

The above view also seems to have pre-empted a more detailed consideration of whether and to what extent the JP3 livelihoods activities succeeded in providing increased economic opportunities, increased agricultural productivity and promoted more diversified livelihoods (as per the JP3 theory of change). I would have preferred to see more attention given to whether JP3 agencies succeeded in doing these things, and perhaps provided some additional recommendations on how, more specifically, livelihoods programmes can contribute to social cohesion and conflict management. It is not clear to me how the livelihoods activities really could or should have been 'leveraged' for added value/greater impact in these areas.

The evaluation findings on the limits of harmonized planning and synergies in the JP3 are fair. I agree with the finding that, for the PBP to have been genuinely coherent, the programmes would have needed to have been planned that way from the design phase.