Evaluation of the Liberian Peacebuilding Office (PBO)

DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT

Prepared by: Carlos Carravilla
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>ADR</td>
<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
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<td>AfT</td>
<td>Agenda for Transformation</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
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<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Working Plan</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>BCR</td>
<td>Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>BIN</td>
<td>Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Collaborative Learning Projects</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>County Peace Committee</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Constitutional Review Committee</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DOCO</td>
<td>UN Development Operations Coordination Office</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFE</td>
<td>Equity Focused Evaluation</td>
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<td>EWER</td>
<td>Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<td>EWWG</td>
<td>Early Warning and Early Response Working Group</td>
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<td>G0L</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>HRBA</td>
<td>Human rights-based approach to programming</td>
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<td>HRPS</td>
<td>UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<td>IJR</td>
<td>South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>INCHR</td>
<td>Independent National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>IOA</td>
<td>Indicator of Achievement</td>
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<td>J&amp;S</td>
<td>Justice and Security</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Steering Committee</td>
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<td>JSJP</td>
<td>Justice and Security Joint Programme</td>
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<td>JSTAG</td>
<td>Justice and Security Technical Advisory Group</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Land Coordination Center</td>
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<td>LDA</td>
<td>Liberia Development Alliance</td>
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<td>LERN</td>
<td>Liberia Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<td>LISGIS</td>
<td>Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services</td>
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<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberia National Police</td>
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<td>LNP/PSU</td>
<td>Liberia National Police/Police Support Unit</td>
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<td>LPI</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Initiative</td>
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<td>LPP</td>
<td>Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan</td>
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<td>LRC</td>
<td>Law Reform Commission</td>
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<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
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<td>MDTFO</td>
<td>Multi Donor Trust Fund Office</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoGD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoGD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender and Development</td>
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<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOM</td>
<td>Minutes of meeting</td>
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<td>MoPEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>MoYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPTF-O</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>NOT</td>
<td>Natural Organizational Theory</td>
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<td>NPRSC</td>
<td>National Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Steering Committee</td>
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<td>OOT</td>
<td>Open Organizational Theory</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Program Management Unit</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Priority Plan</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUNO</td>
<td>Recipient United Nations Organization</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sex and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Statement of Mutual Commitment</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Group</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIL’s HRPS</td>
<td>UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section (HRPS)</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The object of this evaluation is the Liberian Peacebuilding Office. The PBO, based at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Liberia, was established in January 2009 as the Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat in Liberia and the Government’s main office for coordinating key peacebuilding initiatives. The evaluation’s objective is to examine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and sustainability of the PBO’s support on peacebuilding. Its main purpose is to help the PBO and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) identify the best structure and range of support activities to use during the implementation of the current tranche of Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) support.

2. The evaluation assessed to what extent the PBO’s work promotes equity through mainstreaming gender and human rights in the implementation of its support activities as well as during the implementation of activities related to the substantial areas of work in which the PBO is engaged.

3. The evaluation was carried out using a mixed method\(^1\), combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, which is the option that best fits the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the assignment. The evaluator promoted an essentially participatory and inclusive learning process, giving voice to different stakeholders involved in the project.


\(^{1}\) A complete description of the evaluation framework and methodology can be found in Annex 5.

Current PBO accountabilities

5. Accountabilities of the PBO as PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC) Secretariat are: facilitating JSC functioning and oversight; coordinating and supporting Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs) and National Implementing Partners (NIPs) in the design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting of PBF supported projects; and monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.

6. Accountabilities of the PBO as Government of Liberia (GoL) Peacebuilding Office are: maintaining the liaison with Government counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues; implementing a Communication and Outreach Strategy on the Reconciliation Roadmap; training GoL policymakers and technical staff and Civil Society Organization (CSOs); implementing peacebuilding projects; implementing some components of the Early Warning Mechanism; acting as Programme Management Unit for the Reconciliation Programme; contributing to strategic GoL policymaking on peacebuilding; managing GoL partnership with the PBC; and supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding.

Summary of main achievements of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO) since its inception

7. The PBO has been a key player in peacebuilding in Liberia since 2008, thus it is worth presenting a brief summary of its main achievements from 2008 to the present:

8. Contribution to the consolidation of the Peacebuilding Fund support to Liberia: once the UN Secretary-General declared Liberia eligible to receive funding from the Peacebuilding Fund in December 2007, the initial Peacebuilding office was able to develop the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan (2008-2011) in collaboration with other peacebuilding stakeholders in Liberia, which facilitated the first Peacebuilding Fund allocation to Liberia in early 2008. Since then,
the Peacebuilding Fund has made two more Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility allocations, in 2011 and 2013.

9. **Contribution to strengthening capabilities on Conflict Sensitivity and conflict prevention, and management of policymakers; Government of Liberia officials and technical staff and Civil Society Organizations:** the PBO, because of its high technical expertise on peacebuilding issues, has been an excellent resource for strengthening the capabilities of policymakers and Government officials on Conflict Sensitivity and conflict prevention and management, which is especially valuable in a context where peacebuilding capabilities are not yet fully developed.

10. **Contribution to policymaking on peacebuilding:** the PBO played a relevant role as adviser to the GoL in the preparation of several relevant policymaking documents such as the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008-2011), the Agenda for Transformation (2012-2017) and the National Visioning Exercise “LIBERIA RISING”. In addition, the PBO led the preparation of the “Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation” (Reconciliation Roadmap) (2013-2030), a milestone in the path to national reconciliation.

**Main conclusions**

11. The PBO works in a very complex context, characterized by the existence of multiple and sometimes conflicting priorities which affects its performance. The workload on most PBO staff members is quite heavy because of the large number of PBO accountabilities and associated tasks. In addition, the PBO interacts with numerous peacebuilding stakeholders with common interests relating to peacebuilding in Liberia, but with different priorities that the PBO needs to manage. The PBO has various reporting lines and satisfying all of them was a challenge on occasions, which led the PBO to situations of conflict of interest that should be avoided.

12. The conflicts of interest analyzed by this evaluation were always managed by the PBO in the same way. The PBO did not share the information exchanged with the PBSO in a complete and transparent manner with relevant stakeholders such as RUNOs, NIPs and JSC members when a MIA priority did not match PBSO’s funding priorities. This shows that the MIA reporting line prevailed over the PBSO and JSC co-Chairs reporting lines. This hindered PBF’s ability to act accountably on its investments and JSC’s ability to make adequate decisions on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 on occasions.

13. The PBO’s functioning has been affected by four sources of inefficiency, namely: the weakness of PBO’s Programme Management function, PBO’s poor communication function,
too centralized decision-making processes, and poorly applied administrative Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

14. The weakness in Programme Management is due to the absence of a Senior Programme Manager at the PBO. A Reconciliation Officer was recruited in August 2013 while the plan had been to recruit a Program Manager. However the MIA prioritized having a Reconciliation Officer within the PBO on the back of strengthening overall Programme Management capabilities. The main consequence of this decision is that different PBF supported projects are not seen by the PBO as being part of the Reconciliation Programme but as individual interventions, which prevents synergies and the ability to avoid overlaps between different projects. In addition, a stronger commitment of RUNOs to the principles of Delivering as One would have helped improve synergies between different PBF supported projects during the design of proposals and would also help improve coordination between projects during the implementation phase.

15. The quantity and complexity of tasks that the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser perform as advisers to the GoL on peacebuilding issues generates an excessive workload. For this reason the executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser have been forced to prioritize some tasks over others. Tasks have been prioritized according to the strength of the various PBO’s reporting lines, where the MIA reporting line has the highest priority. The main effect of this situation is the untimely support to JSC meetings, which has been hindering JSC’s ability to make adequate decisions on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.

16. The prioritization of the MIA reporting line over other reporting lines, such as the PBSO or the JSC co-Chairs, is chiefly explained by two reasons, namely: the majority of PBO staff members, including management staff, have temporary contracts with the MIA, thus they are not Civil Servants; and the PBO is physically located within the MIA compound.

17. Poorly applied administrative SOPs have been affecting almost every PBO activity, especially fieldwork. This is an internal and external source of inefficiency since both the Administration Unit of the PBO and UNDP’s Administration Department are responsible for it. The PBO has not always been able to produce procurement documentation of high enough quality, and response from UNDP’s Administration Department has often lacked consistency and timeliness.
18. The PBO’s effectiveness in “coordinating and supporting M&E and reporting responsibilities of RUNOs and NIPs” has been excellent. This support has been conducted with an emphasis on strengthening/developing capabilities, which has improved quality and timeliness of JSC reports. The good performance of the PBO when providing M&E and reporting support and training, has to do with the ability of the M&E Team to proactively tackle the causes of inefficiency that affect the majority of PBO’s accountabilities by planning its activities in advance and organizing its communication activities with the supervision of the management staff.

19. The PBO’s effectiveness in “training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs” on Conflict Sensitive approaches and conflict mediation and management has been good. It is worth mentioning that the fulfillment of this accountability, which has been assumed by the PBO since its inception in 2008, is especially valuable in a context where peacebuilding capabilities are not yet fully developed.

20. PBO’s effectiveness and efficiency in “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and in “supporting or representing the GoL on peacebuilding issues, both nationally and internationally” have been excellent. The PBO’s contribution to policymaking is especially valuable in a context where peacebuilding capabilities are not yet fully developed.

21. PBO’s ability to systematically address gender and human rights issues during the implementation of its tasks is limited. This is a consequence of the weak technical capabilities of PBO staff in regards to gender mainstreaming and a human rights-based approach to programming (HRBA).

Main recommendations

22. It is recommended that three tasks from the PBO’s “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight” accountability, which form part of PBO’s function as JSC Secretariat, be reallocated to another institution to prevent a conflict of interests without affecting national ownership or national capacity to work on peacebuilding. The three tasks that should be reallocated are “preparing, convening and facilitating JSC meetings”, “following up on decisions taken by the JSC”, and “acting as the key focal point for communication with the PBSO on the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016”. This evaluation, during its mission to Monrovia, conducted a participatory assessment on the most suitable institution to assume responsibility for these tasks. According to this assessment it is recommended to reallocate these tasks to UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office, chiefly because the SRSG is co-Chair of the JSC, which would
reinforce PBO’s accountability to the JSC; and because UNMIL has the strategic responsibility for coordinating peacebuilding activities in Liberia within the UN.

23. It is recommended to recruit a Senior Programme Manager for the PBO. At the same time it is recommended to separate programme-related activities and tasks linked to the PBO’s accountabilities as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding, namely: “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding”, and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”. This means that the TOR of the Senior Programme Manager should not include any activity related to these two accountabilities.

24. It is recommended to prepare an administrative SOPs manual, with the participation of PBO’s Administration Unit and UNDP’s Administration Department, to clarify all the steps and documentation required to adequately fulfill UNDP’s administrative procedures and those corresponding to the National Implementation Modality (NIM). In addition it is recommended to include in this manual a maximum lag time between submission of procurement documentation to UNDP’s Administration Department and response from this department to the PBO’s Administration Unit.

25. The information and communications technology (ICT) tool used by the PBO is its Website\(^2\) is a very basic tool that needs to be improved to make it more user-friendly and useful by using Web 2.0 resources to promote interaction between different peacebuilding stakeholders through chats, work groups on relevant issues, etc. In addition, it is recommended to make all the information concerning the work of the PBO available on the PBO’s Website: every relevant document on peacebuilding; JSC MOMs; detailed PBO annual work plans; detailed breakdown of PBO’s annual budgets and associated financial progress reports; information from PBF supported projects such as project documents, budgets, and progress reports; Public Perception Surveys reports; PBO’s Procedures Manual, etc.

26. It is recommended that PBO staff strengthen their capacity on gender mainstreaming and on human rights-based approach to programming (HRBA) through a systematic collaboration between the PBO and UN Women and UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section (HRPS).

\(^2\) http://www.lpbo.org
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. ABOUT THE PEACEBUILDING FUND, THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND THE PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN LIBERIA

27. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2005 through United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645. The PBF is a global multi-donor fund to support post-conflict peacebuilding interventions in countries emerging from crisis; the PBF is currently operational in roughly 24 countries. The PBF is managed by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) on behalf of the UN Secretary-General.

28. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003 brought an end to 14 years of civil war in Liberia. In December 2007, the UN Secretary-General declared Liberia eligible to receive funding from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). In September 2010, Liberia was also placed on the agenda of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in response to the Government’s request of May 2010. In October of 2010, the PBC and the Government of Liberia (GoL) adopted a Statement of Mutual Commitment (SMC), which outlined Security, Rule of Law, and Reconciliation as the priority areas for PBC engagement.

29. Liberia has been receiving funding from the PBF since 2007. An initial allocation of $15 million was granted in early 2008, based on a first Peacebuilding Priority Plan. Since then, the PBF has made two more Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) allocations, in 2011 and 2013, totaling an additional $35 million. This latest tranche is aligned with the Agenda for Transformation (AfT) and supports the implementation of the National Reconciliation Roadmap, in recognition of the importance of national leadership and ownership over peace transitions.

30. As in most other PBF-recipient countries, at the country level, the management of the PBF is delegated to a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) that provides strategic guidance and oversight and decides on the allocation of PBF funding at the country level. Typically, JSCs are supported by Secretariats, which are funded by the PBF and dedicated to coordinating and overseeing implementation of the Priority Plans on behalf of the JSC. In Liberia, at the outset of PBF support, PBSO agreed with the government to establish the Peacebuilding Office (PBO) to perform the tasks of the Secretariat from within a government office. In addition to these accountabilities, the PBO was also designed to act as the Government of Liberia (GoL) Peacebuilding Office through which it coordinates the government’s work on peacebuilding,
including its engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and directly implements a number of projects. As the PBSO begins implementation of its third allocation, this evaluation has been commissioned to examine the PBO’s complex accountability structures, performance, staffing structure and roles in order to make recommendations on the best way to move forward.

1.2. ABOUT THE EVALUATION

1.2.1. Objective and scope of the evaluation

31. This evaluation’s objective is to examine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and sustainability of the PBO’s activities. The evaluation’s main purpose is to help the PBO and PBSO define the most appropriate roles and range of activities and responsibilities to ensure maximum impact of PBF support to Liberia. In addition, the evaluator was asked to consider whether the functions of the JSC/PBF Secretariat could be more effectively performed through a different institutional arrangement.

32. The object of study for this evaluation is the Liberian Peacebuilding Office (PBO) and the evaluation’s main area of investigation is the PBO’s performance under the current array of functions, accountabilities and tasks. A historical review of the evolution of the PBO since its first incarnation as early as 2008 was conducted in order to better understand how the PBO has come to its current formulation.3

33. To undertake this examination, the evaluation set out to address a number of issues referred to in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation, which were revisited in the Inception Report. Specifically, the Inception Report noted the omission of questions within the TOR which would investigate the extent to which PBO projects have mainstreamed gender and used a human rights based approach.

1.2.2. Evaluation framework4

34. For the examination of PBO’s organizational performance and effectiveness as the JSC Secretariat, the evaluation employed Organizational Analysis Theory, which allows systematic analysis of how an organization operates and can best be managed. The specific Organizational Theory applied in this case is a mixture between the Open Organizational Theory (OOT) and

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3 A complete review of the country context and the history of the PBO can be found in Annex 4.
4 A complete description of the evaluation framework and methodology can be found in Annex 5.
the Natural Organizational Theory (NOT)\(^5\) since the PBO is a single organization with multiple actors and divisions (NOT), with multiple and sometimes conflicting goals (NOT), and the environment plays a major role in the structure (OOT).

35. For the study of the various peacebuilding projects implemented by the PBO related to reconciliation, conflict prevention and resolution, and justice and security, the evaluation was conducted as an Equity Focused Evaluation (EFE). Much like other evaluation frameworks, an EFE considers the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of policies, programmes and projects concerned with achieving development results. However, an EFE also includes tools for analyzing how marginalized segments of the target population have benefited or been taken into account by object of the evaluation. The most common approaches required to conduct an EFE are the gender approach and the human rights approach, which have been incorporated into this evaluation through a gender and human rights sensitive design of the evaluation matrix and of the data-gathering tools, and by using an inclusive selection of sources of information.

1.2.3. Methodology

36. The evaluation was carried out following a mixed method approach that combines quantitative and qualitative research tools in an integrated design to ensure that the wide range of evaluation questions provided the most appropriate type of data for analysis.

37. The evaluator used classic social research techniques in two phases: a desk review of relevant documentation prior to an on-site visit to the PBO in Monrovia\(^6\), and a two-week field trip to gather first-hand information using a range of qualitative and quantitative techniques. During the field trip the evaluator carried out the following activities:

- Interviews with 50 key informants from the GoL, PBO, UN Agencies, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Civil Society, donors and PBSO, using a mix of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions.\(^7\) Interview guides were adapted to the five typologies of stakeholders identified during the preparation of the Inception Report (Annex 1): GoL, UN System, PBO, Civil Society and PBSO.\(^8\)
- Design and deployment of a self-administered survey to 68 potential respondents from the GoL (30 persons - 44% of the sample), UN System (19 persons - 28% of the sample),

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\(^5\) Organizational Analysis, Daniel A. MacFarland and Charles J. Gómez, September 2013, page 10.
\(^6\) A full list of consulted documents is included in Annex 10.
\(^7\) A full list of persons interviewed is included in Annex 8. Because of accessibility challenges, three interviews were conducted via telephone.
\(^8\) Interview guides can be found in Annex 6.
Civil Society (9 persons - 13% of the sample), donors (9 persons - 13% of the sample) and PBSO (1 person - 1% of the sample approximately). Of the 68 surveys sent out 5 emails were bounced back and 22 people responded to the questionnaire, giving a response rate of 35%, quite high for an electronic self-administered survey. The breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group is as follows: 41% of respondents work for the GoL; 32% for the UN system; 18% for CSOs or NGOs; and 9% for donors.

- **Direct observation of PBO’s activities:** the evaluator interviewed every PBO staff member except for the drivers and the Administrative Assistant. All these interviews were conducted at the PBO, which allowed the evaluator to observe daily activities of the PBO staff, interactions between staff, as well as work and communication dynamics over a considerable number of hours.

38. The two formal information gathering phases were augmented by follow up consultations once the evaluator had returned to his home country, which addressed any shortfall in information that remained after the field trip (third data-gathering phase).

39. **Evaluation principles:** in accordance with the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this assignment, the evaluator has carried out an evaluation guided by the principle of credibility. In addition the evaluator has strictly adhered to the Standards for Evaluation in the UN System (United Nations Evaluation Group-UNEG, 23 February 2012), and to the Norms for Evaluation in the UN System (UNEG, 23 February 2013).

40. **Evaluation constraints:** the main constraint relates to difficulties in organizing the evaluation agenda during the field trip to Monrovia. Meetings were cancelled and rescheduled constantly. The evaluator addressed this constraint by devoting extra time and effort to acquiring the necessary information from different sources. Despite these efforts the third data-gathering phase, which is normally used to fill very specific information gaps, was very time consuming. In addition, the evaluation report does not include an analysis on the detailed breakdown of PBO’s 2014 annual budget and associated financial reports because despite the evaluator having asked the PBO for this information, the request was never answered.

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9 A list of all survey recipients is included as Annex 7. This list was provided by the PBO.
10 The results of the self-administered survey can be found in Annex 13.
11 The principle of credibility was implemented through: (1) consultation with and participation of key stakeholders to ensure that the evaluation remains relevant to the PBO’s work, and that the evidence and analysis are sound and accurate; (2) methodological rigor to ensure that the most appropriate sources of evidence for answering the evaluation questions detailed in the TOR are used in a technically appropriate manner; and (3) independence to ensure that the analysis stands solely on an impartial and objective analysis of the evidence, without undue influence by any key stakeholder group.
2. PBO BACKGROUND

2.1. INTRODUCTION

41. To help support the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan and subsequent Plans, as well as to provide secretarial support to the JSC, the Liberian Peacebuilding Office (PBO) was established in early 2009. Based within the Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the Liberian PBO, as its name suggests, signaled the first time PBF experimented with placement of its JSC Secretariat within a government ministry instead of within a UN office. The aim in doing so was to support the Liberian government to build capacity to lead peacebuilding work. From the outset, the PBO has been assigned two main functions: JSC Secretariat and GoL’s Peacebuilding Office.

42. While the two main functions of the PBO have remained constant, its organizational structure and set of responsibilities and tasks have changed over time. Given the focus on assessing the PBO’s recent performance for the purposes of informing the best array of accountabilities and concrete tasks for moving forward, this section will consider the PBO during the PBF’s third tranche of funding. This section, therefore, will describe the PBO’s accountabilities with associated reporting lines, concrete tasks necessary to fulfill these accountabilities, and PBO’s staffing.

2.2. PBO FUNCTION AS JSC SECRETARIAT FROM JANUARY 2014 TO THE PRESENT

2.2.1. Accountabilities

43. Accountabilities of the PBO from January 2014 to the present are “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight”; “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in the design, implementation, M&E and reporting”; and “monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.”

2.2.2. Tasks

44. Facilitating JSC functioning and oversight: the PBO has been providing secretarial support to the JSC by convening periodic meetings of the JSC, sending invitations to the various JSC members, sharing relevant documentation with JSC members for decision-making, taking minutes of meetings, and following-up on the decisions made by the JSC. The PBO has also

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12 PBO’s tasks are organized by each of the accountabilities identified.
been facilitating JSC oversight on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 through the preparation of quarterly progress reports. Finally, the PBO has been supporting the JSC in its reporting responsibilities towards the PBSO through collecting and preparing its annual reports on the progress and challenges of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and in maintaining communication with the PBSO. Finally, the PBO has been providing secretarial support to the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Justice and Security and to the TAG on Reconciliation.\footnote{The Reconciliation TAG functions as a Technical Working Group that meets according to the needs of the implementation of the Reconciliation Roadmap (4 times in 2013). The Justice and Security TAG meets on an \textit{ad hoc} basis to analyze specific issues since the Programme Management Unit (PMU) of the Justice and Security Joint Programme (JSJP) started operations.}

45. Coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in the design, implementation, M&E and reporting of PBF supported projects: the PBO supported the design of PBF supported projects according to PBF Guidelines before approval by the JSC, and guided RUNOs and NIPs in the development of M&E plans. The PBO has been developing M&E capacities of RUNOs and NIPs and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in the preparation of half year and annual reports on projects.

46. Monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016: the PBO set up an M&E system for quality reporting of performance and results of the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016, and has been providing advice to the JSC on achievement of its objectives. In 2013 the PBO initiated the idea of conducting a national public perception survey on reconciliation. Since a more or less similar proposal had just been developed by researchers from the University of Liberia and Stanford University, funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), PBO’s M&E Team suggested that they collaborate and provide additional support to conduct a “National Reconciliation Barometer Survey.”

2.2.3. Reporting lines

47. The various reporting lines are organized by accountability as follows: Facilitating JSC functioning and oversight: JSC co-chairs and PBSO. Coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in the design, implementation and M&E and reporting of PBF supported projects: JSC co-chairs, MPTF-O and PBSO. Monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016: JSC co-chairs and PBSO.
2.3. PBO FUNCTION AS GoL’s PEACEBUILDING OFFICE

2.3.1. Accountabilities

48. Accountabilities of the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office from January 2014 to the present are “maintaining the liaison with Government counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues”; “implementing a Communication and Outreach Strategy on the Reconciliation Roadmap”; “training GoL policymakers and technical staff and CSOs”; “implementing peacebuilding projects”; “implementing some components of the Early Warning Mechanism”; “acting as Programme Management Unit for the Reconciliation Programme”; “contributing to strategic GoL policymaking on peacebuilding”; “managing GoL partnership with the PBC”; and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”.

2.3.2. Tasks

49. Maintaining the liaison with Government counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues: the PBO planned to conduct a baseline survey to measure how RUNOs and other non-UN stakeholders perceive timeliness of PBO communication and coordination. However, the evaluation did not find any information about this survey or about any systematic activities relating to this accountability.

50. Implementing a Communication and Outreach Strategy on the Reconciliation Roadmap: the main task related to this accountability is the implementation of the “Fostering National Consensus and Ownership of the National Reconciliation Roadmap through Civic Engagement and Outreach” project. Two additional tasks are organizing public events to communicate results of the Liberia Priority Plan 2013-2016 and elaborating and disseminating factsheets on PBF supported projects.

51. Training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs: the PBO has been implementing capacity development activities to strengthen the capacity of specific target groups in conflict management and mediation using a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach.

Implementing peacebuilding projects

52. The PBO provided M&E support to the Justice and Security Joint Programme (JSJP) to measure how services provided by the regional hubs are utilized by the population. This was achieved by designing an M&E tracking sheet. The PBO has also been contributing to
strengthening the capabilities of regional hub managers on conflict mediation and management through training activities. Finally, the PBO has been conducting Perception Surveys on Justice and Security.

53. The PBO has been supporting step-by-step implementation of the Palava Hut Programme, which seeks to promote community based healing and reconciliation by using a traditional justice and accountability mechanism, the Palava Hut.

54. The PBO plans to resume the “National Internship Programme” as soon as some funds are available. From 2009 the PBO had been receiving requests from international students to work as interns at the PBO as a requirement before graduation. Later on the PBO decided it would be interesting to also have national interns to help strengthen local capacity for peace. Therefore, since 2011 the PBO has included in its project proposals a small amount for stipends for national interns who have no sponsorship.

Implementing some components of an Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) Mechanism

55. Brief description of the EWER Mechanism: the objective of this mechanism is to prevent community-related conflicts from escalating into violence. It has two components: the “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms for Peace at County and District level” project, and the "Social Cohesion Initiative". The PBO, acting on behalf of the MIA has been leading the National Early Warning and Early Response Working Group (EWWG), which deploys the EWER Mechanism in the field. The EWWG is composed of national and international organizations and institutions including UNMIL, the Liberia National Police (LNP), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). EWWG focal points collect, collate and send reports on incidents to the Liberia’s Early-Warning and Response Network (LERN) Website through SMS. The LERN website is managed and periodically updated by the PBO.

The “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms for Peace Project”

56. The EWER project was conceived and designed between 2008 and 2011 with the

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14 The PBO implemented the “National Internship Programme” in the 2011-2013 period.
15 CSOs are defined as organized civil society and can come in many forms, some informal and some as formal entities such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), among many others.
16 More than 80% of the EWWG members are CSOs and NGOs.
17 The LERN Website has been functioning since 2011.
involvement of the PBO in research and diagnostic activities. It was implemented in Liberia between 2012 and mid-2014 by the NGO TrustAfrica with funding from the NGO Humanity United. It focused on training and organizing early warning focal points in five counties prone to conflict. It also helped communities carry out mediation activities and to prepare and send monthly early warning incident reports to be uploaded to the LERN website.

57. The PBO has been implementing the “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms for Peace Project” as NIP on behalf of the MIA. This project is basically an expansion of the EWER Project. It has three chief objectives: reactivating, strengthening and decentralizing CPCs in 15 counties, establishing EWER centers in three Justice and Security Regional Hubs, and supporting CSOs and CBOs through the “Small Grants Initiative” to address community based conflicts.

58. The “Social Cohesion Initiative”: the PBO plans to resume implementation of this project as soon as some funds are available, with the objective of developing local capacities for peace by supporting CSOs with small-scale peace and reconciliation projects at the community level to intervene in conflicts and facilitate dialogue in collaboration with CPCs.

59. Acting as PMU for the Reconciliation Programme: the PBO has been acting as Programme Management Unit (PMU) for the Reconciliation Programme.

60. Contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding: PBO’s involvement in the preparation of key policy documents has not been as intense in this phase as in past periods because the AfT, the National Visioning Exercise “LIBERIA RISING” and the Reconciliation Roadmap were finalized during earlier phases with the participation of the PBO. The PBO is currently responsible for preparing reports on the peacebuilding component of the AfT for Liberia Development Alliance (LDA) and quarterly reports on the progress of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report.

61. Managing GoL partnership with the PBC: the PBO has been preparing SMC reports every nine months for the PBC, and acting as focal point for communication with the PBC.

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18 Humanity United is currently only funding the EWER Consultant position and the National Early Warning and Early Response Working Group (EWWG).
19 The PBO had been implementing the MIA’s project “Social Cohesion Initiative” with funds from UNICEF during 2011, 2012 and until March 2013.
62. **Supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding:** the PBO has been preparing talking points, speeches and briefing notes for key international meetings; writing articles and research papers for international events on peacebuilding; receiving international missions; and acting as GoL reference point for foreign peacebuilding experts.

### 2.3.3. Reporting lines

63. The various reporting lines are organized by accountability as follows: maintaining the liaison with Government counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues: **MIA**; implementing a Communication and Outreach Strategy: **MIA**; training GoL policymakers and technical staff and CSOs: **MIA**; implementing peacebuilding projects: **MIA and JSJP Programme Manager**; implementing some components of the EWER Mechanism: **MIA and Humanity United**; acting as PMU for the Reconciliation Programme: **MIA**; contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding: **MIA and the Liberia Development Alliance**; managing GoL partnership with PBC: **MIA**; supporting or representing GoL on peacebuilding issues, both nationally and internationally: **MIA**.

### 2.4. PBO STAFFING

64. The PBO is managed by an Executive Director and has two units. The Programme Unit, which is composed of a Head of Programme Unit, an M&E Specialist and an M&E Officer (M&E Team), a Reconciliation Officer, a Training Officer and an EWER Consultant; and the Administration Unit, which is composed of a Finance Officer, a Procurement Officer, an Administrative Officer and an Administrative Assistant. Additionally, the PBO has three drivers.

### 3. EVALUATION FINDINGS

#### 3.1. RELEVANCE TO THE COUNTRY CONTEXT

#### 3.1.1. Introduction

65. The purpose of this section is to analyze to what extent the range of accountabilities in which the PBO is engaged are relevant to the current Liberian context. Context relevance refers to the connection these accountabilities have to the Liberian reality and how challenges relating to such accountabilities contribute to persisting instability. The relevance assessment is restricted to the majority of PBO’s as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office.
66. PBO’s accountabilities as JSC Secretariat are not connected to the country context but are part of the Standard Operating Procedures of the PBF; and the same applies to the “managing GoL partnership with the PBC” accountability, which forms part of PBO’s function as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office. These accountabilities are obviously necessary for the correct deployment and management of PBF funding in Liberia; and for facilitating PBF’s ability to act accountably on its investments, JSC's ability to make adequate decisions on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and PBC’s ability to make strategic decisions on the progress of the SMC.

3.1.2. Relevance to the country context of different PBO’s accountabilities in its function as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office

67. PBO’s accountabilities as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office can be split into two categories of analysis for the purpose of this section: accountabilities related to the implementation of peacebuilding activities; and accountabilities related to developing capabilities of national peacebuilding stakeholders, contributing to strategic GoL policymaking on peacebuilding and supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding.

3.1.2.1. Accountabilities related to the coordination and implementation of peacebuilding activities

68. Finding 1. All the accountabilities of the PBO related to the implementation of peacebuilding projects are relevant to the current country context.

69. Accountabilities in this category are associated with three work areas, namely: reconciliation, justice and security, and conflict prevention and resolution. The relevance of these three work areas to the country context is analyzed below.

70. The Agenda for Transformation (AfT) includes “Peace, Security and Rule of Law” as one of its pillars, which in turn has four Sector Goals: security, peace and reconciliation, Justice and Rule of Law, and judicial reform. The importance given to justice and reconciliation in the AfT, together with the launching in September 2013 of the Reconciliation Roadmap illustrate how relevant reconciliation and justice are to the current national context.

71. The Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 incorporates in the risk analysis that the progressive transition process of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) may create
security challenges if national security institutions are not adequately equipped and deployed. The UNMIL Transition Planning Working Group points to considerable gaps in the Liberian security sector, especially around issues such as infrastructure, logistics, communications and mobility. The Liberia National Police (LNP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) will be particularly vulnerable as many of the activities currently undertaken by UNMIL will fall to these two security agencies.

72. In addition, reconciliation has never been addressed in the country and special attention needs to be paid to this area so a fully inclusive society can be constructed which has been historically characterized by the socioeconomic divide between Americo-Liberians and natives; which was the main cause of war in Liberia and continues to be a threat to peace. At the same time decentralization of the justice system is paramount to maintain stability. The majority of the population from the counties do not have access to justice services since most Liberians cannot afford to travel to Monrovia and Alternative Dispute Resolution\(^{20}\) (ADR) systems can only deal with lesser crimes.

73. Finally, the results of the self-administered survey match the qualitative analysis of whether the three work areas are relevant to the context: 60% of respondents believe that justice and security are very relevant to the context, 85% believe that reconciliation is very relevant to the context, and 70% believe that conflict prevention and resolution are very relevant to the context.\(^{21}\)

3.1.2.2. \textit{PBO accountabilities in relation to developing capabilities of national peacebuilding stakeholders, contributing to strategic GoL policymaking on peacebuilding and supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding}

74. \textbf{Finding 2.} All the accountabilities of the PBO related to developing capabilities of national peacebuilding stakeholders, contributing to strategic GoL policymaking on peacebuilding and supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding are relevant to the current country context.

75. The AfT, in its “Implementation Strategy” section, identifies the lack of capabilities in public and private institutions as a constraint to the effective and timely implementation of the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The issue of weak capabilities in all development sectors on a national level is also abundantly addressed by the AfT. The Reconciliation Roadmap identifies capacity development on reconciliation and conflict

\(^{20}\) ADR refers to a variety of processes that help parties resolve disputes without a trial such as the Palava Hut.

\(^{21}\) PBO evaluation self-administered survey: question number 1.
prevention and resolution at the national and local levels as one of its core strategies to change attitudes and promote reconciliation throughout Liberia. Finally, the implementation strategy of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 focuses on strengthening the capacities of democratic national and local institutions, Civil Society and communities to address and resolve any potential conflicts.

3.2. EFFECTIVENESS

3.2.1. Introduction

76. The purpose of this section is to assess PBO’s performance in the implementation of different tasks\(^{22}\) associated with the various accountabilities of the PBO presented in section 2 (PBO BACKGROUND: 2011-2013, 2013-2014). The assessment is based on both qualitative data, including the review of Progress Reports of PBF supported projects between January and June 2014, and quantitative data gathered by the evaluation. However, qualitative information is much more detailed thus it is the chief component for the assessment. The effectiveness assessment basically covers the period between the approval of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 by the JSC (6 August 2013) and the evaluation field trip to Monrovia in June-July 2014.

3.2.2. Assessment of effectiveness in the fulfillment of PBO’s accountabilities as JSC Secretariat

3.2.2.1. Facilitating JSC functioning and oversight tasks

77. **Finding 3.** Information to be shared with those attending JSC meetings is not submitted with sufficient anticipation. Detailed breakdowns of PBO’s annual budgets have not always been reviewed in depth by JSC members for comments and recommendations. The handling of minutes of JSC meetings (MOMs) is not conducted in a systematic and timely manner and does not meet the required quality standards.

78. **Finding 4.** Since 2013 the PBO has substantially improved the support provided to the JSC in preparing JSC annual reports in terms of quality and timeliness. However, 2012 and 2013 JSC reports did not address human rights issues. It needs to be mentioned that the reporting templates did not address human rights or gender issues.

\(^{22}\) Annex 3 includes all relevant information regarding each task: to which function and accountability the task pertains, measurable indicators and targets when available, task status according to the 2013 PBO Annual Report, information collected by the evaluation, and a color-coded qualitative assessment of the performance of each task including quality and timelines.
79. **Finding 5.** The PBO responds to PBSO’s information requests with complete information in a timely manner. However, information exchanges between the PBO and the PBSO are not always reliably shared with other peacebuilding stakeholders in Liberia.

80. Invitations and preparatory documents for JSC meetings were not sent to JSC members with sufficient anticipation. The typical lag time between sending out the invitations and documents and the actual JSC meetings is 2.5 days.\(^23\) This situation has a negative effect on PBF management at a national level. JSC members end up having to consult documents and ask for clarifications during the meetings instead of devoting their time and efforts to important discussions on the strategic guidance of peacebuilding activities and to making well-informed decisions on peacebuilding processes. These should include an in-depth review of detailed breakdowns of PBO’s annual budgets so recommendations and comments can be made on how PBO’s resources are used, and so transparency can be improved on the use of PBF funds. For example, the email to convene JSC members to the JSC meeting scheduled for 19 July 2013 was sent three days in advance. The agenda for this meeting included the approval of the revised Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and of the selection criteria for PBF projects.

81. The evaluation detected several issues in regards to the handling of JSC minutes of meetings (MOMs): MOMs are not always complete and reliable and do not always include comments made during the review process; MOMs are not shared with JSC members for comments, review or approval immediately after each meeting\(^24\) but sent as part of the documentation for the next JSC meeting. This was the case in 50% of the cases analyzed\(^25\), which meant JSC members had to ask the PBO to send previous MOMs; MOMs do not always include a list of those present\(^26\); there is no standard template for the MOMs, and there is no proper procedure to officially endorse MOMs.

82. Follow-up on decisions made by the JSC is not conducted in a systematic manner. Since it is the JSC that has the ability to enforce those decisions, the poor preparation of JSC meetings and MOMs negatively affects the application of recommendations and decisions made by the JSC: only approximately 50% of decisions made by the JSC are reviewed in subsequent JSC meetings.\(^27\)

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\(^24\) MOM of the JSC held on 21 May 21, 2014 had not yet been delivered when the evaluation field trip to Monrovia finished on 7 July 2014.


\(^27\) *Idem.*
Communication with PBSO about implementing the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016

83. The PBO responses to every PBSO request for information are usually of high quality and done in a timely manner. However, information exchanges between the PBO and the PBSO were not shared with other peacebuilding stakeholders in a reliable manner on some occasions. For example, the former Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Peacebuilding Support agreed with the former Minister of Internal Affairs in February 2013 to provide $50,000 for the printing and distribution of communication materials on the Reconciliation Roadmap. Later in 2013 the new Minister of Internal Affairs issued a request for the reallocation of $300,000 to finance a Communication Strategy on the Reconciliation Programme. In a draft letter prepared by the PBO that the JSC was going to send to the PBSO, an inconsistency was detected on the amount agreed as it made reference to the fact that the reallocation of $300,000 had already been agreed to, when it hadn’t.

Preparation of JSC annual reports

84. The 2012 JSC annual report was submitted two months late and required major modifications after been reviewed by the PBSO. It failed to include examples of effects on the ground and of catalytic effects. Human rights and gender issues were not systematically addressed. It needs to be mentioned that Liberia and Guinea were the first PBF supported countries that were asked to prepare JSC annual reports in 2012, so this was a new task for the PBO. In addition, the reporting template did not specifically address human rights or gender issues.

85. The 2013 JSC annual report was submitted on time and included detailed information from the Perception Surveys and about the Alternative Land Disputes Resolution mechanism. The report addressed some gender issues though did not include any human rights-related references. Again, it has to be mentioned that the reporting template did not specifically address human rights or gender issues.

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28 This task has been assessed according to progress toward the targets of 3 IOAs included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the January-June Progress Report: “number of JSC Annual Reports submitted within 7 days of the deadline”; “number of JSC Annual Reports of which the quality is rated as acceptable by PBSO review team”; and “percentage of JSC members who provide feedback on JSC reports”.

29 An assessment on how documentation prepared by the PBO addresses human rights and gender issues can be found in Annex 12.
86. The PBO has a proactive approach in preparing these reports, contacting the MPTF-O for clarification on reporting templates and deadlines.

87. **Secretarial support to the Reconciliation and Justice and Security TAGs:** PBO support was key to creating the Reconciliation TAG and facilitating its work by supporting four meetings in 2013 and two in 2014. On the other hand, the PBO has provided very limited support to the Justice and Security TAG although it has attended meetings. It was the PMU of the JSJP which convened, organized and facilitated meetings.

3.2.2.2. **Coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design, implementation, M&E and reporting**

88. **Finding 6.** The PBO did not adequately plan the preparation time for the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and PBF supported projects. This fact, together with the eagerness of NIPs and RUNOs to initiate their projects meant that project proposals were reviewed too fast. PBO’s contribution to promoting synergies and to preventing potential overlaps between projects during the design phase was insufficient. This fact, along with the passive attitude of most RUNOs towards improving their proposals in coordination with other RUNOs before the TAP was established, led to an independent design of project proposals. Gender and human rights mainstreaming in project proposals would have benefitted from some collaboration between RUNOs and NIPs. The PBO provided quality support to NIPs and RUNOs to improve projects’ results frameworks, however none of the frameworks include any human rights-related indicators of achievement (IOAs).³⁰

89. **Finding 7.** PBF supported projects have been implemented independently so far. To date the PBO has not been coordinating the implementation of PBF supported projects with other peacebuilding initiatives under its supervision such as the EWER Project; and RUNOs have not been very active in coordinating efforts as could be expected under Delivering as One.

90. **Finding 8.** The PBO has been providing good and timely support in M&E and reporting to NIPs and RUNOs. All the half-yearly (January-June 2014) progress reports included monitoring data collected in accordance with M&E plans of PBF supported projects.

91. **Finding 9.** Technical support provided by the PBO to project managers is positively assessed. This support has been especially intense since the last Ebola outbreak.

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³⁰ Human rights was a criterion only applicable to projects related to national security forces, thus it did not apply to current PBF supported projects.
Providing effective coordination of the projects included in the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016

i) Review of project proposals included in the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 as project ideas

92. The revised and approved Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan already identified key project areas, projects ideas, RUNOs and NIPs. Since there was not a truly competitive selection process of proposals but project ideas were negotiated, the review process consisted of assessing the quality of proposals to improve them.

93. During September 2013 the PBO facilitated the review of project proposals based on a “Technical Verification Process”31 to make sure projects fulfilled the criteria outlined in the PBF Guidelines. A Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) was set up and a review session held on 12 September, the panel then had five working days to review the proposals and make recommendations to RUNOs and NIPs to improve them. NIPs and RUNOs then had three working days to improve the proposals and submit them, along with the TAP’s recommendations, to the JSC on 25 September 2013 for final review. On 4 October project proposals were approved by the JSC. The main reason why the review process was fast-tracked was that NIPs and RUNOs were eager to initiate their projects and receive funding from the PBF as soon as possible. Since the drafting and subsequent review and approval of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 had taken longer than anticipated, the development of the actual project proposals had to be fast-tracked. However, the PBO could have played a bigger role as peacebuilding coordinator by better planning the review of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and the project proposals. Participatory processes, especially when an important strategic planning document is under discussion, are usually lengthy, so a long review of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 could have been anticipated. In addition, the PBO, with the support of the JSC, could have better managed the eagerness of NIPS and RUNOs to have projects approved as soon as possible by extending the review of project proposals by a few weeks.

94. It should be mentioned that not all the recommendations of the TAP were applied by the RUNOs and NIPs basically because of the short time given. As a consequence four out of five RUNOs believe that when projects were approved some of them were not of a high enough standard. For example, the results frameworks of some proposals had to be improved after

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31 The “Technical Verification Process” is described in a document named “TOR Technical Advisory Panel” and contains a basic description of the proposals review process, the composition of the TAP, the criteria to assess proposals and the project transmittal template.
projects were approved by the JSC.

95. No joint working sessions were organized to promote information exchanges and synergies between different proposals until the TAP was formed. Once the TAP was formed, the process was too fast to allow project proposals to benefit from the interaction between RUNOs and NIPS. Gender mainstreaming and a human rights based approach included in the project proposals are weak in general terms and could have benefitted from some collaborations. For example UN Women, the MoGD and UNMIL’s Gender Section could have contributed to improving gender mainstreaming in all proposals. In addition UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section (HRPS) could have been an interesting resource to improve human rights sensitivity of proposals.

96. The review of PBF supported projects reveals that only two out of eight results frameworks include interactions with other PBF supported projects. At the same time, six out of eight projects include ADR activities in similar target areas and similar target population groups, such as youth, women, elders and traditional leaders. In this situation there is a risk of overlaps and of involving similar target population groups in ADR activities following different approaches and methodologies, such as the Palava Hut methodology, community-based conflict management from a gender perspective; and the land disputes prevention and resolution system. This issue was raised by several RUNOs and NIPs such as the MoGD, the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS), UN Women and UNICEF during the TAP review. The assessment of the projects half-yearly progress reports, presented in the next section, shows that interaction between projects has been minimal.

97. Finally, during the review of project proposals the PBO conducted an exhaustive review of different results frameworks. They then provided comments and suggestions for all the project proposals on how: to better organize outcomes and outputs according to the standard template; to ensure synergies to the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 results framework; to improve the formulation of assumptions; to include some TAP comments, etc. However,

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32 The evaluation’s assessment on how gender and human rights issues are addressed by different documents produced or coordinated by the PBO, found in Annex 12, shows that three project documents address gender issues systematically while the remaining project documents include only isolated references to gender issues; and none of the PBF supported projects address human rights issues.

33 The MoGD and UN Women were represented in the TAP and attended the review session on 12 September 2013, providing comments and suggestions on how to improve gender mainstreaming in the proposals. The participation of UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section (HRPS) in the review of proposals was very limited. Actually UNMIL’s HRPS was not formally part of the TAP, which was supposed to be a small team so only two members of UNMIL from the Rule of Law and the Consolidation of Democratic Governance pillars were in the TAP. It should be mentioned that the human rights criterion in the PBF Guidelines is applicable only to project proposals involving national security forces.

34 The six projects funded by the PBF that were reviewed by the evaluation mission to Monrovia have Bomi, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh as target counties.
suggestions on how to improve the results frameworks on gender and human rights sensitivity were insufficient. Given the tight deadlines for finishing the project documents, the PBO also met with some of the NIPs and RUNOs separately in late 2013 to fine-tune their results frameworks where necessary. The quality of this support was good, although none of the results frameworks of PBF supported projects include human rights-related IOAs.

97.1. Finally, most RUNOs did not show a proactive attitude towards improving the technical quality of their proposals together with their corresponding NIPs and in coordination with other RUNOs before the TAP was established. It should be noted that RUNOs are supposed to adhere to the principles of Delivering as One at all times to capitalize on the strengths and comparative advantages of the different members of the UN family.

ii) Coordination of implementation of projects included in the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016

98. The review of half-yearly progress project reports covering the period from January to June 2014 shows that interaction between different PBF supported projects is almost non-existent. Despite the fact that different project reports include descriptions of main activities implemented, none of these reports mention interactions with other PBF supported projects or with other projects supervised by the PBO. For example, the “Community Based Conflict Management-Women as Peace Makers and Nation Builders” project conducted an assessment in January 2014 to select communities for the construction of five Peace Huts. One of the conflict drivers identified in these communities was land disputes. However, the half-yearly reports do not mention any coordination between the previous project; the “Community-based Truth Telling and Atonement Project” and the “Support to the Establishment of a Land Disputes Prevention and Resolution System in Liberia - Phase 2” project. Furthermore, none of the progress reports mention any coordination with the EWER Project or the “Strengthening Local and Traditional Mechanisms for Peace”, which has nationwide coverage. Finally, the poor interaction between different PBF supported projects during the implementation cannot solely be attributed to the PBO, since, RUNOs are supposed to adhere to the principles of Delivering as One, as above mentioned.

99. It should be added that advantage should have been taken of the initial stages of the projects, before the bulk of the activities start, to focus on those potential synergies that were not identified during the review of proposals.

100. Technical advice to RUNOs and NIPS on preparing their PBF half-yearly and annual
reports: the PBO regularly supports RUNOs and NIPS in the use of templates and in the review of reports, clarifying specific issues as part of the quality control process before reports are uploaded to the MPTF-O Gateway. The PBO organized three training sessions on reporting templates between June 2013 and June 2014 with excellent results since the timeliness and quality of PBF project progress reports and JSC reports has improved since 2013.

101. Development of M&E plans of PBF supported projects: at the end of 2013 and early 2014 the PBO supported NIPs and RUNOs in fine-tuning their M&E plans based on the new format provided by PBSO and in accordance with the review of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 results framework. M&E plans were designed for the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and for each PBF supported project to determine how indicators will be tracked for the measuring of results, and when and by whom monitoring activities have to be undertaken. All the half-yearly (January-June 2014) progress reports included monitoring data according to the M&E plans.

102. Development of national M&E capabilities\textsuperscript{35}: during 2013 the PBO imparted one M&E training session for GoL institutions such as the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) of the Gbarnga Regional J&S Hub, the Judiciary, the LNP, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) and the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation (BCR). The PBO also ran a 3-day training session in Monrovia in October 2013 so the implementing partners could strengthen their capacity in planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation. It was quite successful since implementing partners were able to collect data for their half-yearly progress reports even though practically none of the NIPs and RUNOs have dedicated M&E staff.

103. Support to project managers: the PBO has been providing project managers with regular updates on implementation plans and reporting responsibilities as well as supporting them in the elaboration of Annual Work Plans, the identification of training needs, elaboration of TORs for recruitment processes, etc. In July 2014 the PBO organized a mid-year review and training retreat in Buchanan, Grand Bassa County. Project managers considered the training to be very helpful in providing guidance on assessing the projects, developing action plans for future activities and result-based report writing, which had a positive effect on the timely upload of half-yearly progress reports to the MPTF-O Gateway. The PBO has been very active in providing additional support to projects since escalation of the Ebola outbreak in June 2014, by discussing with RUNOs and NIPs challenges relating to the projects and how these challenges can be addressed. Some ideas such as reviewing work plans and recasting project budgets to

\textsuperscript{35} This task has been assessed according to progress toward an IOA included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the January-June Progress Report: number of M&E trainings conducted by the PBO; target: 3 trainings in 2013 and 2 in 2014.
address the specific peacebuilding difficulties created by the Ebola crisis have been provided by the PBO.

3.2.2.3. Monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016

104. Finding 10. In September 2013 the PBO made substantial improvements to the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 results framework compared to the officially approved version. The improved results framework includes detailed and SMART\(^{36}\) IOA and some impact indicators that will be updated through surveys, baseline data, specific targets to be reached, etc.

105. Finding 11. The implementation of the National Reconciliation Barometer Survey has not yet started because the PBO is collaborating with a similar initiative funded by the United States Institute of Peace that plans to conduct an exploratory study that has not yet been carried out.

106. Monitoring progress of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 to update the JSC: there were several attempts to conduct joint monitoring activities between late 2013 and June 2014, but most of them were cancelled because of successive Ebola outbreaks. It should be mentioned that PBO does not necessarily collect monitoring data during joint monitoring visits, the primary aim being to cross-check the situation on the ground, including results achieved and possible bottlenecks. Data collection for monitoring purposes is basically done by the implementing partners, previously trained by the PBO; consequently difficulties PBO faced with carrying out monitoring visits have not been an obstacle to data collection.

107. Improvement of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 results framework: in September 2013 a detailed results/M&E framework was developed for the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016. The revised results framework was presented to and agreed by the Justice and Security Board and the JSC. The PBO managed to substantially improve the results framework from the original version, which was incomplete. It only included a set of ideas for IOA and lacked specific targets to be achieved. The reviewed results framework includes: detailed and SMART IOA and impact indicators that will be measured by the results obtained from surveys such as the “Reconciliation Barometer” or surveys of representative population samples; baseline data; specific targets to be reached; and easy to collect means of verification. RUNOs and NIPs have been able to collect data from implementing partners with permanent presence in the field, such as the five Land Coordination

\(^{36}\) An indicator should be **Specific**, **Measurable**, **Available/achievable in a cost effective way**, **Relevant** for the programme, and available in a **Timely** manner (SMART).
Centers (LCCs)\textsuperscript{37}, local CSOs and NGOs\textsuperscript{38}, or human rights monitors\textsuperscript{39}, which is used to feed the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 results framework. However, there have been several challenges due to the Ebola outbreak, as noted in the progress reports.

108. Design and implementation of a National Reconciliation Barometer Survey\textsuperscript{40}: as already explained, in 2013 the PBO initiated the idea of conducting a national public perception survey on reconciliation. Since a more or less similar proposal had just been developed by researchers from the University of Liberia and Stanford University, funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), PBO’s M&E Team suggested a collaboration and to provide additional support to carry out a ‘National Reconciliation Barometer Survey’. However, there has not been much progress so far because the exploratory study funded by USIP has not yet been carried out.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{3.2.3. Assessment of effectiveness in the fulfillment of PBO accountabilities as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office}

\textit{3.2.3.1. Maintaining liaison with Government counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues}

109. **Finding 12.** The PBO is not actually conducting extensive consultations on reconciliation issues.

110. **Consultation on reconciliation issues with key peacebuilding stakeholders:** when the PBO led the preparation of important strategic documents such as the Reconciliation Roadmap or the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016, it convened technical sessions to work on the documents with different Liberian specialists. However, consultation with peacebuilding stakeholders included as information sources for this evaluation has been weak: 60% of respondents to the self-administered survey answered that the PBO consults their institutions on reconciliation issues only occasionally or never.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the evaluation did not find any information on systematic activities that form part of this accountability.

\textsuperscript{37}“Support to the Establishment of a Land Disputes Prevention and Resolution System-phase 2” project. UN-Habitat and Land Commission.
\textsuperscript{38}The two projects led by UN Women and the MoGD: “Community-based Conflict management-Women as Peace Makers and Nation Builders” and “Women’s Economic Empowerment”
\textsuperscript{39}“Community-based Truth Telling and Atonement Project”. UNDP and INCHR.
\textsuperscript{40}This task has been assessed according to progress toward an IOA included in the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 Results Framework: Percentage of citizens in pilot locations who are positive about the national reconciliation process disaggregated by men/women (target for September 2014: at least 50% to be confirmed after conducting baseline survey).
\textsuperscript{41}The PBO included some questions about peace and reconciliation in the June 2014 Survey of Public Perception on justice and security to at least get some information about the opinions of people in the counties of Bong, Lofa and Nimba on such issues.
\textsuperscript{42}Source: PBO evaluation self-administered survey, question number 11.
3.2.3.2. Implementing a Communication and Outreach Strategy on the Reconciliation Roadmap

111. Finding 13. The design and implementation of the “Communication and Outreach Project” are delayed and no outreach activities have been carried out since July 2013 due to lack of funding.

112. Implementing the "Communication and Outreach Project"\textsuperscript{43}: the PBO has developed a Draft Communication and Outreach Project that seeks to promote the dissemination of information about the Reconciliation Roadmap to foster national consensus and ownership of the Reconciliation Roadmap through civic engagement and outreach. The full design of the “Communication and Outreach Project” is delayed and there are no funds to develop it yet.

113. Organizing public events to promote the Reconciliation Roadmap and disseminate results of the Liberia Priority Plan 2013-2016: following the Reconciliation Roadmap launch, the PBO was asked to support the MIA and the LPI in organizing a series of follow-up activities, starting with a public outreach event in Gbarnga, Bong County, on 29-31 July 2013. No more public events have been organized due to lack of funding.

114. Elaborating and disseminating factsheets on PBF supported projects: the PBO prepared one factsheet with basic information on the PBC, the PBF, the PBO and the currently PBF supported projects; 200 copies have been distributed in Monrovia so far.

3.2.3.3. Training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs on Conflict Sensitivity and conflict management and prevention

115. Finding 14. This task has been implemented with quality and in accordance with planned targets. However its direct effect on improving the administration of justice will take some time to assess as the aim of training is to change mind-sets on how to handle sources of conflict, which can be a long process.

\textsuperscript{43} This task has been assessed according to progress toward the targets of three IOAs included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the January to June Progress report: PBO Communication Plan developed and operational (target for December 2016: PBO Communication Plan effectively operational); number of factsheets on PBF projects produced and disseminated (target for 2014: 3 factsheets); number of public events highlighting results of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (target for 2014: 3 public events).
Capacity development of specific target groups in conflict management and mediation

116. Under the current PBO Project, the PBO has provided support and training on Conflict Sensitiveness and conflict management and mediation to MIA’s staff, CPCs and other peacebuilding actors such as the Police Support Unit (PSU) of the LNP, the Border Patrol Unit of the BIN and the BCR in Gbarnga County. These activities met with planned targets.

117. One of the issues related to access to legal services in rural Liberia, which is a source of conflict, is the length of pre-trial detention in the prison. The training on Conflict Sensitivity and on conflict management and mediation helped increase awareness among criminal justice system actors of the contribution they can make to reduce this source of conflict. It is hoped that this will contribute in the mid and long-term to modify work habits of criminal justice system actors and highlight the importance of reducing administrative bottlenecks in the administration of justice system, which will eventually prevent jailbreaks and violence.

3.2.3.4. Implementing peacebuilding projects

118. **Finding 15.** The PBO has been providing good support for the step-by-step implementation of the Palava Hut Programme. Quality M&E systems for JSJP have been implemented in a timely fashion and are regularly used by the staff at the J&S hubs and by the JSJP. The PBO has continued to carry out J&S Perception Surveys with high standards and in a timely manner, although they would have benefitted from a more systematic inclusion of gender and human rights issues.

119. **Support for the step-by-step implementation of the Palava Hut Programme:** this support is similar to the support provided to all projects but in this case is more intense as this programme requires a more constant involvement from the PBO in its day-to-day implementation. The PBO has been involved in direct implementation of some activities such as the establishment of the Programme Management Unit (PMU), the preparation of the Annual Working Plan (AWP), the drafting of TOR for the Ethnographic Study, the organization of meetings in communities to facilitate the construction of memorials, etc.

120. **Implementation of the “National Internship Programme”:** this initiative was started in 2011 with the objective of strengthening national capacities. The PBO has provided 16 national

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44 This task has been assessed according to progress toward two IOAs included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the January-June Progress Report: number of conflict management and mediation trainings conducted by PBO (target: 3 trainings in 2014); number of national institutions and ministries assisted in mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity into policy formulation and programme design (target: 17 in 2016).
interns so far with small stipends during their internship. Half of them found employment while they were doing their internship, which is an impressive success rate considering unemployment levels in Liberia among youth.45

Development of M&E systems for JSJP46

121. The PBO, in collaboration with the JSJP PMU, helped the Gbarnga, Zwedru and Harper J&S Hubs design a monitoring log to keep track of how services provided are utilized. Staff at the hubs are using the monitoring log after some modifications were made to suit the practical reality of their work. Information from these logs was useful when designing GoL’s budget, as the data was used to estimate the approximate cost of operating the SGBV Crimes Unit, based on the number of cases attended in the year. The JSJP could set reasonable estimated targets of achievements for 2014-2015 using the information collected, especially in projecting how many cases could be processed through the court system. This information was also used to engage donors to provide additional funding to enhance the services provided. For example, some funding from the European Union based its support to the JSJP on the SGBV Crimes Unit indicators for Hub 1 in Gbarnga.

122. The PBO also designed a set of monitoring logs which are now used to regularly collect data and report on the various services provided at the Regional Gbarnga J&S Hub by: the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit; Public Services Office; LNP; BIN and the Judiciary. These monitoring logs are used by the prosecution and public defenders to provide information on how many cases are being indicted, prosecuted/defended, type of case, how many were won or lost or if any case was deferred or used an alternative to prison, such as plea bargaining to reduce charge and sentence or being sent to community corrections on probation. Also, based on the number of crimes responded to in a given year and the distance from the hub, the JSJP PMU was able to project the estimated fuel cost for GoL’s 2014-2015 budget.

123. Finally, the PBO has continued to conduct Public Perception Surveys on Justice and Security. This task has been implemented to high standards and in a timely manner, although concept notes, questionnaires and reports of the perception surveys are only moderately gender sensitive and human rights sensitivity is weak (Annex 12). The results of the Public Perception

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45 Liberia GDP grew by 8.1% in 2013, only marginally lower than the 8.3% recorded for 2012. However, in spite of the robust growth, unemployment, particularly among youth, remains a major challenge as the domestic private sector remains weak, constrained by inadequate infrastructure (particularly electricity) and credit: [http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/liberia/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/liberia/overview)

46 Part of this task has been assessed according to progress toward one IOA included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the 2014 January to June Progress Report: Number of Public Perception Surveys on Justice and Security conducted by PBO. Target: 3 surveys in total: 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Surveys have been used to improve services provided at the hubs in various ways. The results helped service providers adapt their services to the needs expressed in the surveys. For example, the recent mid-term survey conducted in Hub 1 showed that more work has to be done on public outreach, as inhabitants of the counties covered by the hub are still unaware of the services provided. Therefore, the JSJP has developed a radio drama about services provided by Hub 1 in all three languages spoken in the counties, as well as an English version, using the UNMIL radio station.

3.2.3.5. Implementing some components of the EWER Mechanism

124. Finding 16. Liberia’s Early-Warning and Response Network (LERN) Website\(^{47}\) is a good tool to aid with decision making for the prevention of conflicts at the community level and has already been used to support policy-making. The “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms Project” is progressing but behind schedule. While the “Social Cohesion Initiative” is delayed due to lack of funding.

Updating the Liberia’s Early-Warning and Response Network (LERN) Website

125. The PBO updates the LERN Website with data collected and submitted by the Early Response Working Group (EWWG) focal persons, who are trained and supported by the EWER Project. The LERN Website, together with the annual hot-spot assessments, which are reports that compile and analyze data collected through the EWER Mechanism, are excellent tools for decision making on conflict management at local level. For example, based on incident reports relating to concessions and natural resource management conflicts the EWWG commissioned an investigation. Based on this investigation, in June 2012 the EWWG prepared the report “Agricultural Land Concessions and Conflict in Liberia Policy Analysis Brief”\(^{48}\), which led to the setting up of the National Bureau of Concession by the GoL in 2012. The Bureau’s remit is to monitor and evaluate compliance with concession agreements in collaboration with concession entities and agencies of the GoL involved in this type of processes.

126. Implementation of the “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms Project”\(^{49}\): the project activities started late due to lengthy institutional discussions between the MIA, UNDP

\(^{47}\) [http://www.lern.ushahidi.com](http://www.lern.ushahidi.com)
\(^{49}\) This task has been assessed according to the Progress Report June-July 2014 of the project (MPTF-O Gateway).
and the PBO about which institution should lead the project and which institution should manage the funds. Implementation at the field level is progressing slowly mainly because of a lack of access to vehicles; the project has assessed peace structures (CPCs) in 12 counties so far.

127. Implementation of the "Social Cohesion Initiative": implementation of this project has not begun due to lack of funding. The GoL committed $500,000 from the 2014-2015 fiscal budget for its implementation although the evaluator could not verify that this amount had been approved by the GoL.

3.2.3.6. Acting as Programme Management Unit for the Reconciliation Programme

128. Finding 17. The PBO does not have a proper Programme Management function in place. Communication and coordination between PBO staff members has been conducted in an informal way and information sharing among PBO members has been incomplete. This situation has prevented a coherent integration of the different tasks performed by the PBO, and made it difficult to promote synergies between the skills of PBO staff members. PBO’s Annual Working Plans (AWPs) are not actually planning tools but are basically used to define the procurement plan. AWPs are not reviewed or updated in response to changes in the context or arising needs. Tasks related to the “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and the “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding” accountabilities, cannot be planned as they can arise at any moment, which further complicates the already poor planning.

129. The evaluation identified several issues related to the absence of a Programme Management function that are described below.

Communication, coordination and information sharing within the PBO

130. Despite the fact that the PBO has various tools to regularly communicate and coordinate activities such as weekly, monthly and half-yearly meetings, these are not held systematically, so coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO are too often conducted in an informal way. For example, in 2013 the PBO held only three retreat meetings, in January, July and December; while in 2014 the PBO held one retreat meeting in October and various ad hoc programme meetings. So there may be several months between PBO meetings. Reports of these meetings are not systematically prepared or disseminated and follow-up on
agreed actions is not conducted in a systematic manner, so some issues are recurrently discussed.

131. Communication and coordination between PBO staff members is more related to individual initiatives rather than to a standard way of working, which prevents the sharing of knowledge and practical experiences and the integration of different PBO activities. Limited coordination and information sharing among PBO staff members and inadequate knowledge of some staff about the PBO’s programme are highlighted as challenges in the 2013 PBO Annual Retreat Report. PBO staff members are not well informed about the activities of other colleagues in the office. Some PBO staff members report not having timely access to documents and information relevant to their daily work or not having enough information about decisions that have been made that affect their responsibilities. For example, some PBO Administration Unit personnel do not have information about why the PBO is currently only allowed to directly manage funds for fuel, salaries and scratch cards, and believe this was an arbitrary UNDP decision. It was, however, the result of a UNDP assessment of MIA’s financial procedures in 2012 and has affected the PBO since the MIA became a signatory of PBO’s account in the second quarter of 2014.

Planning of PBO’s tasks

132. The above-mentioned timing problems for reviewing project proposals or for providing support to JSC meetings indicate that the PBO does not plan its work effectively enough to fulfill all its accountabilities and implement associated tasks.

133. The evaluation analyzed the PBO’s 2012, 2013 and 2014 Annual Working Plans (AWPs), which are basically a rough planning of timelines for activities detailed in successive PBO Projects results frameworks. These plans are not reviewed or adapted to any changes in circumstance or context since they are basically used to define the procurement plan. For example, the 2014 AWP has not been reviewed or adapted to the new situation created by the Ebola emergency, which is affecting every activity in Liberia. For example, since July-August 2014 most, if not all, of the PBF supported projects are on hold or have refocused some of their activities, to do outreach on Ebola.

134. The AWPs do not include any activity related to “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding” because these are tasks that could come up at any time, which is an additional difficulty to the already poor planning. It is during informal meetings or discussions between
the MIA and other GoL ministers that decisions are made to assign work related to the PBO’s accountabilities as advisor to the GoL on peacebuilding issues. The MIA may suggest that the PBO can do the work because it has the technical capabilities that other institutions do not have. As a result, the task is assigned to the PBO.

135. As a result of the lack of planning and communication noted above, PBO’s activities are usually implemented in a compartmentalized manner. For example, some Conflict Sensitivity and conflict prevention and management training has taken place when not many people in the office, except those conducting the training, knew about these trainings; in 2013 two PBO field missions were conducted independently within a few days of each other because neither knew about each others plans, even though the Administration Unit provided support to both missions; two PBO staff members made independent visits to the same person from a RUNO on the same day when neither of them knew about the others visit and one of them was not even expected by the RUNO.

3.2.3.7. Contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding

136. Finding 18. The Reconciliation Roadmap strategically brings together interventions on reconciliation and can be considered a great achievement for the PBO. The PBO’s preparation of reports on the peacebuilding component of the AfT for Liberia Development Alliance (LDA) is of excellent quality and timeliness. In general terms, opinions of high ranking GoL officials on the fulfillment of this accountability are excellent.

137. Conducting research and analysis work to prepare documentation to support GoL policymaking: in mid-2013 the PBO finished the preparation of the Reconciliation Roadmap, which has made a major contribution to the systematic organization of reconciliation activities in Liberia. Before the Reconciliation Roadmap existed there were several institutions working independently on reconciliation. The PBO managed to coordinate all these efforts to produce this strategic framework. The PBO’s Executive Director served as lead national facilitator along with the technical support of the Head of the Programme Unit and a team of 24 people who developed the document.

138. Preparation of reports on progress of different peacebuilding policymaking documents and other reference documents: the PBO is responsible for the preparation of reports on the peacebuilding component of the AfT for Liberia Development Alliance (LDA). The opinion of high-ranking GoL officials is that these responsibilities are conducted in a timely manner with optimal quality, even in cases when there is a very tight deadline. The same opinion also applies
to other PBO contributions to policy-making documents developed in the previous period, such as the AfT. The PBO was recently tasked to prepare follow-up reports on the TRC Report recommendations. This used to be a responsibility of the INCHR, but the task was reassigned because of the high technical capabilities of the PBO. It entails coordinating with several GoL institutions to find out what is being achieved regarding the 207 specific recommendations in the TRC Report and gathering information to write the report. The PBO has just prepared its first TRC so it is too early to assess performance, although the task was implemented in a timely manner.

3.2.3.8. Managing GoL partnership with PBC

139. **Finding 19.** This accountability could be better fulfilled. The 2013 SMC half-yearly report was not submitted and the 2013 SMC annual report was submitted with a significant delay. The PBO provides the PBC with good and complete information whenever the PBC has any information requests, although communication has not always been timely.

140. **Preparation of SMC Annual Reports**[^50]: since 2013, the PBC established two reports per year, a mid-year and an annual report, on progress in implementing the SMC. The PBO was tasked to produce both reports, though failed to submit any mid-year report in 2013 while the SMC annual report for that year was submitted late due to confusion within the PBO about who should be assigned this task. The draft report was finally sent to the PBC Liberia Configuration for approval in mid-March 2014 after being approved by the JSC, two months after the deadline. The draft text could have been better organized and drafted in a more comprehensible manner for the readers.

141. **Communication with the PBC:** PBO’s communication with the PBC is usually in response to requests for information from the PBC. The PBO provides detailed answers and collects data from different partners, when necessary, to provide the PBC with consolidated information. In terms of timeliness, however, the PBO has been unresponsive on some occasions. In early 2013 the PBC wanted to start discussions on the SMC review, so sent several emails and made phone calls to the PBO, however, there was no response for some weeks, which delayed the review.

[^50]: This task has been assessed according to progress toward targets of 2 IOAs included in the PBO Project 2014-2016 results framework as reported in the January-June Progress Report: Number of SMC Annual Review Reports produced. Baseline: 2 SMC Review reports: 2011 and 2012; Target (Dec 2016): 5 reports in total: 2011-2015 (report for 2016 to be produced in 2017).
3.2.3.9. Supporting or representing GoL on peacebuilding issues, both nationally and internationally

142. Finding 20. The PBO provides excellent and timely support to the GoL in analyzing and preparing documentation required for international peacebuilding events and initiatives in response to the needs of different GoL high-ranking officials, including the President.

143. Preparation of documentation for international meetings and events on peacebuilding: the PBO prepares briefing notes, talking points, speeches and presentations for GoL ministries attending key international meetings on peacebuilding, and prepares articles and research documents for international events and activities related to peacebuilding. High-ranking GoL officials interviewed all highlighted the excellent quality and timeliness of the performance of the PBO in the preparation of this type of documentation. For example, in October 2013, the PBO developed the concept note “South-South Cooperation: Assistance by and Learning from the Rwanda, Mozambique and other experiences in Reconciliation” in response to a Presidential initiative to mobilize support, ideas and inspiration from peacebuilding processes in other countries, namely Rwanda and Mozambique. The document analyses the Rwandan and Sierra Leone experiences, identifies potential areas of collaboration with Rwanda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and other countries, and proposes institutional arrangements required and specific activities to be carried out.

3.3. EFFICIENCY

3.3.1. Introduction

144. The purpose of this section is to analyze to what extent PBO’s inputs, such as funds, time, information, logistics and human resources, have contributed to the fulfillment of its different accountabilities as JSC Secretariat and GoL’s Peacebuilding Office. It’s worth highlighting that the efficiency analysis, as with the rest of the evaluation, is not of individuals’ performance but of processes; thus it analyzes the PBO as a system or set of processes that transforms inputs into outputs.

145. As in most evaluations, the lack of benchmarks complicates the ability to analyze efficiency. The evaluation sought to identify situations where the use of the aforementioned inputs has been clearly classified as either efficient or inefficient by analyzing information from: semi-structured interviews; the results of the self-administered survey; and the analysis of quality and timeliness in the performance of different tasks that can be found in Annex 3.
3.3.2. Sources of inefficiency

146. **Finding 21.** The evaluation identified four sources of inefficiency in PBO’s functioning, namely: a weak Programme Management function; PBO’s poor communication function; decision-making processes; and poorly applied administrative Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The weakness of the PBO’s Programme Management function entails poor coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO; poor planning; and poor management of logistics (unavailability of vehicles). The PBO’s weak Programme Management and communication functions are internal sources of inefficiency; while poorly applied administrative SOPs are both internal and external, since both the Administration Unit of the PBO and UNDP’s Administration Department are responsible for it.

3.3.2.1. Programme Management function

147. **Poor communication, coordination and information sharing** within the PBO have negative repercussions for PBO’s efficiency, as means PBO staff members have to dedicate extra time and effort to finding the necessary information they need to carry out their responsibilities. In some cases it is only the Executive Director who has access to key information. This also leads to an overtly individualistic way of working, where office personnel do not benefit from teamwork, including knowledge sharing among PBO staff. This compartmentalized way of operating sometimes also means extra expense, as shown in the case mentioned above when two PBO field visits happened within a few days of each other, whereas they could have shared the cost of vehicle rental and fuel coupons if a joint visit had been organized.

148. **Poor planning** leads to poor use of time and human resources and to tasks being implemented at the last minute. It is also conducive to poor assignation of tasks once they become urgent or to the hindrance of important participatory processes that require adequate timing. For example, the review of project proposals was carried out too quickly because of poor planning, as previously mentioned in the effectiveness section. In addition, it was the M&E Team that chiefly facilitated the process although it was a programme management task. Good planning would have given more time for the TAP, RUNOs and NIPs to discuss and review project proposals in detail, which would have had a positive impact on the quality of approved projects, including the possibility of benefiting from synergies with other projects. At the same time, greater involvement of the Executive Director and Head of the Programme Unit,
who jointly perform the Programme Management function, would have improved the review process because of their knowledge of the AfT, the Reconciliation Roadmap, the SMC and the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.

149. **Poor management of logistics:** the unavailability of vehicles is a constant difficulty despite the fact that the PBO has four vehicles and two drivers. Two of these vehicles are in a bad state of repair and due to be decommissioned. Three vehicles were budgeted for in the current PBF tranche of funding, one for the PBO to substitute one of the vehicles that is to be decommissioned, and two additional vehicles for the “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanism Project”. These three vehicles had already been purchased by UNDP, but they were then donated to the MIA to support the fight against Ebola and will be at PBO’s disposal as soon as possible. Vehicles are essential for some of PBO’s activities, especially those that involve field trips, so they need to be very carefully maintained and managed. Although the current unavailability of vehicles has to do with the Ebola crises, the PBO should have planned ahead to replace the vehicles that are so damaged they are too expensive to make them roadworthy again. Additionally, PBO’s official vehicles should always be made primarily available for field trips to avoid having to hire vehicles whenever possible as they are not always reliable and can jeopardize safety of PBO staff.

150. Finally, in August 2013 the PBO recruited a Reconciliation Officer while the plan had been to recruit a Programme Manager. The Liberia Peacebuilding Programme 2011-2013 mentions in its managerial arrangements section that the MIA would recruit a Programme Manager for the Reconciliation component that would be financed by the PBF in accordance with the “PBF Liberia Mid-term review” conducted in March 2010 which recommended recruiting a Senior Programme Manager to lead the Programme Unit.

### 3.3.2.2. PBO’s communication function

151. Communication with RUNOs, NIPs and other peacebuilding actors can be assessed as disorganized, which causes delays, misunderstandings and hampers processes. Some of the typical issues that affect communication identified by the evaluation are: errors on PBO’s distribution list; emails sent to the wrong people; sometimes it took several weeks to add a new email address to PBO’s distribution list, so some individuals missed documents and meetings and were unintentionally excluded from specific processes; some documents are not shared with

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52 PBF Mid-term Review March 2010, Richard Snellen, Oscar Bloh and Julius Togba, Monrovia, pages 9 and 22.
every relevant actor; documentation requests go unanswered, and the wrong documents are sometimes sent out.

152. The PBO’s communication function is too centralized. It is primarily the Executive Director, who is usually over busy, who responds to most information requests, although other PBO personnel could do this if information was systematically shared within the PBO. As a consequence, whenever the Executive Director is not available, because of his professional commitments, other PBO staff members, RUNOs and NIPs have to wait until he is available to get documents or specific information. As a consequence, processes get delayed, such as the above-mentioned delay in the review of the 2013 SMC report. This centralization of information is not an efficient use of PBO’s human resources. It is unnecessary for the Executive Director to have to respond to the majority of information requests, even about day-to-day operational issue, as technical or administrative staff are capable of doing this and could do it faster.

153. The PBO does not always manage information in a completely transparent manner. Some PBO staff members were not allowed to share some documents with the evaluator without permission from the Executive Director. Despite the fact that the evaluator requested to see the budgets of some PBF funded projects including the PBO project several times, the request went unanswered.

154. The results of the self-administered survey show that 36% of respondents believe that PBO’s communication and coordination with their institution is poor or very poor53, this is not satisfactory given the hugely important role that these activities play in maintaining a fluid liaison with peacebuilding actors.

155. PBO’s weak communication function requires that emails and documentation be resent; that there is a constant revision of email lists; that additional explanations be sent to people affected by mistakes; etc. For example, it could be noted that the organization of the evaluation mission to Liberia was too time consuming both for the PBO and the evaluator. Some meetings were not confirmed far enough in advance and had to be rescheduled, or the evaluator had to visit some interviewees several times because they had not been informed about the evaluation interview: approximately 50% of the meetings were rescheduled at the last minute.

53 Source: PBO evaluation self-administered survey, question number 9.
3.3.2.3. Decision-making processes

156. Virtually every decision is made by the Executive Director with advice from the Head of the Programme Unit. PBO staff members are usually consulted about the decision if it involves their area of work. The Executive Director, according to his 2014 TOR, is essentially responsible for leading the implementation of the SMC and the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and for overall management of the PBO, therefore his participation in micro-management has to be assessed as a non-efficient utilization of human resources. Moreover, sometimes processes are delayed when decisions need to be made or an important issue needs attention and the Executive Director is not available because of his professional commitments, as illustrated above with the delay in the review of the 2013 SMC report.

157. In addition, over centralized decision-making processes together with the previously mentioned over centralized communication function do nothing to empower PBO personnel. The main effect being that staff skills are underutilized. This is a common problem in overly centralized organizations.

3.3.2.4. Administrative SOPs

158. In 2012 UNDP conducted an assessment of the MIA’s systems for managing donor funding, the results of which rated them as poor. Since then, the MIA, when managing funds administered by UNDP, is only allowed to make essential payments for day-to-day work. As a consequence, since the MIA became signatory to the PBO’s account in the second quarter of 2014, the PBO is only allowed to directly manage funds for fuel, salaries and scratch cards and as these payments require the MIA signature this has often led to long delays. As for other types of payments, to vendors for example, the PBO has to follow two different Administrative SOPs, those of UNDP and those of the MoF under the new National Implementation Modality (NIM).

159. Administrative SOPs are a constant source of inefficiency for the PBO: firstly salaries are paid late, which is a major concern for PBO personnel and does nothing to promote a productive environment in the office. Another issue is the delay in payment of Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) to PBO staff members making field visits; which means that missions have to be rescheduled at the last minute or that PBO staff members have to pay their own expenses in advance and then do the corresponding paperwork for reimbursements.

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54 This does not have to do with UNDP but with MIA since payment of salaries only needs to be approved by the MIA’s Assistant Minister for Administration.
160. Both the Administration Unit of the PBO and UNDP Operations Department are responsible for this inefficiency. The PBO does not always correctly prepare the required documentation while the feedback from the UNDP Operations Department lacks quality and timeliness. Once procurement documentation is submitted to UNDP, feedback on mistakes can take weeks and is sometimes inconsistent, which is confusing for the PBO.

161. The mid-year review of the Reconciliation Program held in Buchanan in July 2014 included an intensive training on NIM to help improve the fulfillment of procurement processes. However, the final report of this mid-year review does not include any recommendation for the UNDP on how to improve the quality and timeliness of its response.

3.3.3. How sources of inefficiency affect PBO’s accountabilities as JSC Secretariat

162. **Finding 22.** PBO’s efficiency in “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight” and “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design and implementation” is affected by the weakness of the Programme Management (poor planning) and communication functions of the PBO.

163. PBO’s weak Programme Management (poor planning) and communication functions have affected the “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight” accountability. Some tasks, such as the distribution of documentation to JSC members before meetings and the submission of MOMs for approval have not been adequately planned. In addition, the PBO has not always shared accurate information with the JSC, as in the case of funding for memorials in the Palava Hut Programme or budget reallocation for the Communication Strategy. These two inefficiencies have affected JSC’s ability to make well-informed decisions on some important issues. For example, the JSC had only six working days to review all project proposals for the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 before approving them. The proposals were approved without any comments or recommendations from the JSC.

164. “Coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design” has been affected by the weak Programme Management (poor planning) and communication functions of the PBO. Due to poor planning the review of project proposals was conducted too fast, and RUNOs and NIPs went through the process with very limited information on what it entailed. As a consequence, some projects were not of high enough quality when they were approved by the JSC, while synergies and potential overlaps were not actually addressed.
165. “Coordinating RUNOs and NIPs in project implementation” has been affected by the weak Programme Management function (poor planning, communication, coordination and information sharing within the PBO). The PBO has been providing good support to projects individually by: providing technical guidance to project managers for developing Annual Work Plans (AWPs); identifying training needs; the elaboration of TORs for recruitment processes, etc. However, PBF supported projects are not perceived by the PBO as being part of a programme. The 2014 PBO’s Annual working Plan does not include any activity for coordinating with different RUNOs and NIPs on project implementation. As a consequence, interaction between PBF funded projects in the February-June 2014 period has been minimum, which is mentioned in the analysis of the half-yearly progress reports included in the effectiveness section. Additionally, this accountability has been affected by weak communication. Some examples of the effects of the PBO’s weak communication function, such as the unintentional exclusion of relevant actors from certain processes, are provided in the “sources of inefficiency” section.

166. Finally, the qualitative assessment of PBO efficiency in fulfilling the "coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design and implementation” accountability coincide with the opinion of respondents to the self-administered survey: 59% of respondents believe that the PBO is not efficient or not efficient at all in coordinating peacebuilding actors.55

3.3.4. How sources of inefficiency affect PBO’s accountabilities as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office

167. Finding 23. PBO’s efficiency in “Maintaining the liaison with GoL counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues” is affected by the weakness of the Programme Management (poor planning) and communication functions of the PBO. Poorly applied administrative SOPs and the unavailability of vehicles have been affecting “training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs”. Implementation of “Strengthening Local / Traditional Mechanisms” has been affected by the weakness of the Programme Management function (poor planning) and unavailability of vehicles. “Acting as PMU for the Reconciliation Programme” has been affected by the weakness of the Programme Management function (poor planning; and poor coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO).

168. “Maintaining the liaison with GoL counterparts emphasizing extensive consultation on reconciliation issues” is affected by the weak Programme Management (poor planning) and

55 Source: PBO evaluation self-administered survey, question number 6 (Annex 6).
communication functions of the PBO. The 2014 PBO’s AWP does not include any specific activities or tasks for implementing this accountability. Besides, the basis for fulfilling this accountability is good communication, which as previously mentioned, is disorganized. As a consequence, the PBO is not currently conducting extensive consultations on reconciliation issues in a systematic manner.

169. Poorly applied administrative SOPs and the unavailability of vehicles have been affecting “training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs” since this accountability involves fieldwork.

171. The implementation of the “Strengthening Local / Traditional Mechanisms” project which is one of the tasks associated with the “coordinating and implementing some components of the EWER Mechanism” accountability has been affected by the weak Programme Management Function (poor planning). Institutional arrangements between the PBO, MIA and UNDP for implementing the project delayed it from starting. These arrangements should have been clarified during the design stage before JSC approval, but this stage was rushed as mentioned previously. Unavailability of vehicles is obstructing project implementation, especially of activities in the field, which are essential in this particular case since the operation of EWER systems relies on the capabilities of local structures such as County Peace Committees (CPCs) and on focal persons from the Early Warning and Early Response Working Group (EWWG). For example, some field trips had to be cancelled on the day of travel because DSAs for staff were not ready. The main effect of these inefficiencies is the very slow progress in the implementation of this project.

172. The “acting as PMU for the Reconciliation Programme” accountability has obviously been affected by all the weaknesses of the PBO’s Programme Management function, namely: poor coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO; and poor planning. As previously mentioned, the main effect of these inefficiencies is that different components of the Reconciliation Programme, (which basically consists of PBF supported projects until additional funding is found) are not perceived by the PBO as being part of a programme but as independently developed initiatives, which is not conducive to promoting synergies between different components.

173. Finally, badly timed communication occasionally affected the “managing GoL partnership with PBC” accountability, as shown by the effectiveness assessment.
3.3.5. Accountabilities and tasks efficiently implemented by the PBO as JSC Secretariat

174. **Finding 24.** The PBO is efficient in “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in M&E and reporting” and in “monitoring achievement of results of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.”

175. The M&E Team works in a very systematic manner and plans ahead to avoid delays related to administrative SOPs. It also manages its own communications, although formal invitations to training activities are channeled through the Executive Director. The M&E Team is proactive in addressing sources of inefficiency. For example, the M&E Team learnt to plan activities in advance when the implementation of the Perception Survey in June 2013 was delayed by administrative SOPs and miscommunication between PBO and UNDP about financial reports.

176. The qualitative analysis agrees with the results of the self-administered survey on M&E support: 64% of respondents believe that the PBO is efficient or very efficient providing M&E support.\(^{56}\) On the other hand, the qualitative analysis does not agree with the results of the self-administered survey on reporting support: 45% of respondents believe that the PBO is not efficient or not efficient at all at providing reporting support while 32% believe that the PBO is efficient or very efficient at providing reporting support. This can be explained by the fact that the reporting support provided by the PBO was improved in 2014, according to the timeliness and quality assessment of JSC and SMC reports prepared in 2013 and 2014 (Annex 3).

3.3.6. Accountabilities and tasks efficiently implemented by the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office

177. **Finding 25.** The PBO is very efficient in fulfilling its accountabilities as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding issues, namely: “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding.” The PBO is also efficient in implementing M&E related tasks pertaining to the “implementing peacebuilding projects” accountability.

178. “Contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”. Despite the fact that these two accountabilities cannot be planned in advance because they could occur at any time, the PBO

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\(^{56}\) Source: PBO evaluation self-administered survey, question number 6 (Annex 6).
carries out associated tasks to a high quality and in a timely manner. For example, the PBO was recently asked by the President to prepare a report, against a very tight deadline, for the GoL highlighting achievements and challenges of peacebuilding and reconciliation and of addressing the root causes and potential areas of conflict since 2006 to the present day.

179. Tasks associated with these two accountabilities are basically carried out only by the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit; consequently, some identified sources of inefficiency, such as weak Programme Management and communication functions do not bear much relation to the completion of related tasks.

180. M&E related tasks related to “implementing peacebuilding projects”, “supporting different structures of the JSJP including the regional hub managers regarding M&E” and “conducting perception surveys on justice and security”, have been efficiently implemented. The reasons behind this have to do with the capacity of the M&E Team to plan in advance and manage its communication activities, as mentioned above.

3.4. SUSTAINABILITY

181. The only information the evaluation mission to Liberia managed to collect concerning the short-term sustainability of the PBO is that this office completely depends on external support. The Reconciliation Roadmap stipulates that after the first three years of its implementation a Peace and Reconciliation Council (the TRC Recommends a Commission) should be set up. This Council or Commission will have a functioning Secretariat in charge of most of the work the PBO currently carries out and will be funded by the GoL. The MIA plans to develop a Resource Mobilization Strategy through the National Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Steering Committee (NPRSC); however, the NPRSC has not yet been established.

3.5. APPROPRIATENESS

3.5.1. Introduction

182. Appropriateness of the PBO’s involvement in the various accountabilities as JSC Secretariat and as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office has to do with the suitability of the PBO to conduct the work involved. The evaluation used three elements or criteria to assess appropriateness, namely: mandate of the PBO; the position of the PBO to fulfill its accountabilities and perform related tasks; and the risk of conflict of interests. The second criterion relates to the question: is the PBO the best-positioned institution to fulfill PBO’s various accountabilities and perform related tasks? The third criterion was included because the PBO is currently performing a large number of tasks that range from supporting the design and
M&E of PBF supported projects and acting as NIP, to supporting JSC decision-making. This wide range of tasks needs to be analyzed in detail to prevent any risk of conflict of interests that may be affecting PBO’s reporting lines.

3.5.2. Appropriateness of the involvement of the PBO in accountabilities as JSC Secretariat

183. **Finding 26.** The evaluation identified some conflict of interest related to allocating all of the following tasks to the same institution: “preparing, convening and facilitating JSC meetings”; “following up on decisions taken by the JSC”; “acting as the key focal point for communication with the PBSO”\(^{57}\); and “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design and implementation”\(^{58}\). It should be pointed out that a conflict of interest can exist even if no unethical or inappropriate act results from it. This finding refers only to inappropriate but not unethical actions.

184. **Finding 27.** The way the PBO has managed conflicts of interest identified by the evaluation indicates that the MIA reporting line is given priority over the PBSO and JSC co-Chairs reporting lines.

185. **Mandate:** all the current accountabilities and tasks of the PBO as JSC Secretariat are in line with the mandate of the PBO as JSC Secretariat \(^{59}\) as defined in the “United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Guidelines on application and use of funds (April 2014)” document.\(^{60}\)

186. **Positioning:** the evaluation identified one clear situation in which there is another institution better positioned to perform one of the PBO’s tasks, this being the support to the Justice and Security Technical Advisory Group (TAG). None of the members of the PBO have a strong background on justice and security and it was not involved in the recent reorganization of the Justice and Security Joint Programme (JSJP) organizational and coordination structure.

\(^{57}\) These three tasks are associated to the “Facilitating JSC functioning and oversight” accountability of the PBO as JSC Secretariat.

\(^{58}\) This accountability pertains to the PBO’s function as JSC Secretariat.

\(^{59}\) Mandate of the PBF Secretariat: to facilitate its work, the JSC and technical committees are supported by a PBF Secretariat that is funded by PBF through the Priority Plan (the early establishment of a Secretariat can also be funded through initial ‘surge support’ by PBSO, if requested – see section 6.1). A strong Secretariat is essential for enabling the JSC to play its managerial oversight functions effectively. It serves as the interface between the strategic decision-making level bodies (JSC, technical committee) and RUNOs. It provides the coordination and secretarial support to the JSC and technical committee, and between these bodies and the RUNOs. It also undertakes/ facilitates monitoring of and reporting against the Priority Plan.

The JSJP Programme Management Unit (PMU) is better positioned than the PBO to implement this support. Actually, the PBO attended J&S TAG meetings but it was the JSJP PMU that supported the work of the J&S TAG. Furthermore, the PBO has not been included as a support body to the JSJP’s new organizational structure due to the fact that the PBO is far out of the sector.

**Risk of conflict of interests**

187. The evaluation identified some situations that indicate that there is a conflict of interests when all of the current tasks of PBOs accountabilities as JSC secretariat are assigned to the same institution.

188. “Preparing, convening and facilitating JSC meetings”, “following up on decisions taken by the JSC; and “acting as the key focal point for communication with the PBSO on the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016”, which are tasks associated with the “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight” accountability, should not be allocated to the same institution responsible for the “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design and implementation”. The reporting lines corresponding to the above mentioned accountabilities are basically the JSC co-chairs and PBSO. Two examples on how conflict of interest situations have been managed by the PBO are presented below.

189. **Inclusion of memorials in the budget of the Palava Hut Programme**: the Palava Hut Programme, the design of which was supported by the PBO, plans to build two memorials for $150,000 despite the fact that the PBSO was clear about not wanting to fund any memorials. The PBO did not share this information with the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) that reviewed project proposals before being approved by the JSC, nor did they share it with the JSC. As a consequence, the budget for the memorials, which are a priority for the MIA, was approved by JSC without the consent of the PBSO, and their construction is about to start.

189. **Reallocation of funds to support the GoL Communication Strategy on the Reconciliation Roadmap**: this situation was already described in the “effectiveness” section. The former Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Peacebuilding Support agreed with the former Minister of Internal Affairs in February 2013 to support the dissemination of the Reconciliation Roadmap with $50,000 for the printing and distribution of materials. Later in 2013 the new

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61 Although MPTF-O is also a reporting line of the accountability “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in the design, implementation and M&E and reporting of PBF supported projects”, this reporting line is not as relevant as the other two in this particular analysis.
Minister of Internal Affairs issued a request for the reallocation of $300,000 from one of the PBF supported projects to finance a Communication Strategy on the Reconciliation Programme, which is a priority of the MIA. In a draft letter prepared by the PBO that the JSC was going to send to the PBSO an inconsistency was detected on the amount agreed, since the reallocation of $300,000 was referred to as having already been agreed, while it had not.

3.5.3. Appropriateness of the involvement of the PBO in the different accountabilities in its functions as PBF Secretariat and GoL’s Peacebuilding Office.

190. **Finding 28.** The involvement of the PBO in all the accountabilities associated with the function of the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office can be assessed as appropriate.

191. **Mandate:** the mandate of the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office is undefined, which means that there are no officially approved limits to the accountabilities and tasks the PBO can assume as part of this function.

**Positioning**

192. The involvement of the PBO in various accountabilities as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office is chiefly justified by the fact that the PBO has a high concentration of technical capabilities on: reconciliation; conflict prevention and resolution; and M&E, in a country where capabilities to strategically organize and implement peacebuilding activities are not yet totally developed. PBO staff members have received trainings in Liberia and abroad since the approval of the first PBO project (2008-2011). Staff changes have occurred, but the PBO has been able to constantly update its skills on peacebuilding because of accessibility to funds for this purpose and also because it has benefitted from its ability to develop a networking approach in its work.

193. The same justification is used for the involvement of the PBO in direct implementation and

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62 The first PBO Project included a strong component dedicated to build the capabilities of the PBO on Conflict Sensitiveness and peacebuilding.
64 The PBO has managed to forge partnership and collaboration with various institutions and networks specializing in peacebuilding issues: (1) the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; (2) the Summer Peacebuilding Programme at the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University, in Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA; (3) the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), based in Durban, South Africa, has been a close partner of the PBO since 2009; (4) the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, based in Geneva, Switzerland; (5) the University of Uppsala, Sweden; (6) the Institute for Conflict and Coexistence at Brandeis University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA; (7) the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP) and the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) based in Accra, Ghana; (8) Channel Research, based on Brussels, Belgium; (9) the International Peace Institute, New York, USA; (10) the Department of Human Rights and Justice of the University of Berkeley, California, USA, etc.
coordination of peacebuilding projects. Projects teams recruited to implement PBF supported projects have little or no peacebuilding experience due to a lack of personnel with these skills in Liberia, therefore a direct involvement of the PBO in day-to-day implementation is necessary; some NIPs rely heavily on PBO support to implement activities with quality.

194. No other institution in Liberia is better positioned than the PBO to implement the tasks associated with these accountabilities, not only because of its technical capabilities and relationship with international partners, donors and universities, but also because of its accessibility to different GoL ministries.

3.6. PBO STAFFING

3.6.1. Introduction

195. The purpose of this section is to briefly analyze the suitability of PBO staffing to implement the numerous PBO tasks required to fulfill its different accountabilities. This is done by reviewing the technical strengths and weaknesses, workload and type of contract of each position. The current PBO staff members are: Management staff: Executive Director and Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Advisor. Programme Unit: M&E Specialist, M&E Officer, Training Officer, Reconciliation Officer 65, and Early Warning Consultant. Administration Unit: Administrative Officer, Finance Officer, Procurement Officer, Administrative Assistant, and three drivers.

196. The analysis of the technical capacity of the PBO to fulfill its accountabilities and of the workload of each position was carried out by reviewing the 2014 TOR for each position and the effectiveness analysis. Information obtained through semi-structured interviews with PBO staff and direct observation of PBO’s activities allowed the evaluator to identify tasks not included in individuals TOR and to assess the real workload of each position.

3.6.2. Suitability of PBO’s technical capacity to fulfill its various accountabilities

197. Finding 29. The PBO currently has excellent capabilities on reconciliation, conflict prevention and resolution, and on M&E. This is reflected in the effectiveness analysis of PBO’s fulfillment of accountabilities and tasks in its role as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding issues; when training NIPs and staff working at the J&S Regional Hub in Gbarnga in Conflict

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65 During the preparation of this evaluation report the Reconciliation Officer was appointed as the Deputy Minister of Operations, MIA.
Sensitivity and conflict management and prevention; and when supporting and training RUNOs and NIPs in M&E. It should be noted that once the contract of the M&E Specialist expires at the end of 2014, PBO’s M&E capacity will be reduced which may negatively impact the PBO’s ability to continue to deliver quality M&E and reporting support. On the other hand, the PBO does not have the required knowledge to support the J&S TAG.

198. **Finding 30.** The Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit, who perform the PBO’s Programme Management function jointly, have a proven track record in coordinating large work teams; unfortunately this has not translated into an effective performance of the Programme Management function of the PBO. Although the recruitment of a Programme Manager was planned in the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme 2011-2013, this position has still not been filled.

199. **Finding 31.** PBO’s capacity to mainstream gender and work under a human rights based approach when implementing tasks and fulfilling accountabilities, is very limited as shown by the weak and non-systematic inclusion of both approaches in its work.

**Strength: capabilities on reconciliation, on conflict prevention and resolution, and on M&E**

200. Six out of seven of PBO’s technical or managerial staff members have substantial experience and/or education on reconciliation and conflict prevention and resolution; while four staff members have strong training and work experience in reconciliation and/or conflict prevention and resolution. This has been translated into an excellent performance by the PBO as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding issues, and in its contribution to improving the daily work of Conflict Sensitivity and conflict management and prevention trainees at the J&S Regional Hub in Gbarnga, as shown by the effectiveness analysis.

201. The PBO M&E Team has extensive knowledge and experience in Results-Based Management (RBM), RBM training, M&E training, evaluation management, Conflict Analysis and M&E, Peacebuilding M&E, etc. This strength has been translated into the excellent results of the M&E support the PBO has been providing to NIPs, RUNOs and the JSJP, as shown by the effectiveness analysis.

**Weakness: capacity to mainstream gender and apply a human rights based approach**

202. Only two PBO staff members have some training on gender mainstreaming. Because of this lack of technical experience, the PBO sometimes asks for help from UNMIL’s gender Section, from UN Women or from the MoGD. However, these collaborations have not had...
sufficient impact on PBO’s overall performance in ensuring a systematic gender sensitive approach to programming. The evaluation assessed to what extent documents produced or reviewed by the PBO address gender issues (Annex 12)\(^\text{66}\): it showed that 15 out of 33 (45%) do not include any reference to gender issues; and only 6 address gender issues systematically (18%). Finally, the PBO has managed to introduce some gender-sensitive elements in its M&E work, as is the case of the Public Perception Surveys on J&S, although this is not done systematically.

203. Nobody in the PBO has any specific training on human rights. Consequently, the ability of the PBO to systematically address human rights issues in its work is very limited. The evaluation assessed to what extent documents produced or reviewed by the PBO address human rights issues (Annex 12): it showed that 22 out of 33 (67%) documents do not include any reference to human rights issues; and only 2 address human rights issues systematically (6%).

204. For example, the PBO recommended that RUNOs and NIPS include sex-disaggregated indicators of achievement (IOAs) in the projects’ results frameworks, but this is not sufficient. Gender sensitive indicators require the collection of data disaggregated by sex as well as by age, socio-economic groups and ethnic groups as well as addressing the gender gaps and inequalities. In addition qualitative indicators are essential. For example, it is not enough to know that women or members of an ethnic group are participating in an activity; the quality of their participation and experience, whether in community level meetings or trainings or as users of public services, is all-important.

**Weakness: lack of Senior Programme Manager**

205. Despite the fact that the PBF Mid-term Review in March 2010 recommended setting up a Programme Management Unit managed by a Senior Programme Manager\(^\text{67}\) within the PBO; and that the recruitment of a Programme Manager was planned according to the Liberia...
Peacebuilding Programme 2011-2013, this position has not yet been filled. Actually, the weakness of the PBO’s Programme Management function is one of the main sources of inefficiency in PBO’s overall performance.

206. The Programme Management function is performed by the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser with the support of the Executive Director, who were able to coordinate a 24-person team to develop the Reconciliation Roadmap. This is a much more complicated task than acting as Programme Management Unit for the Reconciliation Programme, as at that time, before the Reconciliation Roadmap was finished, there were many independent institutions engaged in reconciliation activities (reconciliation is a very sensitive issue in Liberia that has virtually as many interpretations as peacebuilding stakeholders). The capabilities of this team, however, did not translate into a proper performance of the PBO’s Programme Management function. The reasons for this are analyzed in the next section.

3.6.3. Workload of different PBO positions

Management staff: the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit

207. Finding 32. The workload of the management staff (Executive Director and Head of the Programme Unit) is excessive, especially because of the high complexity of tasks carried out as advisers to the GoL on peacebuilding issues, since it is the management staff that assumes almost all work related to “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding”, and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding” accountabilities.

208. Finding 33. The effectiveness analysis indicates that management staff are prioritizing some accountabilities and tasks over others, which is clear proof of their overload. This situation affects two accountabilities pertaining to the PBO’s function as JSC Secretariat, namely: “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight”, and “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design.” It also affects one accountability pertaining to the PBO’s function as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office: “acting as Programme Management Unit”. Finally, accountabilities related to acting as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding issues are implemented in a timely manner with high quality despite the fact that they cannot be planned, which indicates they have high priority.

209. Finding 34. The way the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser have been prioritizing tasks indicates that the MIA reporting line has priority over the JSC co-chairs and PBSO reporting lines.
210. **Executive Director:** the main tasks to be carried out in this post according to its 2014 TOR are:

- Providing overall management of PBO, supervising staff performance, procurement and general financial issues; organizing meetings of the JSC; coordinating with the PBSO; ensuring timely submission of JSC reports; ensuring coordination between PBF Liberia and national processes, in particular to the AFT; and serving as a focal point for managing overall functions of the PBO and acting as a focal point for RUNOs.

**JSC Secretariat:** providing overall management of PBO, supervising staff performance, procurement and general financial issues; organizing meetings of the JSC; coordinating with the PBSO; ensuring timely submission of JSC reports; ensuring coordination between PBF Liberia and national processes, in particular to the AFT; and serving as a focal point for managing overall functions of the PBO and acting as a focal point for RUNOs.

**GOL Peacebuilding Office:** developing the three-year strategic work plan for the PBO to ensure the full implementation of the SMC; coordinating with the Country Configuration in New York to guide the strategic plan for the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016; and ensuring timely submission of SMC reports. The Executive Director also has responsibilities not included in the TOR related to acting as an adviser to the GOL on peacebuilding issues that pertain to PBO’s accountabilities “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding”, and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”.

210.1. Activities related to contributing to strategic policymaking usually involve a desk review of several policy related documents as well as comparative reviews of other country documents to learn from their experiences. A first draft is then developed which will be improved upon thorough consultations with relevant stakeholders. For example, the development of the Reconciliation Roadmap involved reviewing the peacebuilding strategies of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Solomon Island and Kenya to learn from their experiences and see what could be applied to the Liberian context. After the comparative review was completed, the PBO prepared a zero draft and circulated it to various actors for review and inputs until the document was finalized.

210.2. The Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit work in close coordination and collaboration as advisers to the GoL on peacebuilding issues on most policy documents. Depending on the nature of the work the Executive Director or the Head of the Programme Unit take the lead. Most times it is the Head of the Programme Unit who takes the lead on proposals and project related documents, while the Executive Director takes the lead on policy related documents. Field based research and analysis is usually carried out by the Head of the Programme Unit, while desk review is usually carried out by the Executive Director.

211. Finally, the Executive Director supports the Head of the Programme Unit in his role as Programme Manager by coordinating all project teams in peacebuilding. At the time of this evaluation there were ten projects supported by the PBO: eight projects under the Liberia

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68 The list of responsibilities of each position is not intended to be exhaustive, thus only those especially relevant responsibilities were included. A complete description of each position’s responsibilities and an analysis of the complexity of responsibilities can be found in Annex 11.
Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016, plus the two Justice and Security projects (Hub 1 and Hubs 2 and 3 projects) under the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme 2011-2013 that have been extended to 31 December 2016. When funds are available, this figure will be expanded to include the “Social Cohesion Initiative”, the “Communication and Outreach Project” and the “National Internship Programme”.

212. The list of tasks to be carried out by the Executive Director and the high complexity of some of them\(^{69}\), especially those related to acting as adviser to the GoL at the strategic level and coordinating all project teams in peacebuilding, suggest that his workload is excessive. Direct observation of PBO’s activities bore witness to how the Executive Director is permanently interrupted with phone calls, emails and people trying to arrange a meeting or who are looking for advice or funding.

**Head of the Programme Unit**

213. The main tasks to be carried out in this post according to its 2014 TOR are basically related to acting as Programme Manager for the Reconciliation Programme with the support of the Executive Director, namely: ensuring the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 is implemented in line with the elements approved by the JSC; supporting information sharing; coordinating and supervising project managers; maintaining up-to-date, comprehensive conflict mapping assessments of the country; leading reports on SMC; and following-up on JSC decisions and updating JSC members. The Head of the Programme Unit also has responsibilities not included in the TOR related to acting as adviser to the GOL on peacebuilding issues that pertain to PBO’s accountabilities “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding”, and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”.

215. The list of tasks to be implemented by the Head of the Programme Unit and the high complexity of some of them\(^{70}\), especially those tasks related to acting as adviser to the GoL at the technical level, suggest that his workload is excessive. Direct observation of PBO’s activities bore witness to how the Head of the Programme Unit is also constantly interrupted with phone calls and emails and people waiting to meet with him at the PBO.

**Tasks prioritization by management staff**

216. The evaluation identified some situations which clearly indicate that the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser have been prioritizing some tasks over others. Some examples on this situation are provided below.

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\(^{69}\) Especially complex tasks are highlighted in light brown in Annex 11.

\(^{70}\) Especially complex tasks are highlighted in light green in Annex 11.
217. The secretarial support to JSC meetings cannot be considered a complicated task, but requires planning and working in a systematic manner to follow up on decisions made. However, this support has not been provided in a timely and systematic way as shown by the effectiveness analysis. The reporting lines for these tasks are the JSC co-chairs and PBSO.

218. The review of project proposals by the TAP was a key task under direct responsibility of the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit, but they were not sufficiently involved in this task. The process was essentially facilitated by the M&E Team, which volunteered in August 2013 to help move the process along even though it was not directly M&E related but was top priority for the development of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016. The reporting lines for this task are the JSC co-chairs and PBSO.

219. The fact that the weakness of the PBO’s Programme Management function is one of the sources of inefficiency in the overall performance of the PBO shows that “acting as PMU for the Reconciliation Programme” is not a priority for the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser. The reporting line for this accountability is the MIA, but this is a special case. A Reconciliation Officer was recruited in August 2013 although the plan was to recruit a Program Manager. The MIA prioritized having a Reconciliation Officer within the PBO instead of strengthening the Programme Management function.

220. Highly complex tasks directly implemented by the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit associated with “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding” accountabilities of the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office are implemented with high quality and in a timely manner despite the fact that they cannot be planned in advance. The reporting lines for this task are MIA and the Liberia Development Alliance.

**M&E Team**

**M&E Specialist**

221. The main tasks to be carried out in this post according to its 2014 TOR are: supporting the JSC in its reporting obligations; elaborating an M&E plan with assigned roles and responsibilities, methods of data collection and cost allocation for tracking outcome indicators and critical assumptions outlined in the results framework of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016; providing technical support to strengthen the M&E capacities of RUNOs and NIPs, including training in Results Based Monitoring (RBM), etc.
222. Some additional tasks have been assigned to the M&E Specialist, namely: providing M&E support to the J&S Regional Hubs; coordinating the production of annual JSC reports; supporting PBO management with any upcoming tasks; collecting and consolidating updates from national and international partners for the SMC Annual Reports; supporting the design and application of a 'National Reconciliation Barometer survey'; conceptualizing and coordinating the Public Perception Surveys on Justice & Security (one in 2013, one in 2014); providing M&E trainings to NIPs and RUNOs; and training the M&E Officer.

223. The list of tasks to be implemented by the M&E Specialist and the high complexity of some of them indicate that his workload is quite heavy.

224. M&E Officer: the main tasks to be carried out in this post according to its 2014 TOR are: documenting and guaranteeing follow-up of the JSC’s decisions with those submitting reports on the projects; providing quality assurance and consolidating draft reports submitted by project teams; identifying problems that may arise in relation to project delivery and management. The list of tasks assigned to the M&E Officer indicates that his workload is reasonable.

225. Distribution of tasks within the M&E Team: the two members of the M&E Team collaborate in carrying out most of the M&E and reporting support activities. However, it is usually the M&E Specialist who leads the main tasks such as preparing JSC reports, analyzing data from Public Perception Surveys on Justice and Security and writing the reports, or designing the content of training sessions. As a consequence, the distribution of work within the M&E Team is unequal to some extent.

Other technical staff

226. Reconciliation Officer: according to her 2014 TOR, she is responsible for: maintaining communications with MIA on reconciliation matters; supporting project managers or focal persons for each thematic area of the Reconciliation Roadmap to ensure its full implementation; supervising performance tracking and management of implementing partners to ensure quality assurance and delivery of outputs on time. The list of tasks assigned to the Reconciliation Officer suggests that her workload is reasonable.

227. Training Officer: according to his 2014 TOR, he is responsible for: developing training manuals on Conflict Sensitivity, conflict analysis and transformation, and conflict early warning for PBO workshops, seminars and related programmes; facilitating executive
consultations with policymakers on Conflict Sensitivity and follow-up to ensure its practical
application; conducting analyses of the implementation of national processes and documents
within the context of Conflict Sensitivity; facilitating building and strengthening Conflict
Sensitivity capabilities of the GoL. The list of responsibilities and tasks of the M&E Training
Officer and the high complexity of some of them indicate that his workload is quite heavy.

228. **The EWER Consultant** is responsible for coordinating the “Strengthening
Local/Traditional Mechanisms Project”; developing and providing leadership for a consortium
of CSOs, UN organizations and GoL actors involved with conflict early warning and
prevention in Liberia; leading the EWER Working Groups; assisting the PBO with policy
advice and in developing strategic frameworks in conflict transformation, governance and
reconciliation, etc. The high complexity of tasks of the EWER consultant indicates that his
workload is quite heavy.

229. **Administrative Unit:** the workload of different members of the Administrative Unit is
reasonable (Procurement Officer, Administrative Officer and Administrative Assistant) with
the exception of the Finance Officer, whose list of tasks, according to the 2014 TOR for the
position, is quite long and has been expanded to provide support to all GoL ministries to ensure
that budget proposals comply with the administrative guidelines of different international
donors.

3.6.4. **Type of contract of each PBO position**

230. **Finding 35.** The majority of PBO staff members, including the PBO management staff
have temporary contracts with the MIA, which, together with the physical location of the PBO,
explains disparities on how different reporting lines are conceived by the PBO, the MIA being
the main reporting line.

231. **Finding 36.** Once the M&E Specialist’s contract expires at the end of 2014, the M&E
Officer will not be able to undertake all the tasks currently assigned to the M&E Team for the

232. The majority of PBO staff members have temporary contracts with the MIA as individual
contractors; none of them are Civil Servants. The M&E Specialist has a temporary contract
with UNDP and the EWER Consultant has a temporary contract with Humanity United. The
contract of the M&E Specialist expires at the end of 2014, which means that the M&E Officer
alone will have to assume all current M&E tasks of the PBO. This is not realistic since the
workload of the M&E Specialist, which is quite heavy, will be added to the current workload of the M&E Officer.

233. The influence MIA has on the PBO is mainly due to the contractual status of most of PBO’s personnel as well as some other factors such as: the physical location of the PBO within the MIA compound; the fact that PBO staff salaries, with the exception of the M&E Specialist and the EWER Consultant, are only paid after approval of individual monthly performance reports by MIA; and that MIA has to approve every PBO expenditure as it is a signatory on PBO’s account. The effects of this influence can be seen in how the PBO managed the conflict of interests situations mentioned above and in how the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Programme Manager prioritize tasks. Ultimately, this influence means that the PBO prioritizes the reporting line to MIA over the reporting lines to the JSC co-Chairs and PBSO. This means that the PBO is strongly accountable to the MIA, while accountability to the PBSO and to JSC co-Chairs is not so strong.

4. CONCLUSIONS

234. Conclusion 1. All PBO's accountabilities are relevant to the country context or necessary for the proper deployment and management of different PBF funds allocations to Liberia.

235. Conclusion 2. The PBO works in a very complex scenario characterized by the existence of multiple and sometimes conflicting priorities where the environment plays a major role in its performance. The workload on most PBO personnel is quite heavy because of the large number of PBO’s accountabilities and associated tasks. In addition, the PBO interacts with numerous peacebuilding stakeholders with common interests relating to peacebuilding in Liberia, but with different priorities that the PBO needs to manage. The PBO has various reporting lines and satisfying all of them equally was a challenge on occasions which put the PBO in conflict of interest situations that should be prevented.

236. Conclusion 3. The evaluation identified two clear conflict of interest situations involving the two following accountabilities of the PBO as JSC Secretariat, namely: “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight”, and “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design, implementation, M&E and reporting”, in both cases the reporting lines are PBSO, the JSC co-Chairs and the MPTF-O. In both cases the situations were managed by the PBO following the same pattern: the PBO did not share information it had exchanged with the PBSO in a complete and transparent manner with relevant stakeholders including RUNOs, NIPs and JSC members mainly because a MIA priority did not match PBSO’s funding priorities and
MIA’s objective was prioritized. This shows that the MIA reporting line was given priority over the PBSO, JSC co-Chairs and MPTF-O reporting lines, which hindered PBF’s ability to act accountably on its investments and JSC's ability to make appropriate decisions about the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.

237. **Conclusion 4.** The PBO’s functioning has been affected by four sources of inefficiency, namely: the weakness of PBO’s Programme Management and communication functions; decision-making processes; and poorly applied administrative Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

238. **Conclusion 5.** The weakness of the Programme Management function is essentially caused by the absence of a Senior Programme Manager at the PBO. A Reconciliation Officer was recruited in August 2013 while the plan had been to recruit a Program Manager; however the MIA prioritized having a Reconciliation Officer within the PBO on the basis of strengthening the Programme Management function. As a consequence, this function is jointly performed by the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit, neither of whom dedicate enough time to it, which means that basic programme management tasks, such as systematically organizing internal coordination meetings or preparing and periodically updating detailed work plans, have not been performed. This weakness basically consists of poor coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO; poor planning of PBO’s activities; and poor management of logistics (principally the unavailability of vehicles for PBO’s day-to-day functioning). Poor coordination, communication and information sharing within the PBO all lead to a compartmentalized way of supporting PBF supported projects and other initiatives that are under the supervision of the PBO. As a consequence different PBF supported projects are not seen by the PBO as being part of the Reconciliation Programme but as individual interventions, which prevents synergies and avoiding overlaps among different projects.

239. **Conclusion 6.** The PBO has a hierarchical organizational model where the most important information is managed by the Executive Director, who does not always systematically and reliably share relevant information within the PBO or with other peacebuilding stakeholders. The Executive Director personally responds to every information request and carries out almost every communication activity of the PBO. Additionally, decision-making processes are equally centralized. It is the Executive Director, in consultation with the Head of the Programme Unit, who makes all decisions from the strategic level down to the micromanagement level, which is not an efficient use of management staff’s time. This organizational model contributes, to some extent, to the excessive workload of the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser, and to a delay in processing requests for information or in
decision-making when the Executive Director is not available because of his professional obligations. In addition overtly hierarchical organizational structures are not conducive to empower staff and results in the underutilization of available human resources, which in the case of the PBO are excellent, in technical terms.

240. **Conclusion 7.** The large number and high complexity of the tasks the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser perform as advisers to the GoL on peacebuilding issues generate an excessive workload for the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit, which is only increased by the above-mentioned PBO organizational model. Despite the fact that they try to perform all the tasks to fulfill the accountabilities they are responsible for, as shown by the effectiveness analysis, some tasks do not receive enough of their attention, which means they have been executed poorly and not in a timely manner or without their full involvement. Both the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit/Senior Technical Adviser have often been put in the position of having to prioritize some tasks over others due to the overload of work. Management staff have prioritized tasks according to the strength of the various PBO’s reporting lines, where the MIA reporting line has the highest priority.

241. **Conclusion 8.** The prioritization of the MIA reporting line over other reporting lines, such as the PBSO or the JSC Co-Chairs, is chiefly explained by two reasons, namely: the majority of PBO staff members, including management staff, have temporary contracts with the MIA, thus they are not Civil Servants; and the PBO is physically located within the MIA compound.

242. **Conclusion 9.** Poorly applied administrative SOPs have been affecting almost every activity of the PBO but especially fieldwork. This is an internal and external source of inefficiency since both the Administration Unit of the PBO and UNDP Operations Department are responsible for it. The PBO has not always been able to prepare procurement documentation to a high enough standard and responses from the UNDP Operations Department usually lack consistency and timeliness.

243. **Conclusion 10.** Effectiveness of the PBO in “supporting JSC functioning and oversight” has been poor when it comes to the implementation of various tasks associated with facilitating JSC meetings. These have not been adequately planned and were therefore conducted in a non-systematic and untimely manner, which has hindered JSC’s ability to make adequate decisions on the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016. It has also obstructed the application of decisions made by the JSC due to a non-systematic handling of minutes from JSC meetings and to non-systematic follow-up on decisions made by the JSC.
244. **Conclusion 11.** PBO’s effectiveness in “coordinating and supporting RUNOs and NIPs in project design” was affected by poor planning. This led to project proposals being reviewed too quickly which did not give RUNOs and NIPs enough time to properly improve them, and prevented the identification of synergies and the management of overlaps between proposals; this gave rise to an independent implementation of PBF supported projects that has not been managed by the PBO because of the weakness of its Programme Management function. In addition, the lack of commitment of RUNOs to Delivering as One has contributed to PBF supported projects being developed and implemented in an independent manner.

245. **Conclusion 12.** PBO’s effectiveness in “coordinating and supporting M&E and reporting responsibilities of RUNOs and NIPs” has been excellent. This support has been conducted with an emphasis on developing capabilities, which has helped improve the quality and timelines of JSC reports. The good performance of the PBO when it comes to providing M&E and reporting support and training has to do with the ability of the M&E Team to proactively manage the main sources of inefficiency that affect the majority of PBO’s accountabilities. They’ve achieved this through advance planning of activities and organizing communication activities under the supervision of management staff. However, once the M&E Specialist’s contract expires at the end of 2014, the M&E Officer will not be able to take on all the M&E tasks on their own to fulfill the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 with the same quality and timeliness. The M&E Officer will be overloaded with work as he will continue to carry out his current tasks and will also have to take on the M&E Specialist’s workload, which is also quite heavy.

246. **Conclusion 13.** PBO’s effectiveness in “training GoL policymakers, technical staff and CSOs” on Conflict Sensitive approaches and conflict mediation and management has been good although affected by poorly applied administrative SOPs and the unavailability of vehicles. The fulfillment of this accountability involves frequent field trips, which obviously require timely availability of vehicles and DSAs. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the fulfillment of this accountability, which was taken on by the PBO in 2008, is especially valuable in a context where capabilities for working on peacebuilding are not fully developed.

247. **Conclusion 14.** PBO’s effectiveness in “implementing peacebuilding projects” and “implementing some components of the EWER Mechanism” has been variable. The PBO has been very effective and efficient in supporting the development of M&E tools for the regional J&S hubs and in conducting Public Perception Surveys on J&S in collaboration with the LISGIS and the JSJP. The reasons behind the efficient performance of the PBO in providing M&E support have already been presented in conclusion 12. The PBO’s involvement in the step-by-step implementation of the Palava Hut Programme has been effective. Finally, the PBO
has been neither effective nor efficient in the implementation of the “Strengthening Local/Traditional Mechanisms Project” so far, because of poor planning of the review of project proposals. The project has also been delayed because of lengthy institutional discussions between implementing partners that should have been clarified before approval by the JSC.

248. **Conclusion 15.** PBO’s effectiveness and efficiency in “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and in “supporting or representing the GoL on peacebuilding issues, both nationally and internationally” have been excellent. Associated tasks are carried out by the Executive Director and the Head of the Programme Unit, who have excellent capabilities for providing this support to the GoL. Because of the nature of their activities they have not been affected by the sources of inefficiency previously mentioned. The role played by the PBO in facilitating the preparation of the Reconciliation Roadmap should be highlighted as a great contribution to the strategic organization of reconciliation efforts in Liberia. Finally, the contribution of the PBO to policymaking is especially valuable in a context where capabilities for working on peacebuilding are not fully developed.

249. **Conclusion 16.** PBO’s ability to systematically address gender and human rights issues in the implementation of its tasks is limited. Only some M&E support activities have sporadically addressed gender issues. This is a consequence of weak technical capabilities of PBO staff in regards to gender mainstreaming and a human rights-based approach to programming (HRBA). This weakness hinders PBO’s ability to fulfill its accountabilities in line with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/120 (Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action); the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325; and the International Bill of Human Rights, constituted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which recognizes human rights as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.

71 Extracts from A/RES/53/120: the UN General Assembly: (1) “Calls once again upon States, the United Nations system and all other actors to implement the Platform for Action, in particular by promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective at all levels, including in the design, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programmes to ensure effective implementation of all critical areas of concern in the Platform for Action”. (2) “Directs all its committees and bodies, and draws the attention of other bodies of the United Nations system to the need to mainstream a gender perspective systematically into all areas of their work, in particular in such areas as macroeconomic questions, operational activities for development, poverty eradication, human rights, humanitarian assistance, budgeting, disarmament, peace and security and legal and political matters.”

72 Extracts from Resolution 1325: the UN Security Council: (1) “Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693).” (2) “Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. PBSO.

250. It is recommended that three tasks associated to PBO’s accountability “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight”, pertaining to PBO’s function as JSC Secretariat, be reallocated to another institution. The justification being to prevent a conflict of interest in PBO’s functioning without hindering national ownership and national capabilities for working on peacebuilding. The three tasks that should be reallocated are “preparing, convening and facilitating JSC meetings”, “following up on decisions taken by the JSC”, and “acting as the key focal point for communication with the PBSO on the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016”. The evaluation, during its mission to Monrovia, conducted a participatory assessment to find out which would be the most suitable institution to assume the responsibility of performing these tasks (the complete assessment can be found in Annex 9). The recommendation is to reallocate these tasks to UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office, chiefly because the SRSG is co-Chair of the JSC, which would reinforce PBO’s accountability to the JSC, and because UNMIL has the strategic responsibility for coordinating peacebuilding activities in Liberia within the UN. The three tasks recommended for reallocation pertain to PBO’s accountability “facilitating JSC functioning and oversight”. The current reporting lines, JSC co-Chairs and PBSO, would remain unchanged.

251. Recommendation 2. PBSO. The JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office responsible for the reallocated tasks (“preparing, convening and facilitating JSC meetings”, “following up on decisions taken by the JSC”, and “acting as the key focal point for communication with the PBSO on the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016”) should: maintain a permanent communication with the PBO Senior Programme Manager (see recommendation 4) and the PBO M&E Team; take part in every joint monitoring visit to help identify any challenges and bottlenecks in the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 and to gather accurate information on the implementation of JSC decisions; and should also participate in PBO’s monthly, half yearly and annual meetings. This staff should also maintain regular communication with the PBO Executive Director on any issues affecting the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 to ensure they have the most accurate information on its progress and challenges. Finally, this staff should get involved in final quality assurance of JSC reports and in following-up on decisions made by the JSC members in collaboration with the PBO Executive Director and the Senior Programme Manager.
252. **Recommendation 3. PBSO.** It is recommended that a standard procedure be followed to adequately support JSC meetings. The proposed procedure is described below.

**Preparation of JSC meetings:**
- Information to be shared with JSC members before JSC meetings should be submitted five weeks before the scheduled date of the meeting and should include up to date monitoring data, analysis of this data and relevant information from quarterly reconciliation consultation reports led and prepared by the Executive Director (see recommendation 6) so that the JSC can perform its oversight function of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016.
- JSC members will then have one week to ask for clarifications on the documentation submitted and the JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office will have one week to answer questions and prepare and share a proposed agenda for the meeting.
- JSC will then have one week to propose modifications to the agenda.
- JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office will have one week to finalize the agenda and submit it one week before the JSC meeting date.
- A detailed breakdown of PBO’s annual budgets should be shared with the JSC members for comments and recommendations before approval. Associated financial reports on PBO’s budget expenditures should also be shared with JSC members before approval.

**Handling of minutes (MOMs) of JSC meetings:**
- Note taking needs to be completely accurate.
- A draft version of the MOMs has to be shared with JSC meeting attendants within three days of the meeting and then a week is allowed for any comments to be sent.
- MOMs have to be modified to include any comments then shared again with JSC meeting attendants within three days of the comments deadline.
- Finally, once JSC meetings attendants approve the MOMs, they have to be sent to the JSC co-Chairs to be signed.
- MOMs need to be prepared using a standard template. The following items should always be included: agenda, follow-up on decisions made in previous JSC meetings, human rights and gender challenges and progress, discussions, decisions made, business arising, and list of attendants.
Recommendation 4. PBSO.

253. It is recommended that a Senior Programme Manager be recruited for the PBO. The TOR for this position should include at least the following responsibilities: making decisions at the operational level; ensuring systematic coordination, communication and information sharing among PBO staff members through the organization of weekly, monthly, half yearly and annual meetings and ensuring follow-up on decisions made during these meetings; promoting synergies and collaboration between PBO staff members; managing PBF funded that form part of the Reconciliation Programme by promoting information exchanges, collaborations and synergies between the various projects and among all the partners involved in its implementation (RUNOs, NIPs, CSOs, NGOs, donors and any other additional partners) in a systematic and regular manner (monthly meetings are recommended); maintaining systematic and regular communication and coordination with the JSIP PMU (monthly meetings are recommended); and maintaining permanent communication with the staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office responsible for the three reallocated tasks, to ensure all relevant information on progress and challenges of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 is promptly communicated to the PBSO and to the JSC for adequate decision-making; managing logistics planning to ensure resources such as vehicles and DSAs are ready when required for fieldwork; preparing detailed PBO annual work plans, including every PBO’s task, and reviewing them periodically to adapt them to any challenges or context changes; and reporting to the PBO’s Executive Director, PBSO and the JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office on any difficulties in the performance of his/her duties so the PBSO and JSC can take appropriate action.

254. **Recommendation 5. PBSO.** It is recommended that programme-related activities and tasks associated with the accountabilities of the PBO as adviser to the GoL on peacebuilding be separated. These accountabilities are: “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding”, and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding”. This means that the TOR of the Senior Programme Manager should not include any activity related to these two accountabilities.

Recommendation 6. PBSO.

255. It is recommended that the TOR of the Executive Director and the Senior Technical be revised to include the most detailed description possible of the tasks they’ve been carrying out in their capacity as advisers to the GoL as part of PBO’s accountabilities “contributing to strategic policymaking on peacebuilding” and “supporting the GoL in national and international activities on peacebuilding.”
255.1. The updated TOR of the Executive Director should include a more detailed description of the following tasks: “providing overall responsibility for the PBO management”; and “developing PBO strategic work plans ensuring linkages of PBF Liberia to national processes, in particular the Agenda for Transformation and the National Visioning Exercise.” On the latter task, the TOR of the Executive Director should specify that PBO’s strategic work plans will be done in consultation with main peacebuilding stakeholders such as relevant GoL ministries, PBSO, NIPs, RUNOs, other relevant UN agencies, CSOs, NGOs, donors, etc. by implementing systematic and documented participatory process.

255.2. In the changing Liberian context the strategic guidance of the PBO cannot be limited to the development of the abovementioned strategic work plans. Therefore it is recommended that the TOR of the Executive Director be expanded to include specific tasks to fulfill PBO’s accountability related to conducting extensive consultation on reconciliation issues with decision makers from different peacebuilding stakeholders, including relevant GoL ministries, UNCT, Civil Society and donors. It is recommended that these consultation activities be implemented on a quarterly basis and in a flexible manner, through one-on-one meetings, workshops or work sessions with various stakeholders. The Executive Director should prepare brief reconciliation consultation quarterly reports to be shared with PBO staff members during relevant PBO meetings to link the strategic and operational levels, and also uploaded to PBO’s Website. These brief reports should at least contain information about activities carried out to implement the consultation, list of participants in the consultation and main discussions and proposals. This quarterly report should be one of the inputs used by the JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office to prepare JSC meetings.

255.3. The TOR of the Senior Technical Advisor should include a detailed description of his responsibilities as Senior Technical Adviser of the PBO: the nature of this technical support; and recipients of the support, such as PBO staff members, RUNOs, NIPs, other UN and GoL agencies, donors, etc.

255.4. The review of the TOR of the Executive Director and the Senior Technical Adviser should be based on: their current TOR; information in Annex 11 on tasks they’ve been carrying out that are not included in their current TOR; and on this recommendation; it should avoid overlaps with the TOR of the Senior Programme Manager.

73 First accountability of the PBO as GoL’s Peacebuilding Office in Annex 3.
256. **Recommendation 7. PBO’s Administration Unit and UNDP Operations Department.**

It is recommended that an administrative SOPs manual be prepared with the participation of PBO’s Administration Unit and UNDP Operations Department to clarify all the steps and documentation required to adequately fulfill UNDP’s administrative procedures and those corresponding to the National Implementation Modality (NIM). In addition it is recommended that this manual include a maximum lag time between submission of procurement documentation to UNDP Operations Department and response from this department, and to keep a record of the response time and feedback provided by UNDP Operations Department to the PBO; this will help in verifying the consistency of responses from the UNDP Operations Department. If administrative SOPs continue to delay PBO’s activities the Senior Programme Manager should report the situation to the PBO’s Executive Director and to the JSC support staff at UNMIL’s SRSG’s Front Office to raise the issue with the JSC.

257. **Recommendation 8. PBO.** The PBO’s Website\(^74\) is a very basic tool that needs to be improved to make it more user-friendly and useful by using Web 2.0 resources to promote interaction between different peacebuilding stakeholders through chats and work groups on relevant issues. It is also recommended that the PBO Website be updated with information on its staff such as position, areas of expertise, services provided and contact details so RUNOs, NIPS and any other peacebuilding stakeholder can contact the right PBO staff member instead of always contacting the Executive Director. It is also recommended that all the information concerning PBO’s work be uploaded to the Website: every relevant document on peacebuilding; JSC MOMs; PBO’s annual work plans; detailed breakdown of PBO’s annual budgets and associated financial progress reports; information on PBF funded projects such as project documents, budgets, and progress reports; Public Perception Surveys reports; PBO’s Procedures Manual, etc.

258. **Recommendation 9. PBO’s M&E Team.** It is recommended that joint monitoring visits be organized for RUNOs and NIPs from different PBF funded projects to promote exchanges of information and experiences and foster collaboration and synergies between different PBF funded projects.

259. **Recommendation 10. PBSO and UNDP.** It’s recommended that the contract of the M&E Specialist be extended to ensure that all the M&E tasks planned for the fulfillment of the Liberia Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016 are performed with quality and in a timely manner. At the same time it is recommended that the TOR of the M&E Specialist and the M&E Officer be

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\(^74\) [http://www.lpbo.org](http://www.lpbo.org)
revised to include all the tasks they are currently performing and to modify the distribution of workload and tasks within the M&E Team. More specifically, it’s recommended that some of the complex tasks currently performed by the M&E Specialist be transferred to the M&E Officer to facilitate a transition process before the contract of the M&E Specialist ends; along the same lines it’s also recommended that training of the M&E Officer by the M&E Specialist be fast tracked.

260. **Recommendation 11. PBSO.** It is recommended that JSC reports templates be modified to specifically address human rights and gender issues.

261. **Recommendation 12. PBO.** It is recommended that the capabilities of PBO personnel on gender mainstreaming and on a human rights-based approach to programming be strengthened. A systematic collaboration with UN Women and UNMIL’s Human Rights Protection Section (HRPS) with a focus on developing PBO’s capabilities is recommended. Some self-study resources that can aid this process are provided below:

- **UN Practitioners’ Portal on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Programming:** [http://hrbaportal.org](http://hrbaportal.org)
- **Human rights-based approach. UNFPA:** [http://www.unfpa.org/rights/approaches.htm](http://www.unfpa.org/rights/approaches.htm)
- **The human rights of women. UNFPA:** [http://www.unfpa.org/rights/women.htm](http://www.unfpa.org/rights/women.htm)
- **United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/120.** Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action.
- **United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.**