International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
2013-2017
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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Channel Research</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Comité Technique Conjoint</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR/RR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration/ Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ETD</td>
<td>Decentralized Territorial Entities</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>DRC Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>FSV</td>
<td>Fight against Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>GCP</td>
<td>Donor Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoDRC</td>
<td>Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>GPRSP</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference of the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IMPT</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Team</td>
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<td>ISSSSS</td>
<td>International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kampala Negotiations</td>
<td>Negotiations between the GoDRC and M23</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>Mouvement du 23 mars</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Un Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>Congolese National Police</td>
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<td>PNDDR III</td>
<td>National DDR programme III</td>
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<td>PSCF</td>
<td>Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>RBB</td>
<td>Result-based Budget</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>DRC Armed Forces Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>RRR</td>
<td>Return, Reintegration and Recovery</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Restoration of State Authority</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STAREC</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme for War-Affected Areas</td>
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<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>UN Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>UN Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees/ UN Refugee Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police (part of MONUSCO)</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNSE</td>
<td>UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region</td>
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<td>UNSSSSS</td>
<td>UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy</td>
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<td>UNTF</td>
<td>UN Transitional Framework</td>
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I. METHODOLOGY

In early 2012, following internal assessments and external evaluations of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) which questioned its impact on the stabilization of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the ISSSS partners started to reflect on the need to review the strategy. These efforts were recognized by the UN Security Council and reflected in Resolution 2053 (2012) in its paragraph 7. A report on progress was annexed to the UN Secretary General Report of February 2013. It sets out the objectives and timeframe of major milestones in the revision process.

1. Objectives of the Review

During the first phase of the ISSSS, a number of shortcomings and limitations appeared which have led to its revision, these included:

- The existence of various interpretations of the meaning and content of the ‘stabilization’ concept;
- The absence of a clear definition of the goal and objectives of the stabilization programme;
- Difficulties to assess the impact of interventions due to a lack of baseline studies and the rather basic character of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework – focusing mainly on quantitative indicators and on measuring outputs rather than outcomes and impact;
- Questions around the medium to long term sustainability of investments by the international community and the need to better engage with government authorities at the provincial and central level;
- The limited connection between efforts at the field level, and the formulation and implementation of national reform processes and policies and the need for a strategic dialogue with Government on stabilization issues to emphasize these links.

In order to address these issues, an in-depth review of the ISSSS started in 2012. The review aimed to produce a planning framework elaborating a clear link between an analysis of what causes and fuels conflict in eastern DRC with indicative programme responses which could address these. The relevance of these programmes would be demonstrated through a clear and effective monitoring tool, and periodic evaluations of both individual programme impact, and the impact of the overall strategy itself. The strategy would need to demonstrate synergies with other initiatives in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reinsertion (DDR) of ex-combatants emerging through the dismantling of armed groups; and more targeted sectorial reforms supported by the international community, such as in the justice sector. In addition, as the context evolved through the life of the review process, it became clear that the strategy would have to demonstrate relevance to new initiatives and possibilities, such as those arising from the deployment of MONUSCO’s Force component under the robust mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2098, and to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF).

Specifically, the objectives of the ISSSS revision were:

1. Obtain a clear picture of the main opportunities and threats of the environment in which stabilization activities were implemented;
2. Analyze good practices and weaknesses during the first phase of the programme; and

The following is a summary of the methodology. The full version is available from SSU.
(3) Redefine the strategy and identify clearer, more realistic, programme objectives which would contribute to the desired end-state.

2. Methodological Steps

The methodology for the ISSSS review, defined in a workshop held in June 2012, include the following 4 main steps:

1. Definition of the objectives of the review
2. Diagnosis
3. Definition of the Strategic Concept
4. Definition of the operational modalities of the strategy

2.1. Definition of the objectives of the review

The first step of the review process aimed at developing a shared vision among all ISSSS partners on the review objectives, through agreeing a methodology to guide the review, proposing a working definition of the concept of stabilization in the context of eastern DRC, and the development of policy and programmatic theories of change (ToC) to be refined throughout the review process. These steps were achieved through a workshop held on 4 and 5 June 2012 in Goma with key ISSSS implementing partners and donors. The outcomes and conclusions in terms of the way forward for the review were then shared with Government counterparts.

2.2. Diagnosis

The Diagnosis phase of the process aimed at developing an analytical basis at 3 levels – macro/environment, structural/pillars, micro/projects, for the review of the strategy concept and pillars.

- At macro level (environment):

The diagnosis aimed at analyzing the strategic security and political environment at local, national and regional levels, as well as the regulatory and policy framework in force, (i) during the first phase and (ii) at the beginning of the second phase, through the following:

1. Contextual Analysis: analysis of the overall context in which stabilization activities were implemented realized through interviews with 50 national and international stabilization stakeholders between March to May 2012 in eastern DRC and in Kinshasa;
2. Conflict Analysis and Mapping: in-depth desk review of relevant literature and other conflict analysis resulting in the development of an ISSSS conflict analysis. The mapping of the local, national and regional dimensions of the conflict dynamics and identification of the root and proximate causes; critical dynamics, entry points and generic policy responses which should inform the search for sustainable solutions.
3. Analysis of the National Regulatory Frameworks:
   a. Analysis of the key reforms influencing stabilization (army, police, justice, decentralization, land reform), their main orientations, potential contributions to conflict transformation and impact on ISSSS, as well as the contribution of the revised ISSSS to their implementation if any;
b. Analysis of the development policy frameworks of the GoDRC and international supporting frameworks in which the ISSSS is included.

4. Analysis of Regional and National Peace Processes: the negotiations between the Government of the DRC (GoDRC) and the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) (Kampala Negotiations), the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in February 2013, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2098, the re-launching of the DDR process and the development of the national DDR programme III (PNDDR III), and the conclusions of the National Consultations of September 2013.

- At structural level – pillars: examine and validate or adjust the existing structure of 5 broad thematic pillars comprising the ISSSS;

- At micro level (projects):

At the micro-level, the objective was to identify best practices, deficiencies and areas for improvement, and analyze the impact of programmes with a view to guiding the development of the project portfolio for the second phase. It included the following:

1. Analysis of the Programmatic Responses of the First Phase: Data was analyzed to provide a picture of the impact at programmatic level. The following sources were used: the 2011 and 2012 Situation Assessments – quantitative data on pillar-specific indicators compiled to provide a picture of the evolution of the situation with regards to security, restoration of state authority and return, reintegration and recovery; Quarterly Reports; as well as the 2010 ISSSS external evaluation, the 2013 external evaluation of projects financed by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), external evaluations of individual programmes contributing to stabilization efforts. The picture was only partial due to lack of qualitative data, limited availability of information beyond output-level, and the realization of very few external evaluations of programmes and projects.

2. Diagnosis of the 5 pillars: the realization of desk research and pillar workshops enabled SSU and ISSSS partners to establish (1) the specific problematic the pillar was designed to tackle and; (2) the impact of projects during the first phase, including challenges and lessons learned.

The diagnostic was then consolidated to provide an analytical overview enabling the formulation of the strategic concept.

2.3. Definition of the Strategic Concept

The realization of the diagnosis enabled the entry into a new phase of the revision: the definition of the strategic concept. This phase included:

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2 The workshop on the ‘Support to Political Processes’ pillar was held in Goma in September and attended by 25 representatives of international stakeholders; the second workshop on the ‘Restoration of State Authority’ (RSA), co-organized with the Interprovincial Coordination of the STAREC programme, was held at the end September 2012 and attended by 85 participants from GoDRC authorities and international stakeholders; For the Security pillar, a series of bilateral consultations and meetings were held in August 2012 with both international and national partners; the third workshop on the ‘Return, Reintegration and Recovery’ (RRR) was co-organized with the STAREC South-Kivu, held on 16-18 of April 2013 and attended by national and international stakeholders; the last workshop on the ‘Fight against Sexual Violence’ (FSV) pillar was held in Bukavu on 18-20 June 2013, co-organized with the national Ministry of Gender, Family and Childhood and attended by 80 national and international participants.
1. Definition of ‘stabilization’: based on an analysis of existing definitions of stabilization and case studies of other stabilization interventions. A number of common characteristics were identified and transposed to the DRC environment to develop a proposed definition, which was subsequently amended and validated by international partners during the June 2012 workshop.

2. Definition of critical factors whose engagement seem necessary for the success and sustainability of ISSSSS interventions: the compilation of findings on the first phase environment and programmatic response resulted in the identification of critical factors affecting stabilization and the elaboration of mitigating strategies to ensure that these are taken under consideration in future programme design (risks analysis).

3. Definition of different levels of theories of change (generic/strategic, pillars): based on the definition of the stabilization concept and the overall objective of stabilization for the DRC, as well as strategic risks identified. The ToC developed in June 2012 were continuously enriched through the pillar workshop discussions.

4. Revision of the pillars: for each of the pillars, the workshop enabled national and international partners to articulate the strategic approach of the new orientation. These were compiled following each workshop or consultation into five concept notes including in areas new to the second phase: (a) new principles of engagement and pillar ToC; (b) outputs and policy response; and (c) links with other pillars. Upon finalization, these notes were commented on and validated by partners.

2.4. Definition of Operational Modalities

The last step in the review looked at the operational modalities of the strategy, i.e. the operational principles, programming approach, coordination and funding mechanisms, and the M&E framework.

The challenges and lessons learned with regards to the operational modalities were identified through desk research, discussed in each of the pillar workshops, with recommendations formulated by participants, and findings were included in the pillar concept notes. From the pillar-level conclusions, the SSU team analyzed the pillar findings to identify issues to be addressed at the strategy level. For each of these issues, the desk research and workshop discussions provided SSU with enough substance to consolidate comprehensive challenges and lessons learned. On the contrary, the development of operational recommendations required, and – with regards to the programming approach, coordination and funding mechanisms – still requires, additional work.

The development of the revised M&E framework, addressing identified short-comings – the main one being the measure of impact, required significant work. Thanks to the support of the UK Department for International Development (DfID), a consultancy company – Channel Research (CR), worked hand-in-hand with SSU and ISSSS partners to develop a revised M&E framework, adapted to the new strategy and defining tools which could be used to enable partners to assess the impact of second phase interventions. CR conducted 3 missions to Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu and Bunia and met with key partners, including personnel of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGO), local authorities and donors. A workshop was then held in July to validate CR proposals with all ISSSS partners.
II. DIAGNOSIS

1. Conflict Analysis and Mapping

Between 1996 and 2003, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced two wars in which nine foreign armies and some thirty armed groups clashed on its territory. These wars led to the temporary partition of the country and the death of millions of people. The 2002 Sun City peace agreement contained provision for territorial reunification, the installation of a transitional government and the formation of an army of national unity. Ten years later, despite the signing of several peace agreements, the organization of two presidential elections (in 2006 and 2011), and a significant investment of international resources, eastern DRC continues to host many armed factions and experience regular cycles of violence. The complexity and longevity of the Congolese conflict should be seen in the context of a profound disintegration of Congolese society over the last decades, and the interplay of two mutually reinforcing cycles of conflict – one regional, the other local, with local, national and regional dimensions.

Without an in-depth understanding of the context, the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC may seem to be a result of regional agendas, greed for mineral riches, and a lack of capacity of state institutions to manage the situation. In reality, the dynamics at the heart of the conflict are more complex.

1.1. The Anarchic Playing Field: Root Causes of the Conflict

At the root of the conflict are structural factors which keep the state weak and fragmented and which cause tensions between the state and its citizens, thereby creating the conditions for conflict. Root causes do not lead to violence directly but they do create the unequal, anarchic playing field within which individuals, groups and institutions who formulate violent responses to the opportunities and challenges of the context seem to prosper to the detriment of those who do not.

The following are the main root causes of conflict in eastern DRC. All are deeply interconnected:

1. Patrimonialism. The Congolese state and its citizens are caught up in a patrimonial system, in which everyone is part of a reciprocal network: to get ahead in life, people need to use their jobs or weapons, to ‘feed’ the networks that keep them in their positions. Competition over the control of state resources is a high-stakes, zero-sum contest. State resources provide opportunities for enrichment and are, for many, the only vehicle through which they can advance and protect their privileges. Those who end up outside the patrimonial pyramid lack this type of access, often leading to resentment. This patrimonial system is active in all parts of society; it is active between the highest political authorities and between average citizens, proffered equally by army officers as by businessmen and businesswomen. Such a system thrives best when state institutions are kept too weak to provide viable checks and balances against it. As such, the DRC fits the description of what some call an ‘intentionally fragile state’, where institutions are purposefully kept weak so as to be more easily exploited. This is particularly acute in the case of the country’s justice and security

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3 Root causes are factors of conflict fragility, structural issues which contribute to tensions between individuals and communities, place stress on government and society, and create the conditions for inter-group conflict. But, in the absence of multipliers or drivers, they are not in themselves sufficient to cause these conflicts to develop into organized violence.
institutions, which sometimes function more to protect private interests than to provide services to the people or safeguard the country’s territorial integrity. As a result, the state is not always able to mediate conflicts peacefully, or exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence to quash illegal armed groups. Moreover, many civil society organizations and NGOs are also part of this patrimonial network and work for political or private ends, and do not provide a counter-weight to the influence of elites.

2. **Fragmented identities.** In uncertain times, people fall back on smaller reciprocal networks, which are usually made up of their tribe, clan and extended family. The more outside pressure there is, in the form of increased violence or reduced livelihoods, the more people are likely to define their social group in small, exclusive terms, increasing the perceived differences between themselves and other groups. An important element of ethnic and group identity is based on the relationship to ancestral lands and the granting of land access through traditional mechanisms. Recent changes in traditional systems governing usufruct rights and the confiscation by the state or selling by traditional chiefs of large parcels of land are also often seen as threatening identity. These dynamics are used by political entrepreneurs, who fuel tensions to mobilize groups in their favor. Even if peace returns, people will remember the harm they suffered at the hands of other groups, which makes it difficult for solidarity between citizens to establish itself after the conflict has ended, and keeps tensions simmering under the surface. The years of conflict in the DRC has deeply engrained these perceived differences in people’s minds.

3. **People’s ingrained frame of reference.** Most citizens of eastern DRC have been through various wars in their lifetime and live in a constant state of insecurity. They have little objective information available to them. This has fundamentally altered people’s outlook on life. Not knowing what the future will bring has made many people’s outlook quite short-term, focused on day-to-day survival. As people have little experience of change through non-violent means, violence has become engrained as a legitimate response to resolve actual or potential conflict. This creates a society which tends to be skeptical about long-term peaceful political change and which, once mobilized, can turn very violent. A particularly worrying effect of this dynamic is the growth of disparities between men and women and the creation of violent masculinities. This has profound implications for women and girls, increasing their potential victimization and limiting their abilities to participate in conflict resolution processes.

4. **Socio-demographic pressure.** The highly fertile strip of land lying between the forest basins to the west and the mountainous borders of the east is heavily populated by a growing number of people. With significant areas not available for cultivation as the result of the establishment of National Parks during the 20th Century, competition over the ownership and access to the remaining agricultural land is growing, and fuelling ethnic tensions. In the past few decades, land-grabbing by opportunists well connected to the different elites which have seized control over the area have taken advantage of the political economy of chaos to carve out for themselves large farms and ranches from which others are now excluded. Thus corrupt practices combined with natural pressures occurring as a result of growing
populations in a context where few alternatives exist to agricultural modes of production all fuel current or potential conflict.

5. **Poverty.** People struggle to make ends meet on a daily basis, which increases their short-term outlook on life. As agriculture offers increasingly fewer opportunities, many young people choose to migrate to cities or zones rich in natural resources, where an income may be made more easily. However, city jobs often lack any long term future and working in mineral zones is highly exploitative. This increases the pool of unemployed youths and the attractiveness of armed groups, who promise a relatively easy income through illegal taxation and theft. As youths escape the conservative bounds of village society, their elders often have less influence over them in terms of establishing and enforcing respect for traditional social norms, and are no longer accepted as mediators when violence does erupt.

6. **Access to Land.** Land is an issue around which many of the other root causes of conflict are crystallized. Land is not only important as a limiting factor in agricultural production of all kinds, but is also the source of a host of other primary resources deriving from the use of forests: timber, charcoal, bush meat, foraged foodstuffs etc; and mineral resources derived through mining activities. Aside from providing people with livelihoods, land governs people’s access to power and is an important source of identity, being associated with the history of the tribe and a factor in determining national identity. This makes access to land a pivotal and multifaceted cause of conflict. Land-related conflicts range from competing inter-group claims of original occupancy, conflicts between traditional authorities and the state over the right to grant land, individual disagreements over titles, usage and boundaries, as well as tensions between socio-professional groups.

1.2. **Violent Dynamics: Drivers of Conflict**

The figure below shows how the interactions between the root causes of conflict, and the presence of conflict “multipliers” (the availability of small arms and light weapons, impunity and the activities of conflict entrepreneurs) leads to violence. This conflict map takes as a starting point the inability of people to meet their basic needs, be it in the form of security, livelihoods, or community solidarity, and how this condition in the presence of conflict multipliers leads to a cycle of violence which perpetuates and feeds on itself.

On the left-hand side of the figure are the negative conflict dynamics. The ability to meet basic needs in a patrimonial system depends on one’s networks and relative position within the system. To be able to exploit institutions, they are purposefully kept weak. The results are (1) that the Congolese state is vulnerable to external interference; (2) the DRC Armed Forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo - FARDC) and security institutions lack the capacity to provide public security and may be used instead to secure private interests; (3) the state does not provide a functioning regulatory framework. The consequence of these three dynamics is that people live in physical and institutional insecurity, which exacerbates their reliance on exclusive (mostly ethnic) in-and out-groups. These tensions are manipulated by armed actors to turn violent.

The right-hand side of the figure depicts the existing positive dynamics which could potentially counter these conflict dynamics. The conflict has caused or strengthened the limited availability of
legitimate state services, the fall-back on exclusive identities, the reduction of economic opportunities, and the unequal power relations between women and men. However, these negative dynamics may also have a positive side: (1) services are increasingly provided by a developed civil society with external support; (2) the potential to reinforce the role of traditional and religious leaders as moral authorities provided other issues are addressed simultaneously; (3) after years of war, people are exhausted and there is a growing local demand for peace; (4) women rights organizations have become active; and (5) people have been forced to become creative entrepreneurs (the positive side of débrouillardise) to make a living. Taken together, these dynamics could potentially be supported to increase community resilience against violent mobilization and increase demands for state accountability. These dynamics will be addressed later in this strategy.
The conflict systems map can also be shown in a more simple way, in which four negative dynamics and two positive ones can be distinguished. Like the root causes of conflict, the four negative dynamics, or ‘drivers of conflict’ are inter-linked and produce different outcomes upon interaction with each other.

1. **Security dilemmas.** Security dilemmas are a result of the patrimonial nature of the state, which has kept institutions, in particular defence and security, weak and fragmented. As the state is unable or unwilling to protect people and their livelihoods, communities tend to rely on armed groups for self-defence. The security ‘vacuum’ presents an opportunity for multiple, competing armed groups to flourish and expand their influence and agendas. As certain state actors may have an interest in keeping the fragmented status quo, the state’s usual response to insurgencies is short-term and violent, and rarely addresses the root causes of conflict. This increases the possibilities for mobilization and leads to a heavily militarized eastern DRC, which further entrenches violence in people’s minds as a tool to resolve conflict. This leads to a self-perpetuating cycle. As judicial institutions have been kept purposefully weak, there is near-total impunity for crimes which spurs armed actors on even further. The easy availability of small arms makes this dynamic even deadlier.

2. **Mobilization around land and identity.** Through a complex interplay of root causes (patrimonialism, frames of reference, fragmented identities and socio-demographic issues), community grievances are mobilized. As livelihoods are difficult to come by, communities fall back on exclusive tribal identities (in-groups) as a source of solidarity and resources and identify themselves in contrast with other communities (out-groups). The association of land with tribal identity adds an economic dimension to this process and solidifies identities even further. These grievances are easily manipulated by political or armed actors (conflict
entrepreneurs). Customary authorities play a pivotal role in these dynamics, being the physical manifestation of the community’s possession of the land in question. They have, at times used land-related issues to increase their own influence vis-à-vis other communities and the state.

3. **Exploitation of natural resources.** The availability of valuable, marketable natural resources, which can be exploited by methods requiring relatively small financial inputs, and high-labour intensity, is also attractive to armed groups, as well as political actors and businessmen. In particular, young men are drawn into an exploitative economic situation which leaves them vulnerable to recruitment by those armed groups. As there are few other (or easier) ways to obtain this sort of wealth, control over zones rich in natural resources is an important driver of conflict between armed actors and the state.

4. **Regional dynamics.** A combination of extensive and highly porous borders with neighbouring state, decades – if not centuries – of uncontrolled population flow, and seasonal migration patterns, and the lure of the Congo’s vast natural resources, have created a situation in which the DRC is not the only state with a stake in the future of the East. However legitimate or not these interests may be, the fact now is that individuals, criminal networks and state actors all pursue a complex web of agendas which contribute to prolonging the conflict, either directly, by proxy, or – occasionally – both. One clear result has been to polarize public opinion against Congolese Rwandophone communities and provideneighbouring countries with an excuse to interfere further. The tensions in the border areas have led to a substantial deployment of military personnel, and subsequent predatory behavior and profit-seeking by the military. Moreover, as long as the regional threat remains urgent, the GoDRC may continually rely on a short-term military approach, instead of a long-term political one.
This graphic shows how the overlap of the different dynamics creates particular types of conflict, which require different types of integrated policy responses to counter:

1. **Interplay between ‘security dilemmas’ and ‘mobilization around land and identities’** This analysis reveals why people form self-defence groups to protect themselves or exploit the security vacuum created through fragmented state institutions, and how tensions around land crystallize around identity as competition for land grows and the state cannot or will not protect people’s safety or property. These tensions can then be manipulated by conflict entrepreneurs. The original interplay is strengthened by the addition of ‘regional dynamics’ which lead to the association of Rwandophone groups with regional politics and drives further mobilization. The ‘exploitation of natural resources’ reinforces the dynamic by proving a readily available source of income for armed groups and the struggle increases in areas rich in natural resources.

2. **Interplay between ‘security dilemmas’ and ‘regional dynamics’**. As a result of the fragmented nature of state institutions, borders are insecure and regional actors can expand their influence in eastern DRC. ‘Mobilization around land and identities’ combines with this dynamic to show how communities mobilize against the supposed foreign threat and increasingly associate Congolese Rwandophone communities with a hostile out-group.

3. **Interplay between ‘exploitation of natural resources’ and ‘regional dynamics’**. As regional actors have become increasingly deeply embroiled in the conflict in eastern DRC, state actors have sought to recoup the costs of military intervention through the exploitation of Congo’s natural resources. In parallel, non-state actors have established profitable cross-border networks to permit personal gains to be made from this illegal trade. These profitable activities are now widely regarded as a factor fuelling further external interference in their own right, either through direct manipulation of the situation by non-Congolese, or manipulation through the intermediary of Congolese proxies.

4. **Interplay between ‘mobilization around land and identity’ and ‘exploitation of natural resources’**. As communities identify the land which produces the resources as closely linked to their tribal identity, they tend to guard rights of access and exploitation jealously. This makes a more rational regime of planned investment, including by legitimate business interests based in the region and beyond, difficult and uncertain unless there is a quick and clear financial advantage to the community claiming possession of the asset. This dynamic in combination with regional dynamics notes how communities associate the exploitation of these resources by ‘foreign’ actors with theft, which increases competition over land and leads to resentment.

5. **Interplay between ‘security dilemmas’ and ‘exploitation of natural resources’**. Security dilemmas lead to a state which is unable to regulate the trade in natural resources, from which high-placed officials and security officers benefit.
6. **Interplay between ‘regional dynamics’ and ‘mobilization around land and identity’**.

   Regional dynamics provide an external, perceived hostile out-group, against which exclusive in-group identities can be formed, leading to mobilization around land and identity.

2. **Policy and Programmatic Responses ISSSS First Phase (2008-2012)**

   **2.1. Development of STAREC and the ISSSS**

   Between 2006 and 2009, eastern DRC experienced some notable advances in the field of peace and security, including the rapprochement between Rwanda and the DRC (Nairobi Communiqué of 2007), the 2008 Goma *Actes d’Engagement*, and the 23 March 2009 Agreements between the government, CNDP, and 14 local armed groups.

   The government developed the Amani programme in response to the 2008 Goma accords and then the Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) programme to consolidate the security gains made under the 23 March agreements. The international community, with MONUC in the lead, developed a support strategy to assist the government in its efforts to stabilize the east: the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) in support of the Amani programme, and the ISSSS in support of the STAREC. Having accompanied the DRC’s formal transition process which culminated in the 2006 elections, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC intended to refocus its efforts and resources on the stabilization of the eastern provinces through the ISSSS, which would allow it to progressively downsize and prepare for its exit. This was reflected in the revision of the mission mandate in June 2010, and the renaming of the mission to MONUSCO, with the ‘S’ reflecting the position of stabilization as one of the mission’s top priorities.

   Joint military operations by Rwanda and the DRC were supposed to neutralize the threat posed by remaining armed groups, particularly the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR). At the same time, STAREC and the ISSSS would “address specific root causes and consequences of conflict, support the implementation of peace initiatives at local level, and help stabilize areas where conflict has recently ceased.” The ISSSS had an approach modeled after counter-insurgency principles, whereby military operations to ‘clear’ areas from armed groups were followed by ‘holding and building’ the state and providing a peace dividend to the population to decrease the attractiveness of armed groups. The underlying assumption was that security vacuums caused by a lack of capacity were exploited by armed groups, and that by strengthening local institutions the state could start taking the situation in hand. This would provide the international community with an exit strategy. Joint programmes were set up around the five pillars of the ISSSS (security, political processes, state authority, socio-economic recovery and fight against sexual violence) along specific strategic axis in North-and South-Kivu and Ituri.

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4 ISSSS Integrated Programme Framework (2009), pg. 7.
5 The six priority axes were chosen with the government on the basis of a quick assessment of where armed groups were active, where returnees were most likely to return to and where grassroots conflicts were ongoing. They were Sake-Masisi and Rutshuru-Ishasha in North Kivu; Miti-Hombo, Burhale-Shabunda and Baraka-Fizi-Minembwe in South Kivu; and Bungo-Boga in Ituri. More information about the stabilization zones is available from SSU.
2.2. Programmatic Responses and Key Results

Between 2008 and 2012, a total of 69 projects were implemented for a total worth of USD367 million. The following are some of the key results under the ISSSS’s five pillars:

1. Improving Security. Security interventions were meant to contribute to the creation of a protective environment for civilians by strengthening security forces, improving discipline and control and supporting the demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. While the MONUSCO force supported FARDC operations, and bilateral partners trained FARDC battalions, ISSSS partners constructed two large FARDC garrisons in South Kivu for officers and their dependents. Built for a total of 1600 soldiers, the barracks could service only some 10% of the FARDC deployed to the east. The DDR process was more successful, with 4900 ex-combatants from the Kivus, Maniema and Province Orientale demobilized, of which 2600 passed through reintegration programmes. Five prosecution support cells were put in place which supported the FARDC in processing dozens of cases of misconduct amongst the military as part of wider efforts to end impunity.

2. Supporting Political Processes. Under this pillar, the national and provincial governments would be supported to advance peace processes and implement commitments made under the 2008 and 2009 peace agreements. As the peace agreements ran aground, there were few ISSSS works undertaken under this pillar. Two projects were set up: the first a one-off programme for medical support to wounded soldiers, the second a programme to support the functioning of the STAREC coordination teams. This second programme improved the functioning of provincial coordination platforms and cooperation between the government and international partners.

3. Restoring State Authority. Under the RSA pillar, essential public services would be re-established in areas formerly controlled by armed groups; security would be transferred to the civilian police; and the rule of law would be strengthened. A network of 90 state infrastructures for administration, police, justice, prisons and mineral trade were constructed in strategic locations across the Kivus and Ituri, connected by some 630 kilometers of improved roads. 860 police officers and 195 administrative officers were trained by the partners to provide services to the people from these new buildings. The actual deployment of state officials was slow though, especially in the justice sector.

4. Facilitating Return, Reintegration and Recovery. Under the RRR pillar, internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees would be supported to return in a safe and dignified way; priority social needs and key sources of conflict would be addressed; and economic recovery would be kick-started. Partners targeted some 500,000 people through interventions in the fields of health, water and sanitation, education and child protection, conflict resolution, community governance and social cohesion, economic and agricultural recovery. These activities were mainly set up in ‘containment zones’ around the most hard-hit areas, to prevent conflict from spilling over to the neighbouring zones.

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6 See the pillars’ concept note for a more in-depth discussion of each pillar’s goals, activities and results, and the difficulties encountered in their implementation (available from SSU).
5. **Fighting Sexual Violence.** Under the FSV pillar, prevention and response to sexual violence would be mainstreamed throughout the pillars above, in line with the Comprehensive Strategy on Sexual Violence subsequently integrated into the National Strategy to Combat Gender-based Violence as its short- to medium-term action plan. Eleven projects were implemented under five components: Fight against Impunity, Protection and Prevention, Security Sector Reform, Multi-Sectoral Assistance, and Data Mapping. Results included the development and validation of National Standards and Protocols on medical and psychosocial assistance; socio-economic reintegration and legal support for survivors of sexual violence; validation of FARDC and Congolese National Police (PNC) manuals to train trainers on sexual violence and other human rights violations; development of tools for sensitization and prevention and improved multisectoral assistance; support to 20 permanent legal clinics which provided legal assistance to 1,108 survivors of sexual violence; and the establishment of a harmonized and integrated data collection system for the prevention and response to sexual violence, based at the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children.

Despite the above results, with the passing of time, partners began questioning the actual impact of the ISSSS as eastern DRC remained unstable and insecure. However, it was difficult to come to concrete conclusions about the impact of the ISSSS on the conflict dynamics of eastern DRC beyond the level of programmatic outputs. The reasons were:

- It was unclear what ‘stabilization’ meant, and what it was supposed to achieve. As the strategy had been set up rapidly in 2008, under pressure to provide rapid peace dividends after the peace accords, the concept of stabilization itself had not been described in detail. It was loosely defined as a transitory phase between humanitarian and development programmes, and based on counter-insurgency models applied in locations like Iraq and Afghanistan. In **absence of a common vision and objectives**, partners set up programmes in a diffused way, based on different understandings of conflict dynamics, and negotiated bilaterally with a broad range of donors. This made it difficult for partners to target their programmes towards a singular stabilization objective and created difficulties for the monitoring and evaluation of the strategy’s impact.

- The **monitoring and evaluation** framework of the ISSSS was **rather basic**, focused mainly on quantitative indicators and placed greater emphasis on measuring the concrete outputs of individual projects rather than outcomes and impact of the strategy as a whole. In addition, discussions with partners to feed their programmes into this framework were limited, so programmes reported on different indicators. These were rarely disaggregated by gender, age and locality. To address this situation, the implementing partners of the ISSSS met in 2011 and developed a number of indicators per pillars. However, as qualitative indicators were mostly missing, only a partial picture could be provided. In addition, there were**few baseline studies** conducted. As a result, it was difficult to measure what exactly had changed for better or worse, and whether this was related to the programmes or to other factors.

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7 For more detailed discussion of why the impact of the ISSSS was difficult to measure see, ISSSS situation assessment, pillar papers, an independent studies.
2.3. Contextual Limitations

Despite the limited evidence of the impact of ISSSS programmes on the eastern DRC’s conflict dynamic, internal and external evaluations tend to agree on the reasons for the strategy’s seemingly limited success in stabilizing eastern DRC:

- Due to the emergency context in which the ISSSS was first set up, programmes were designed in a top-down manner, without much initial consultation of the provincial authorities and stakeholders or in-depth analysis of the conflict context. As a result, programmes were often rather static and not always able to adapt to the complex and ever-evolving local dynamics of conflict.

- Programmes were developed based on the assumption that the government would be an equal partner in the stabilization process: leading the process through engagement with the STAREC and working towards long-term solutions to address the root causes of conflict by implementing peace agreements and national reforms (SSR, decentralization, public administration and civil service, land and mining reform). This turned out differently. Following the formal signature of peace agreements in 2008 and 2009, the government became less engaged in the stabilization programme; long-term solutions and reforms were delayed or ran aground due to competing, or sometimes conflicting, political or economic interests. The international community, the UN in particular, was progressively sidelined from political discussions, in particular those concerning agreements with armed groups. The government, after a period of supervised transition, had seemingly decided to limit international engagement with sovereign matters. The lack of a long-term political solution contributed to continuing insecurity and instability. The STAREC and the ISSSS – designed as technical responses and not yet equipped to engage with national processes and dynamics of conflict, could only produce short-term results, which would be unsustainable in the long run.

- Similarly, within the UN, the ISSSS progressively became one of a constellation of technical programmes increasingly divorced from the political content necessary to provide coherence and ensure the long term sustainability of interventions. This was partly a result of the changing security situation in the East: with armed groups on the rise, MONUSCO went back into a more reactive military protection-mode and was less focused on medium-to long-term phase-out visions. The government also requested the UN to focus more on military operations, state capacity building and economic development. The engagement of the mission with longer-term political processes, such as SSR and decentralization, was similarly reduced to technical support. The international response to the crisis in eastern DRC became diffuse and uncoordinated.

- The limited engagement of the GoDRC and MONUSCO with the stabilization process became apparent through the inactivity of the national level coordination mechanisms established to promote dialogue between the GoDRC and the International Community, such as the Comité de Pilotage and the Comité de Suivi. A number of other factors affected the process, such as the marginalization of the STAREC with the broader government programme and the lack of
funding for the implementation of the programme; the growing cleavage between the GoDRC national level institutions involved in the STAREC and those at the provincial level; and the limited human resources allocated to the SSU which has so far remained a small unit with little representation in Kinshasa and mostly resourced by donor countries.

- As a result, misunderstandings between the national, provincial and international partners grew. International partners perceived the GoDRC as being an unequal partner, while the government felt uninformed and bypassed.

To summarize, while the ISSSS may have provided much-needed support to many people, the strategy was not sufficiently connected to the root causes of conflict and operated on a number of incorrect planning assumptions. Due to the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation framework, measuring its impact was difficult and the strategy couldn’t easily be adapted to the changing security context.

3. The New Political-Strategic Environment

The revised ISSSS will function in a political and strategic context that is fundamentally different from that of 2008. The fall of Goma to the M23 in November 2012 underlined the limitation of an approach which was largely based on technical support to state institutions without addressing the political root causes of the conflict.

3.1. Peace Processes

Following the emergence of the M23 and the reports of neighboring countries’ support for the rebellion, the international community and regional states undertook two parallel processes. On the one hand, the Kampala negotiations with the M23 started in November 2012 under the auspices of the ICGLR, with UN support. So far, these have had no concrete results yet. In the meantime, on 24 February 2013, the regional states signed the PSCF. This framework sets out international, regional and national commitments to attempt to end conflict in the region, amongst others (1) with regional/neighbouring countries to prevent interference in each other’s affairs; (2) with the DRC to advance on key reforms; and (3) with the donor community to remain seized of the importance of supporting the long term stability of DRC and engaged with appropriate means. Two monitoring mechanisms have been foreseen by the PSCF, a regional and a national one:

- The Regional Oversight Mechanism is made up of the great lakes’ countries, the African Union (AU), the South African Development Community, the UN and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and will strengthen regional diplomacy, security cooperation and cross-border control and monitor whether the regional states respect each other’s territorial sovereignty, the principles of non-interference and prevent armed groups from being active on their territory. The UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region (UNSE) has been appointed to coordinate the implementation of the PSCF, in particular its regional provisions. The mechanism may play a critical role in countering the regional dynamics which cause conflict. At the time of writing, the regional oversight mechanism has met twice and benchmarks for progress were published in September.
The National Oversight Mechanism, under the leadership of the presidency, ensures that national commitments, mainly the national reforms, are implemented (for more details on reforms, see III.3.2). Three committees have been established. The Presidency remains in charge of the main one, the Comité de Pilotage, while the Prime Minister heads the Comité de Suivi. The third committee provides for consultation with civil society. Should the mechanism be able to push through the required reforms and provide for the participation of representative segment of the population, this could increase checks and balances and counter some of the patrimonial tendencies which lead to the fragmentation of state institutions and a lack of state capacity to peacefully manage conflict in the eastern provinces.

The humiliating military defeat of the FARDC against the M23 triggered also a national response in the form of the National Consultations. The consultations have five themes: governance, economy, disarmament, intercommunity conflicts and decentralization. Discussions started on 7 September after number of controversies and have now concluded.

In addition, the GoDRC has since the beginning of 2013 expressed its willingness to review the STAREC programme and to expend it to the entire state territory. This was announced again in October 2013 by the President in its address on the state of the nation following the conclusion of the National Consultations. Recommendations from the National Consultations also included the integration of the STAREC into a new Special Programme mainly orientated towards technical interventions. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear what form will the STAREC programme have in the future.

MONUSCO also adapted its operations to the PSCF: UNSCR 2098 provides MONUSCO with a more robust mandate than before and reflects the expectation of the Security Council that MONUSCO will play an active role in the elimination of armed groups from eastern DRC. Aside from its usual tasks in protecting civilians, providing good offices and supporting the government and state authorities’ capacity-building, there are three elements in the mandate which are of key importance:

1. MONUSCO has deployed its Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which has the mandate to neutralize armed groups and push them to demobilize, either by unilateral operations or by joint operations with the FARDC. Targeted ‘clearing’ operations by the FIB and FARDC may lead to fast results and movements of armed groups, which means the ISSSS will have to be ready to provide rapid support to the ‘holding’ and ‘building’ after an area has been freed from armed groups. For this, a specific ISSSS operationalization modality has been developed – the ‘Islands of Stability’.

2. The activities of the FIB and the FARDC will likely lead to an increase in surrenders by armed groups. For these purposes, a new DDR/RR programme supported by the UN is currently being developed (PNDDR III) for an expected total of some 14.000 ex-combatants from Congolese armed groups. Armed groups will no longer be provided with the possibility to integrate into the FARDC, which led to a weakening of the army in the past. Disarmament and Demobilization will be followed up by a community-based Reintegration process, for which the ISSSS will be the foremost framework, supporting dialogue and socio-economic

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For more details on the Islands of Stability see Annex 2: Excerpts from the “Islands of Stability” Concept Note.
recovery activities to decrease tensions and re-start inclusive relations between communities and returning ex-combatants and provide alternatives to joining armed groups.

3. The mission’s **Protection of Civilians** strategy has been clarified in tandem with the new mandate. The strategy focuses on three types of protection-activities: (1) short-term military responses to imminent threats by the MONUSCO brigades, in support of the FARDC or unilaterally; (2) civilian protection through support to human rights defenders and supporting civilian response networks; and (3) longer-term institutional protection, by building the capacity of the state's security services so they can more effectively protect their citizens. The revised ISSSS will play an important supporting role in particular as regards the third component.

These different initiatives may represent a real opportunity for the establishment of long-lasting peace in the DRC. However, a few **uncertainties** remain:

- The **peace agreements and interventions take place in a fragmented fashion**. At the time of writing, the Kampala negotiations with the M23 have largely stalled. The PSCF, in the meantime, is quiet on options ahead concerning national armed groups. Rwandan support to the M23 seems to continue to this day, as its security interests on the DRC have not been a subject of serious debate yet.

- The new peace architecture does not articulate a vision for a significant participation of communities directly affected by conflict and is largely focused on national and regional dimensions of the conflict. The PSCF Oversight Mechanisms provide limited space for the participation of civil society. The National Consultations, which were supposed to provide an inclusive platform, were boycotted by some opposition parties who claimed that the participants had been chosen on the basis of their links to the ruling elite. National armed groups have also complained about their absence from the discussions.

- The GoDRC remains **unclear about the modalities for its security apparatus**. While the official policy is that there is to be no more integration of armed groups within FARDC and PNC, the FARDC reportedly continues to approach some armed groups to convince them to integrate into the army. This type of integration is exactly what left the FARDC weak and fragmented over the last years and is a critical source of concern. The army reform plan (see below) mentions the number of future recruits, but not the composition of the army.

- **Consultation between Government and international partners concerning key issues**, such as the development of benchmarks to orientate international support and allow transparent monitoring of progress on the PSCF commitments and the future role of STAREC need to be better structured. This focus should create an atmosphere of mutual trust necessary if both the GoDRC and international partners are to work together in a meaningful partnership to assure long-term progress.
3.2. National Reforms
Since the transition, the DRC state has been going through a long process of transformation and modernization to address some of the inconsistencies and inefficiencies of its legal and institutional structures, enhance its performances and increase civilian oversight. The following provides an overview of the most important reforms.

- **Army Reform.** As part of the ongoing (2011-2016) reform plan, which has been reviewed in June 2013 following the signing of the PSCF, the FARDC will be divided over three defence zones, and their training plan will be adapted and shortened to serve the needs of an army which will be employed in operations against armed groups for the foreseeable future. The reform plan is mainly focused on capacity building and on the modernization and equipment of the FARDC. The plan says little about internal control and disciplinary measures, or addressing impunity and internal corruption. In line with both the PCSF and the army reform strategy, the GoDRC has committed itself to training a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), supported by MONUSCO, which will take over security tasks from the Force Intervention Brigade as soon as possible.

- **Police Reform.** The current five-year reform plan for the PNC foresees a clearer distinction between the security tasks of the PNC and the FARDC and the two organizations’ disciplinary mechanisms. It orients the tasks of the PNC towards the protection of people and their goods and the improvement of relations with the local population, and sets out a new code of police professionalism. While the reform of the police, which was launched in 2007, has been largely stalled, the Law 13/013 on the Autonomous Status of Career Policemen was signed off on 1 June 2013, which could be a signal of renewed government engagement on this issue.

- **Justice Reform.** The reform plan, which dates from 2007, proposes to organize an extensive mapping of all existing Congolese judicial institutions present throughout the country to on which to base decisions about strategic reforms and staffing. The plan also foresees a component to counter corruption within the judicial system. However, the reform strategy notes the extreme shortage of human and financial resources to put these assessments and reforms in place, and serious delays may be expected.

- **Decentralization** foresees the partial transfer of powers from the central state to the provincial authorities and decentralized territorial entities so they are capable of better addressing local needs. The decentralization provisions of the constitution include the increase in the number of provinces from the current 11 to 25, and measures to increase citizens’ participation in decision-making processes. It also foresees the division of competencies between customary and statutory authorities at local levels, with the customary system being embedded within the statutory one and, in the case of Decentralized Territorial Entities (ETD), its representativeness increased by the creation of an elected legislative branch of local government. The decentralization process has been seriously delayed and obstacles such as the completion of the legal framework, the transfer of competencies including the recruitment of human resources and the allocation of necessary financial resources, and the holding of elections remain. The main points of
contention however are the fear that decentralization might lead to the ‘balkanization’ of the country and that financial decentralization – retrocession versus withholding at source – will significantly reduce the formal influence of central government, and weaken the hold over patrimonial networks of currently powerful figures associated with the centre.

- **Land Reform.** The 2012 reform plan foresees the clarification of rights to land acquired in accordance with local traditions, revising the regulatory status of customary land rights which had been left unregulated since the passing of the 1973 Law, and introduces the obligation to have prior discussions with local communities in all cases where exploitation of natural resources is foreseen. Legal texts will be drafted to clarify the ownership of land between formal and customary authorities and the relationship between the two systems. The land reform process seems to be moving steadily so far, with a July 2013 workshop setting out concrete parameters to take the reforms forward.

3.3. **Aid infrastructure**

The aid infrastructure for the DRC has developed significantly since 2008. Over the last years, the government-led *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (GPRSP) has come to serve as the overarching framework for all development-related frameworks. It focuses on outcomes in governance and peace consolidation, economic diversification and acceleration of growth, access to basic social services, and environmental protection. These themes are addressed through sectoral committees led by government ministries. The GSCRP is translated into Priority Action Plans and *Plan Quinquenaux de Croissance et d’Emploi* at provincial level also coordinated through sectoral committees led by provincial institutions. Large sections of the GPRSP estimated to cost USD 26 billion remains unfinanced.

There are a number of supporting programmes implemented within the framework of the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which directs the work of the UNCT on long-term development cooperation. In addition, humanitarian assistance is governed by the yearly Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), which coordinates humanitarian support through a number of thematic clusters and foresees certain early recovery activities which are closely linked to ISSSS RRR pillar. Activities of MONUSCO, guided by the yearly mission mandate implemented through the Result-based Budget (RBB), are linked with the UNDAF and the HAP through the UN Transitional Framework (UNTF). The UNTF includes five integrated programmes, of which the ISSSS is one. This links the ISSSS, through the various frameworks, to long-term Congolese development plans.

The **coordination of donors and international partners** has gained a new momentum through the re-launching of the Donor Coordination Group (*Groupe de Coordination des Partenaires* - GCP) in Kinshasa. The GCP assures the coordination of donor support, and discusses joint international approaches to engagement with the government. This has facilitated cooperation between the various donors. The GCP has repeatedly expressed a common commitment on the part of the traditional international partners to align aid and diplomatic engagement with the GoDRC in such a way as to enhance the impact of both, and to organize programming in such a way as to explicitly support the achievement of the 6 national commitments contained in the PSCF. The ISSSS is

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9 For a more detailed discussion, see the revised ISSSS RRR Concept Note.
regarded by members of the GCP as the key strategy lending coherence to international efforts to bring greater stability to the East, in part as a way of realizing tangible progress in large areas of the PSCF commitments, and in part as an integral support to wider commitments on governance, democratization and other national reform processes.
III. STRATEGIC CONCEPT

After four years of programme implementation under the ISSSS with USD 367 million invested in some 69 projects, stabilization priority areas are still characterized by high levels of insecurity, the presence of foreign and Congolese armed groups and the displacement of communities. A perception survey conducted in 2011 by Oxfam showed that 50% of women and 35% of men surveyed felt less safe than in 2010.

As the diagnosis in the previous chapters showed, while the causes of conflict in the DRC are deeply structural and political and few reliable conclusions can be reached about the impact of ISSSS programming within that context, it’s clear that the strategy missed chances to contribute globally and sustainably to the securitization and stabilization of eastern DRC. With this understanding, and in the context of 2013 where new peace agreements have been launched and the military stalemate between Government and armed groups seems to have been breached, ISSSS plans for 2013-2017 can take a different approach to address the root causes of conflict which is adapted to the realities of the eastern provinces.

This chapter will explain the overall new approach to stabilization, before moving on to the pillar-by-pillar strategies in chapter IV. It will first address the new definition of what ‘stabilization’ means in the context of the DRC. Then, the overall policy response to the main drivers of conflict (identified in chapter II) will be discussed, making a distinction between long-term and medium-term responses and sketching a first overview of ISSSS responses to the interplay of conflict drivers. It will then explain the new three-pronged strategic approach of the ISSSS, consisting of (1) renewed political engagement with stabilization by national and international actors; (2) development of the ISSSS as a complimentary mechanism to ongoing peace processes; and (3) reorientation of the approach to provide community-based solutions to conflict and providing visible impact on the ground. Next, the Theories of Change for the new ISSSS will be set out at all levels.

1. Defining ‘Stabilization’ in the DRC

As noted in the diagnosis, the first phase of ISSSS suffered from a lack of common understanding of the concept of stabilization in the DRC.

Stabilization is a comparatively new concept in international security which lacks a widely accepted definition and often overlaps with more accepted concepts, particularly with ‘peacebuilding’. The term ‘stabilization’ has been used to refer to interventions as diverse as military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Colombia, the pacification of Haitian urban centers by the UN peacekeeping mission and the consolidation of security gains from peace agreements and military operations in the DRC. All these stabilization interventions have some elements in common: (1) the context, with high-level violence and state fragility; (2) the short-term objective: the immediate prevention or reduction of violence and the protection of the population or key infrastructures; and (3) the long term objective: the institutionalization of peaceful political processes and governance mechanisms; (4) the method, which is integrated and holistic and combines military and civilian elements; and (5) the timeframe: relatively short-to medium-term, a transitional period in between humanitarian and development interventions.
Given the lack of widely accepted definition, it is important to link the concept of stabilization to the specific conflict dynamics of the DRC. As set out in the diagnosis, the DRC is (1) characterized by an unequal, anarchic playing field (root causes of conflict) formed by patrimonialism, fragmented identities, negative frames of reference, socio-demographic pressure, poverty and access to land; within which (2) the interplay of four key drivers of conflict – security dilemmas, mobilization around land and identity, natural resources and regional dynamics, creates violence.

Stabilization interventions should address these political and structural drivers of the conflict and thereby start to address its root causes. The only durable way to do so is to build the trust and capacities of local actors and of state- and social institutions which are able to promote the peaceful transformation of violent conflicts. Stabilization can therefore be described as a process which aims to reinforce mutual trust and legitimacy between state and society in order to enable them to jointly address or mitigate the main conflict drivers. It aims to bring about changes in state-society relations by supporting a continual negotiation of mutual responsibilities of state actors and communities, on the basis of which accountability and trust can start to emerge. Stabilization is therefore both top-down – enabling the state to deliver, and bottom-up – empowering the population to hold the state accountable. By doing so, stabilization sets the ground for longer-term development and governance interventions. Faced with the extreme complexity of the DRC, the stabilization response needs to be (1) holistic – addressing multisectorial and multidimensional challenges; (2) integrated – all stakeholders working together towards a common goal; and (3) targeted – high-impact interventions concentrated in specific geographic areas and implemented in a relatively short timeframe.

As such, ‘stabilization’ in the context of the DRC is defined as follows:

*Stabilization is an integrated, holistic but targeted process of enabling state and society to build mutual accountability and capacity to address and mitigate existing or emerging drivers of violent conflict, creating the conditions for improved governance and longer term development.*

Taking this definition, keeping in mind the current conflict dynamics in the eastern provinces and projecting it on a 2013-2017 timeline, the goal of the revised stabilization programme is:

*The International Community’s support to stabilization in eastern DRC will enable the Congolese state and society to have the mutual accountability and capacity to address and mitigate the main drivers of violent conflict in the eastern provinces, and conditions will be in place to reinforce the legitimacy of the social contract and foster long-term economic development.*

2. Policy Responses to conflict drivers and root causes of conflict

As discussed in section II, the conflict analysis has highlighted the interplay of causal factors which lead to violent conflict.

A comprehensive policy response should address these conflict drivers and by doing so, start to address the root causes of conflict. This includes interventions at international, regional, national and local levels, ranging from short-term interventions to long-term structural changes at the level of state institutions and social norms.
2.1. Long-terms responses

Long term responses should start immediately but will require more than five years to be implemented and probably more than that to demonstrate results. Most of these responses fall well outside the scope of the ISSSS and their outcome is difficult to predict. (1) At the international and regional level, increased regional integration, support to trade between the various countries in the region, and the establishment of regional transitional justice mechanisms could be helpful. (2) At the national level, support could be given to the effective implementation of national reforms aimed at improving state service delivery (SSR, public administration reform, education), assuring proper public financial management, protecting minority rights and improving political participation. Increased attention to fostering a more rational, transparent, and secure business environment, especially oversight of natural resource exploitation are equally important actions which will compliment stabilization initiatives in the long-term.

2.2. Medium to short-term responses

At the international and regional level diplomatic initiatives aiming to improve regional security; monitoring the implementation of regional agreements by third/neutral parties; arresting- or enforcing economic sanctions against the leaders of armed groups abroad; strengthening international controls of illegal exports of natural resources from the DRC; ensuring the respect for economic and political rights in neighbouring countries; and diversifying livelihoods opportunities in neighbouring countries to reduce the competition for land. At the national level measures include the organization of local and provincial elections; intensifying the fight against corruption; strengthening existing international tracking mechanisms for natural resources, supporting the work of independent researchers (think tanks, UN group of experts, NGOs) on illegal resource exploitation, including by foreign armed groups; and protecting the communities living in zones rich in natural resources against forced relocation. In addition, the policy response includes measures aimed at targeting armed groups and their resources directly in support of political goals, such as Joint MONUSCO and FARDC operations and economic sanctions against armed groups’ leadership.

It is at the local level where the revised ISSSS will play a key role, as it will be the foremost framework to address the interplay of the main conflict drivers:

1. Security dilemmas and mobilization around land and identity: The policy response should focus on transforming and removing sources of community grievances linked to land, identity or the non-provision of services by the state. To reinforce positive dynamics, partners may work with religious and traditional leaders, womens organizations, professional associations and cooperatives, peacebuilding NGOs and local authorities. The key areas in which to demonstrate change are (1) the quality and equitable distribution of services by defence, security and justice institutions and civil administration; (2) improving access to land; (3) the representativeness of local, provincial and national government institutions and their responsiveness to population’s needs; (4) the transformation of communities’ perceptions of identities to become more inclusive; (5) the development of economic opportunities and security of livelihoods, especially in potential areas of return and traditional areas of refuge; (6) the support of the durable reintegration of ex-combatants in the communities under a new DDR-programme; and (7) the management of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
2. **Regional dynamics and Security dilemmas**: The objective should be to prevent and deter direct or indirect external interference in the organization and management of the DRC’s internal affairs, principally security and the external support provided to armed groups. While the ISSSS has little leverage on regional actors, it can support the reinforcement of DRC’s defence and security apparatus, in particular the FARDC and border management institutions.

3. **Regional dynamics and Exploitation of natural resources**: ISSSS is not a comprehensive response to this issue. The ISSSS policy response can, however, focus on strengthening transparency in the exploitation of natural resources, amongst others by supporting GoDRC institutions in publishing information on the process, and reinforcing border management.

4. **Mobilization around land and identity and Exploitation of natural resources**: The ISSSS policy response aims to remove sources of grievances associated with exploitation of natural resources, through a range of programmes combining community approaches to diminishing tensions, investment to create and diversify livelihoods opportunities, including providing alternatives to illegal exploitation of natural resources, and efforts to improve the state’s ability to make and communicate coherent and transparent decisions over the granting of access rights to land, minerals and the revenues generated by National Parks.

5. **Security vacuums and exploitation of natural resources**: The ISSSS supports state institutions to ensure that the legal framework for the exploitation of minerals and other natural resources is respected. Measures include the development of incentives for the mining police to respect the law; advocacy of national and provincial political, administrative, and police authorities to combat corruption; increase oversight by independent international actors such as MONUSCO force, UNPolice (UNPOL) and others on the activities of the mining police and administration, as well as the FARDC; and provision of information to local communities on contracts and supply chains.

6. **Regional dynamics and mobilization around land and identity**: The ISSSS can target the narratives of conflict entrepreneurs and the stigmatization of communities, by supporting local, provincial and national authorities in raising awareness on the law on Congolese citizenship; supporting dialogue platforms to create more shared understanding of the role of all communities in eastern DRC in a common history in which identity has been manipulated to the advantage of individuals or small elite groups at the cost and suffering of everyone else. The ISSSS will also embrace initiatives to develop economic opportunities to forge bonds of mutual advantage between groups in conflict; and mediation with traditional chiefs to increase the political participation of all communities at local levels. The ISSSS can also support the resolution of land conflicts between ‘autochthonous’ communities and those considered to be ‘foreigners.’

3. **Three-pronged Strategic Approach to Stabilization**

On the basis of the required policy responses to the main conflict drivers in the DRC, and the new definition of stabilization, the following section will describe the strategic three-pronged approach to
stabilization: the re-engagement of high-level government- and international support for ISSSS and STAREC; the development of complementary mechanisms to create an inclusive peace process; and the reorientation of the ISSSS pillars’ interventions to produce visible impact for the population on the ground.

3.1. Re-engagement of high-level government and international support for stabilization

The new strategic approach recognizes the necessity of high-level engagement of both the GoDRC and international partners for stabilization interventions to succeed and be sustainable. In order to support this dialogue the following measures will be undertaken:

- **Revitalizing stabilization coordination structures to increase Government engagement and participation.** The success of ISSSS’s second phase will rely on reciprocal engagement and commitment, and on improved coordination between international and national partners. It is absolutely critical to revitalize the dialogue between the GoDRC and International stakeholders around stabilization issues. Currently, Government engagement is mainly vested in and expressed through STAREC, in particular the national-level *Comité de Pilotage* and *Comité de Suivi*. (The implications of the transformation of the STAREC on how this relationship can best be readressed are not yet clear, but the need for an outcome in terms of strengthened dialogue remains constant.) An important focus must be on improving the flow of information among and between the local, provincial and national levels of Government and between national and international partners. International support to the strengthening of government coordination capacities will be reviewed to produce greater impact.

- **Developing a Compact between the GoDRC and the international partners.** At the beginning of the STAREC and ISSSS, programmes were developed mainly in a top-down manner, with limited consultations, especially at provincial levels. While all programmes were formally endorsed by relevant institutions within the GoDRC, there tended to be a significant time lapse between the approval and the delivery of projects and with weak coordination structures at the national level, it become difficult for GoDRC and international partners to provide a coordinated response. In addition, the GoDRC capacity to sustain the investments made within some projects were often not sufficiently taken into account, with the government lacking the means, for example, to operationalize state infrastructures after completion of projects. For the revised ISSSS, it is therefore proposed to negotiate clear roles and responsibilities for both GoDRC and international partners to ensure a common understanding of what is required for stabilization to succeed. This could take the form of a Statement of Mutual Commitment or a compact, in line with the framework of the ‘New Deal’, and/or a programme specific agreement between the GoDRC and donors.

- **Linking STAREC/ISSSS to Broader Peace Processes and Reforms.** As the diagnosis shows, they are several peace processes and national reforms currently underway whose successful implementation would greatly enhance the chances for achieving sustainable stabilization. Linking the STAREC/ISSSS to these processes would not only ensure that structural changes are taking place in the long run but also that international support is sustained after the end of the stabilization process. The ISSSS could be linked to mechanisms like the PSCF National
Oversight Mechanism and its three committees, the GPRSP II sectorial committees, and the reforms monitoring committees. The STAREC/ISSSS would not only benefit from these processes, it can also inform their development. The strategy provides for a localized response which complements efforts at national and regional levels. As such, progress on the STAREC/ISSSS could provide relevant information on the impact of the GoDRC’s activities on the establishment of sustainable peace in eastern DRC. STAREC/ISSSS monitoring and evaluation data could, for example, provide the PSCF with important information on the situation in the provinces, which would allow for PSCF decision-making to be aligned with the needs on the ground.

3.2. Development of complementary mechanisms to create an inclusive peace process

The second dimension of thenew strategic approach – the Dialogue dimension, is the ISSSS direct contribution to ongoing peace processes.

The development of benchmarks to accompany the realization of the national level commitments of the PSCF is a process currently largely confined to conceptual debate in Kinshasa between highly placed figures in government and international partners. The ISSSS aims to contribute to the process through assisting the population of stabilization zones to articulate their own visions for a peaceful future, and ensuring that this is communicated to the decision-makers responsible for oversight of the broad peace process. In so doing, the ISSSS affirms the vital role of communities (and not only the state) in improving the political, security and socio-economic situation in the eastern provinces. The area of the ISSSS which will fulfil this function is what is being called Democratic Dialogue. The Dialogue will contribute to:

- **Lay the foundations for a more inclusive and transparent system of governance that promotes peace and social cohesion.** The Congolese political landscape is currently highly fragmented due to a patrimonial system wherein the management of power and access to (political, economic and social) resources is organized around networks of loyalties. By increasing public participation in decision-making and improving transparency around the implementation of these decisions, public confidence in state institutions will be strengthened and civic responsibility and a broader engagement for peace and development in the DRC will be fostered.

- **Put the people directly affected by the conflict at the centre of seeking non-military solutions to inevitable social tensions.** By enhancing people’s understanding of the causes of conflict and their dynamics and providing them with the capacities to formulate concerted actions in favour of peace in their community, the Dialogue will contribute to (1) countering people’s engrained frames of reference, according to which they feel powerless; (2) depriving armed groups from a discourse that they are the only ones who defend the communities’ interests and thereby eroding their claims to legitimacy and reducing their capacity to violently mobilize people; and (3) fostering community ownership of the stabilization programmes by basing programme design on an depth participatory analysis of the conflict environment.
- **Link peace dividends to peace efforts and ensure that economic recovery activities are focused on supporting peace processes and social cohesion.** By putting particular emphasis on the political aspects of stabilization, it should be possible to ensure that coordination between efforts for peace (negotiations, operations et cetera) and peace dividends (through programming) will be improved. An important component of this is to assure that activities for socio-economic recovery do not aim for ‘development as such’, but clearly address the root causes and consequences of conflict.\(^{10}\)

This dimension of the strategic approach is mainstreamed throughout the strategy, including by re-orienting the ‘Support to Political Processes’\(^{11}\) towards the ‘Support to the Democratic Dialogue’, and making the Democratic Dialogue the first and a transversal pillar of the revised ISSSS.

### 3.3. Re-orientation of the pillars towards local community-based solutions to produce visible impact for the population on the ground

The third aspect of the ISSSS’s strategic approach focuses on developing alternative ways of producing visible changes on the ground for the population, and by doing so start a long-term process of behavioural and structural change towards peace.

The ISSSS explicitly directs its focus towards the peaceful transformation of conflicts. It targets the interplay of the four conflict dynamics and, by doing so, it addresses the deeper root causes of conflict. When translated into each of the pillars’ strategies (which are discussed in more detail below), pillar objectives are re-orientated towards (1) calming tensions at the local level by addressing locally identified causes of and solutions to conflict; (2) the transformation of the wider conflict environment, by supporting programmes which address the interplay of conflict drivers, and thereby aim to affect the deeper root causes of conflict in the long run.\(^{12}\)

This has important implications especially for the manner in which the ISSSS works with government institutions under the Security, Restoration of State Authority, and Fight against Sexual Violence pillars. The conflict analysis has clearly shown the fundamental role fragmented, patrimonial and predatory state structures play in the creation of violent dynamics. To counter these dynamics, the ISSSS needs to use innovative mechanisms to facilitate the emergence of more responsive, participatory, transparent, and accountable modes of governance - effectively transforming the nature of state institutions’ practices. The Dialogue dimension of the approach will also play a critical role in all activities related to state services under the pillars mentioned above, engaging the communities themselves with their state service providers. Examples are the creation of platforms in which state institutions and communities can discuss the need for particular state services; the use of participatory budgeting methods; the development if incentive structures emphasizing payment by results enabling the services’ beneficiaries to participate in performance evaluations (a strategy which has already had some success); and the strengthening of civilian oversight and disciplinary

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\(^{10}\) For more details, see the new RRR approach as well as the RRR Concept Note.

\(^{11}\) The original ‘Support to Political Processes’-pillar was meant to help national and provincial governments to advance peace processes and implement key commitments under existing agreements (like the 23 of March 2009 Agreement). As demonstrated in the diagnosis, this pillar was never effectively implemented and political processes stagnated.

\(^{12}\) See under Operationalization, VI.0
Defining the Stabilization Zones, below.
bodies. The use of strategic communication will be generalized in order to support the change of behaviours and perception of both the populations and the state agents.

Taking the above into account, the new configuration of the pillars is set out in the graphic below. Political engagement is the *sine qua non* for the stabilization investments to reach their full impact. Democratic Dialogue initiatives should influence the work defined through all the pillars, putting the communities and local authorities in stabilization zones front and center to help define root causes of conflict and identify solutions to go forward. The Fight against Sexual Violence will be a transversal matter, informing the work organized throughout the implementation of the strategy.

![Stabilization Diagram](image)

4. **Theories of Change for the Revised ISSSS**

At the overall objective level:

- *If* individuals (1) increasingly feel that the state is providing them with physical, institutional and livelihood security in an open, transparent, equitable, non-discriminatory manner; and (2) develop capacities to analyze conflicts and formulate solutions which are supported by the state; *then* they will progressively feel empowered to become agents of peaceful change and will start longer-term planning and investments in peace and livelihoods.

- *If* (1) communities and the state are in constant negotiation on the basis of which mutual responsibilities are established; and (2) state institutions are enabled to deliver the services demanded by the communities in an open, transparent, equitable, non-discriminatory manner; *then* trust will progressively emerge and the population will be less reliant on armed groups for protection, thus diminishing the mobilizing power of armed groups.

- *If* (1) a relationship of trust emerges between state institutions and communities; and (2) capacities to peacefully manage conflict are built, *then* Congolese stakeholders will be empowered to take the lead in stabilization, and longer-term peacebuilding and development.
At the strategic level:

- If (1) stabilization coordination structures are revitalized in particular at national level; (2) clear roles and responsibilities for both GoDRC and international partners are negotiated to ensure a common understanding of what is required for stabilization to succeed; and (3) stabilization efforts in the East are able to inform and benefit from progress on broader reform processes, such as the PSCF; then GoDRC and international engagement for stabilization will be ensured, national-international partnerships (STAREC/ISSSS/PSCF) will be more effective and stabilization in the East will be able to produce concrete results at provincial and local levels.

- If (1) the Dialogue lays the foundations for a more inclusive and transparent system of governance that promotes peace and social cohesion; (2) puts the people directly affected by the conflict at the center of seeking non-military solutions to insecurity; and (3) links peace dividends to peace efforts and ensure that economic recovery activities are focused on supporting peace processes and social cohesion; then stabilization interventions in the East will reinforce and inform the ongoing national peace processes.

- If (1) ISSSS interventions are based on an in-depth participatory analysis of the conflict; and (2) are re-orientated to diffuse tensions at local level by supporting locally identified solutions and to transform the conflict environment by supporting programmes targeting root causes of conflict; then stabilization interventions will produce visible impact for populations on the ground.

At the level of the pillars:

- If (1) a collective and long-term vision and concrete solutions for peace is formulated in stabilization priority areas; (2) the authorities endorse the Dialogue results and these inform the definition and revision of national policies; and (3) stabilization initiatives are harmonized based on the results of the Dialogue; then trust will increase among communities and towards the state, conflicts will increasingly be managed non-violently, and causes of conflict will be addressed better, creating the basis for stable institutions and consolidating peace.

- If (1) principles of protection of civilians and of accountability are integrated in the functions of the FARDC; (2) the populations’ perception of the FARDC change; and (3) the army’s capacity to “hold” key areas increases; then the Government of DRC will be increasingly able to protect its civilians and implement a gradual transition of responsibility for security from the FARDC to the PNC.

- If (1) the state has the capacity to provide more and more relevant services through increased presence in stabilization zones; (2) the state is increasingly recognized as the main service provider and become less patrimonial; and (3) an enabling regulatory framework is put in place; then the state will be increasingly perceived as an enabling presence, the institutional insecurity endured by the population will decrease, and they will not need to resort to parallel strategies for their protection and the pursuit of their interests.

- If (1) the population of eastern DRC engages in socio-economic recovery activities that focus on social cohesion and resilience; (2) the authorities and the international community are
aligned in their support for these initiatives; then communities will be able to manage external shocks more peacefully, and there will be a possibility for development and more equitable distribution of wealth.

- If (1) civil and state structures are empowered to fulfill their responsibilities in terms of protecting men and women against sexual violence; (2) gender roles are perceived and challenged as factors perpetuating sexual violence; then trust in peaceful prevention and response actions will increase, incidents of sexual violence will decline, the needs of survivors and their communities will be addressed and peacebuilding efforts will be more resilient to external shocks.
IV. PILLAR STRATEGIES

On the basis of the diagnosis, and the new approach to stabilization defined in the chapters above, the following chapter will set out what activities will concretely be undertaken under the five thematic pillars of the ISSSS. It should be noted that what follows is a summary of the five ISSSS concept notes. The notes themselves describe in much more detail the new approach to the pillars.

1. Democratic Dialogue

1.1. Relevance to the Conflict Analysis

The Democratic Dialogue will address all six interplays of conflict dynamics identified in the diagnosis: by supporting the population to develop capacities to analyze and transform conflict, they will become more aware of the subjectivity of what is “true” and less likely to be mobilized by conflict entrepreneurs. As the state will be accompanied to support the process, the Dialogue will contribute to transforming the state-society relationship and in so doing, the very nature of the state system. The Democratic Dialogue addresses the root causes of patrimonialism, fragmented Congolese identity and people’s engrained frames of reference, and also sets the scene for transformation of land issues.

1.2. Specific Objective and Theories of Change

Specific Objective: The population of eastern DRC and the Congolese State are engaged in an inclusive dialogue process in order to respond to the causes of conflict, to consolidate peace and to create the basis for the creation of stable institutions.

Transparent, inclusive and efficient institutions will be created and peace will be consolidated:

- At the individual level: If the prejudices and the stereotypes between groups and communities in conflict diminish, because the populations will recognize and have empathy for the suffering experienced by other groups and will acknowledge the negative consequences of violence for all groups, then solid collaborative relations will be constructed between a critical mass of stakeholders and as a result concerted solutions to the problems that divide them can be found.

- At the level of power structures: If inclusive and participatory spaces for decision making emerge and are institutionalized, because citizens and political authorities will together decide the best way to respond to conflict and jointly assume the responsibility for social change, then the communities will have an alternative to the use of violence to pursue their interests.

- At the institutional level: If political authorities endorse the results of the Dialogue to drive institutional reforms, because politics and national legislation will address better the causes of conflict and present some qualities of inclusion and equality, then the confidence of communities in state institutions will be strengthened.

- At programmatic level: If the analysis and understanding emerging from the Democratic Dialogue with the communities is used to inform programme design across the ISSSS, then programmes will be better targeted, more relevant, and more likely to be owned by Congolese stakeholders, leading to a more efficient implementation of the strategy.
1.3. Expected Outcomes

*Expected Outcome 1.1:* A collective, long-term vision of concrete solutions is formulated for the country in the stabilization programme's zones of intervention and a culture of dialogue is established.

*Expected Outcome 1.2:* The results of the Dialogue are endorsed by the authorities (provincial and national) and the definition and revision of national politics and laws are taken into account.

*Expected Outcome 1.3:* Country initiatives within the programme of stabilization are harmonized and reinforced.

2. Security

2.1. Relevance to the Conflict Analysis

The Security pillar addresses particularly the interplay between ‘security dilemmas’ and ‘mobilization around land and identity’, although it has an added value on the other dimensions too. It’s important to note that the Security-pillar of the ISSSS is not primarily focused on ‘classical’ Security Sector Reform, as this is largely a Kinshasa-led top-down process which is already managed by MONUSCO’s SSR section; nor will it focus on overall training of the FARDC, which is undertaken by bilateral partners and the MONUSCO force. Instead, the ISSSS security pillar will focus on the local interaction between the FARDC and the population in the areas where they are deployed. It will support the fostering of behavioral change within the FARDC, and promoting an institutional culture of protection, including the enhanced “good behavior” of commanders and troops which will help to create internal peer pressure to hold each other accountable, it will also seek to give civilian population in areas where the FARDC is deployed a bigger stake in their own security, and will attempt to counter the ‘pendular’ movements of FARDC and armed groups holding and withdrawing from terrain, with the civilian population caught in between. In so doing, the pillar will address the root causes of patrimonialism, fragmented Congolese identities and engrained frames of reference.

2.2. Specific Objective and Theories of Change

*Specific Objective:* Based on their own recommendations, the population of conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC and locally deployed FARDC are engaged in a mutually supportive process, whereby the FARDC protects the people, trust is built, the people’s view of the FARDC as a legitimate and enabling presence is increased, and a legitimate form of law and order is extended into areas formerly dominated by armed groups.

- **At the individual level (1):** If individuals feel that they can express their concerns to the FARDC, see that these are taken seriously and acted upon effectively and in a manner which is respectful of individuals and groups’ rights, then individuals will feel more secure in the presence of soldiers and a positive collaboration may emerge.

- **At the individual level (2):** If soldiers feel more capable of providing security to civilians and feel that civilians understand their concerns and that of their families, then they will feel increasingly respected in their roles as security providers and will be encouraged to engage with civilians in turn, less likely to commit violations, and start a positive dynamic that increases social cohesion.
• At the level of power structures: If the population is provided with the opportunity to meaningfully influence FARDC’s operations, and FARDC improves its behaviour and capacity to “hold” terrain and secure the population, then civilians and soldiers will more likely see common cause between them, the dominant relationship of the FARDC over the population will gradually turn into one of a partnership, and civilians will be less likely to turn to armed groups for protection.

• At the institutional level: If at field level protection of civilians is internalized as a positive norm, and a degree of civilian oversight is accepted by both parties and exercised in practice, then lessons learned by the FARDC at the local level may be formalized at the central level through SOPs and training, and set new standards country-wide and improve the FARDC’s engagement with the SSRprocess.

• At the programmatic level: If the international partners coordinate a two-pronged approach of SSR at the national level and the ISSSS security pillar at the community level, then a more holistic security dynamic may be started which protects the population in strategic zones while local lessons learned are integrated into the national SSR-process.

2.3. Expected Outcomes

Expected Outcome 2.1: Internalization of Protection of Civilians as a core function of the FARDC

Expected Outcome 2.2: Changing the populations’ perception of the FARDC

Expected Outcome 2.3: Effective increase of security of civilians in the key ‘holding’ areas

3. Restoration of State Authority

3.1. Relevance to the Conflict Analysis

The RSA pillar effectively targets all conflict dynamics, much like the Democratic Dialogue pillar. The pillar focuses on bringing state actors and society closer together, and assures the equitable delivery of services based on local needs. It also attempts to address fragmented structures of government and improve the regulatory framework. As such, the RSA pillar is the foremost vehicle through which to address the root cause patrimonialism, but it also has an effect on people’s engrained frames of reference as it addresses people’s concepts of (and loyalty to) the state.

3.2. Specific Objective and Theories of Change

Specific objective: populations in priority areas perceive the state and its agents as an enabling presence.

• At the individual level: If individuals feel that the state provides them with security and justice in a predictable, non-discriminatory, transparent and accessible manner, and civil servants, policemen, judiciary and prison staff increasingly understand their role as one of service provider at the service of the population, then legitimate authorities will gradually replace other security- and justice providers and the legitimacy of the state will increase.

• At the level of power structures: If the state starts to provide access to services, especially security and justice, on the basis of transparent decisions reached in consultations with the communities, then the influence and revenues of armed groups and other parallel service providers will decrease.
At the institutional level: If citizens and the state are engaged in a process of negotiation over their respective responsibilities according to transparent criteria, then formal institutional behavior may slowly start to supplant individual rent-seeking practices thus reinforcing the social contract between the government and the governed.

At the programmatic level: If international partners base their state authority interventions on a realistic assessment of the nature of the state, and work with both local communities and national actors to address this dynamic, then the state may slowly become an enabling presence thus increasing the impact and sustainability of all other stabilization-interventions.

3.3. Expected Outcomes

Expected Outcome 3.1: The state has the capacity to provide more and more relevant services through increased presence in stabilization zones

Expected Outcome 3.2: The state is increasingly recognized as the main service provider and become less patrimonial

Expected Outcome 3.3: An enabling regulatory framework is put in place

4. Return, Reintegration and Socio-Economic Recovery

4.1. Relevance to the Conflict Analysis

The RRRpillar addresses the socio-economic root causes of violent mobilization, and is linked closely to dynamics such as ‘mobilization around land and identity’ and ‘natural resources’. The RRR-pillar will not undertake socio-economic works as such, but with the specific goal of addressing the root causes of conflict and calming tensions in stabilization zones. It will be closely linked to the Dialogue-pillar, as communities themselves will help identify appropriate programme interventions based on their analysis of local conflicts. By addressing the socio-economic causes of conflict, the RRR-pillar attempts to address the underlying root causes of poverty, socio-demographic pressure, access to land and fragmented Congolese identities.

4.2. Specific Objective and Theories of Change

Specific objective: Based on their own recommendations, the population of conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC is engaged in small-scale socio-economic recovery and building social cohesion despite external shocks and notices a tangible dividend from these activities, such as increased social cohesion and resilience at the community level. This will help provide a space for potential longer term development.

At the individual level: If individuals can, and feel able to, increasingly provide for the basic needs of their families, and are provided with the opportunity to recognize the benefits of engaging jointly across divides in improving the well-being of their communities, then this will decrease competition over scarce resources and improve social cohesion at the community level, thus making individuals less susceptible to mobilization against their neighbors.

At the level of power structures: If people begin to work together towards improving the well-being of their communities, then patterns of collaborative behavior will emerge,
thus people will be more likely to handle external shocks and work together to prevent internal conflict from escalating and have increased capacity and confidence to negotiate more inclusive, accountable and transparent governance relationships (the “social contract”) with State actors.

- **At the institutional level:** If investments in improving socio-economic infrastructures are decided jointly by communities and local authorities, *then* a pattern of positive interactions between the citizens and the State may be established, *thus* the State may start to play an enabling role for economic growth and equitable distribution of benefits.

- **At the programmatic level:** If international partners strive for the same conflict-preventive outcomes and align their activities with the ISSSS, and the government becomes more committed to support, *then* a coherent peacebuilding dynamic will be started and the complex socio-economic and political root causes of conflict can be targeted more efficiently in each locality and lessons will be learned which will improve efficiency of programming in the future.

4.3. **Expected Outcomes**

_Expected Outcome 4.1:_ Improved capacity of agricultural- and fishery sectors

_Expected Outcome 4.2:_ Mapping of and resolution of conflicts

_Expected Outcome 4.3:_ Generation of economic alternatives for at-risk groups

_Expected Outcome 4.4:_ Reduction of vulnerability in local communities and ensuring access to social services

_Expected Outcome 4.5:_ Adequate hosting of migrants and displaced people

_Expected Outcome 4.6:_ Reduction of tensions in mining areas and creation of alternatives to mining

5. **Fight against Sexual Violence**

5.1. **Relevance to the Conflict Analysis**

Addressing the contribution of sexual violence to the conflict cycle involves focusing on root causes of sexual violence, through transforming harmful gender norms and addressing notions of masculinity and femininity that may perpetuate violence; strengthening the defence, security and justice system; and on increasing social, economic and political participation of women and girls. Additionally, it requires mitigating some of the consequences of sexual violence through interventions aiming at fostering reconciliation and social cohesion, and ending impunity. Conflict sensitivity will be integrated in a cross-cutting manner in all activities under the ISSSS.

5.2. **Specific Objective and Theories of Change**

The specific objective of this pillar is the reduction of the level of conflict-related sexual violence incidents thereby limiting sexual violence contribution to the cycle of conflict.

- **At the individual level:** If individuals are not directly affected by sexual violence or they have access to functioning system of redress, *then* they will not resort to violent conflict as a means of revenge or protection, and they will be more amenable to conflict resolution
processes and more accepting of rule of law based approaches. If individuals are not directly affected by sexual violence (or have recourse to effective response), then they will have the physical, psychological and social capacity to contribute to society through active citizenship.

- **At the social/community level:** If existing community dialogue and support systems are reinforced to understand and strengthen gender roles to better address all types of violence including SV inflicted on women, girls, boys and men, and communities have better knowledge of and confidence in institutional services and system of redress; then social norms will evolve towards improved gender equity, improved collective ownership of the issue, stigmatization will decrease; and communities will have greater resilience.

- **At the institutional level:** If state and civil society institutions foster a better knowledge of existing laws and regulations to fight against Sexual Violence, increase their capacity to promptly implement them without discrimination, impartially and transparently; and are able to acquire the confidence of their intended beneficiaries through impartial and quality protection, legal and social services; then they will be viewed as the vehicles through which grievances can be addressed and violence will become less attractive as a means of achieving objectives.

- **At the programmatic level:** If partners striving for the same conflict-preventive outcomes align their activities with the ISSSS geographical scope, log frame and M&E-framework as well as their funding; and if communities are involved in, and Gender is mainstreamed from, conception to evaluation for each pillar of stabilization; then a more coherent peace building dynamic will begin and the root causes of sexual violence will be targeted more effectively and lessons will be learned to improve efficiency of programming in the future.

5.3. **Expected Outcomes**

*Expected Outcome 5.1: Combating impunity*

*Expected Outcome 5.2: Prevention and Protection*

*Expected Outcome 5.3: Security Sector Reform*

*Expected Outcome 5.4: Multisectorial Response for Survivors*

*Expected Outcome 5.5: Data & Mapping*
V. STRATEGIC RISK ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
<th>Probability (1 to 3)</th>
<th>Consequence of risk occurring</th>
<th>Impact (1 to 3)</th>
<th>Possible reason for risk</th>
<th>Risk management strategy</th>
<th>Responsibility for mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At impact level (ISSSS's contribution to stabilization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSSS activities inadvertently make things worse, by failing to address conflict drivers and by either exacerbating existing tensions or creating new conflict dynamics.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stabilization efforts are nullified, the State and the international community are perceived as a destabilizing presence.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Insufficiently participative conflict analysis, dialogue fails to engage different groups, monitoring fails to pick-up destabilizing activities.</td>
<td>Monitoring activities identify early on in programme implementation any negative outcomes which seem to be developing, and implementing partners and donors work to correct or end such programmes.</td>
<td>SSU, GoDRC, Impl. partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At strategic level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If (1) stabilization coordination structures are revitalized in particular at national level; (2) clear roles and responsibilities for both GoDRC and international partners are negotiated to ensure a common understanding of what is required for stabilization to succeed; and (3) stabilization efforts in the East are able to inform and benefit from progress on broader reform processes, such as the PSCF; thenGoDRC and international engagement for stabilization will be ensured, national-international partnerships (STAREC/ISSSS/PSCF) will be more effective and stabilization in the East will be able to produce concrete results at provincial and local levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| National level coordination and mutual accountability mechanisms are not established. | 2 | Lack of mutual trust amongst actors involved in Stabilization; impossibility to monitor respect of commitments made. | 3 | Lack of political will to engage in such a process. | Political efforts to ensure all actors are aligned on a common objective and agree to use the ISSSS M&E framework as a planning, implementation and monitoring tool. | GoDRC, UN, Donors, Impl. partners |

<p>| The ISSSS and national stabilization strategies are not aligned and not clearly linked to national and regional peace processes. | 1 | Possible overlaps and gaps in the interventions; weak or contradictory messages delivered to stakeholders; fragmentation and non-sustainability of peace efforts. | 2 | Lack of coordination, ineffective communication on ISSSS objectives. | Communication on decisions made e.g. in Joint Committees, highlighting common goals. | STAREC, SSU, Impl. partners |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
<th>Probability (1 to 3)</th>
<th>Consequence of risk occurring</th>
<th>Impact (1 to 3)</th>
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<th>Risk management strategy</th>
<th>Responsibility for mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donors and implementing organizations work outside the ISSSS framework.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Impossible coordination between partner organizations and other actors involved; impossibility to monitor contribution to stabilization; ISSSS’s role is undermined.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lack of understanding of the benefits of using a common strategy as a reference for all interventions in eastern DRC.</td>
<td>&quot;Lobbying&quot; with all donors to contribute and refer to the ISSSS framework for all their programmes in the East.</td>
<td>UN, SSU, Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing organizations are unable to feed the ISSSS framework with reliable data.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indicators are poorly measured; overall contribution to impact is difficult to assess.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lack of competencies or resources for effective monitoring of activities and for data collection.</td>
<td>Adequate support from the SSU and donors, to provide necessary trainings, mentoring and technical assistance.</td>
<td>SSU, GoDRC, Donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If (1) the Dialogue lays the foundations for a more inclusive and transparent system of governance that promotes peace and social cohesion; (2) puts the people directly affected by the conflict at the center of seeking non-military solutions to insecurity; and (3) links peace dividends to peace efforts and ensure that economic recovery activities are focused on supporting peace processes and social cohesion; then stabilization interventions in the East will reinforce and inform the ongoing national peace processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
<th>Probability (1 to 3)</th>
<th>Consequence of risk occurring</th>
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<th>Risk management strategy</th>
<th>Responsibility for mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No interest to partner with the strategy on the part of the national and provincial authorities.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The state does not take ownership of the Dialogue and solutions to transform conflict are not met by the authorities.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fear of possible outcomes of the dialogue, Lack of political will for inclusive process.</td>
<td>Political efforts, Regular reporting, conditionality of further help based on observed commitment.</td>
<td>Donors, SSU, Congolese civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If (1) ISSSS interventions are based on an in-depth participatory analysis of the conflict; and (2) are re-orientated to diffuse tensions at local level by supporting locally identified solutions and to transform the conflict environment by supporting programmes targeting root causes of conflict; then stabilization interventions will produce visible impact for populations on the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
<th>Probability (1 to 3)</th>
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<th>Risk management strategy</th>
<th>Responsibility for mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impl. partners do not participate and use the conflict analysis issued from the dialogue to develop programmes.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Impl. partners continue to apply their respective assessment procedures.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Impl. partners do not see an advantage in transforming their methods, or have difficulties in implementing change.</td>
<td>Political and communication efforts.</td>
<td>SSU, Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Risk</td>
<td>Probability (1 to 3)</td>
<td>Consequence of risk occurring</td>
<td>Impact (1 to 3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ongoing programmes are not adapted to reflect the results of the conflict analysis.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Poorly designed programme interventions with low ownership by communities which have low chances of producing a sustainable, positive impact</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Donors and impl. partners do not adhere to the flexible area-based programming approach; Rigidity of funding mechanisms.</td>
<td>Political and communication efforts</td>
<td>SSU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**At pillar level**

1. Democratic Dialogue

*If (1) a collective and long-term vision and concrete solutions for peace is formulated in stabilization priority areas; (2) the authorities endorse the Dialogue results and these inform the definition and revision of national policies; and (3) stabilization initiatives are harmonized based on the results of the Dialogue; then trust will increase among communities and towards the state, conflicts will increasingly be managed non-violently, and causes of conflict will be addressed better, creating the basis for stable institutions and consolidating peace.*

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No interest to partner with the strategy on the part of the national and provincial authorities.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Meetings are cancelled, relevant state representatives do not attend, no dialogue can take place.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fear of possible outcomes of the dialogue, legitimization of populations/groups’ demands.</td>
<td>Regular reporting, conditionality of further help based on observed commitment.</td>
<td>Donors, SSU, Provincial and central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No agreement on areas of intervention.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No starting point for project implementation.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Different priorities between actors involved in the dialogue.</td>
<td>Provision of space for constructive dialogue, effective communication on the Strategy's objectives and justification of selected intervention areas.</td>
<td>SSU, Impl. Partners, National authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments made during the dialogue process are not respected.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Programme implementation is jeopardized, resources are not made available.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of political will to support an effective dialogue.</td>
<td>Regular monitoring of and reporting on commitments made.</td>
<td>SSU, Impl. Partners, National authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Security

*If (1) principles of protection of civilians and of accountability are integrated in the functions of the FARDC; (2) the populations’ perception of the FARDC change; and (3) the army’s capacity to "hold" key areas increases; then the Government of DRC will be increasingly able to protect its civilians and implement a gradual transition of responsibility for security from the FARDC to the PNC.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARDC do not receive their salaries.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No incentive to change behaviour.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No interest to support financially on the part of the State</td>
<td>Coordinate with the development of the SSR programme to place emphasis on the need for regular payment of salaries.</td>
<td>Donors, Impl. partners, National authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight mechanisms are not implemented</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No change of behaviour can be observed, impunity maintained.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of will to be held accountable, lack of resources for implementation.</td>
<td>Monitoring of reports, follow-up.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, SSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC are unable to &quot;hold&quot; key areas.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>State authority is diminished and populations resort to other means to resolve conflicts, including violence.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Resurgence of violence, desertion of FARDC members.</td>
<td>Increase MONUSCO-FARDC coordination and communication.</td>
<td>MONUSCO, GoDRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Restoration of State Authority

*If (1) the state has the capacity to provide more and more relevant services through increased presence in stabilization zones; (2) the state is increasingly recognized as the main service provider and become less patrimonial; and (3) an enabling regulatory framework is put in place; then the state will be increasingly perceived as an enabling presence, the institutional insecurity endured by the population will decrease, and they will not need to resort to parallel strategies for their protection and the pursuit of their interests.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure (PNC/Admin./Justice) is not delivered/not used.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No change in perception of the PNC/Administration/Justice Administration by the population.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of coordination between State and ISSSSS planning.</td>
<td>Conditionality of construction works on effective use of structures.</td>
<td>GoDRC, Donors, Impl. partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained officers/staff are not monitored.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No incentive to change behaviours, no change in perception by the population.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Training programmes do not have a follow-up component planned for and funded.</td>
<td>Regular monitoring of trained PNC/staff and changes in behaviour.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, SSU, National authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Risk</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No funding for running costs and salaries (police, administration and justice)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No incentive to change behaviours, predation, structures and equipment not used by state representatives, services not accessible to population.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of political will to finance stabilization, corruption.</td>
<td>Conditionality of project approval.</td>
<td>GoDRC, Donors, Impl. partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential administrative services are not accessible.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Populations' perception of the State in terms of provision of services will not improve.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of will to provide necessary resources to make essential services available; technical difficulties; insecurity.</td>
<td>Engage service providers in a constructive dialogue.</td>
<td>GoDRC, Impl. partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. RRR

If (1) the population of eastern DRC engages in socio-economic recovery activities that focus on social cohesion and resilience; (2) the authorities and the international community are aligned in their support for these initiatives; then communities will be able to manage external shocks more peacefully, and there will be a possibility for development and more equitable distribution of wealth.

<table>
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<th>Responsibility for mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity prevents population in priority areas from accessing fields and markets.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No improvement of livelihoods, limited opportunities for socio-economic recovery.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>New conflicts erupt.</td>
<td>Delivery of outputs and outcomes under pillars 2 and 3.</td>
<td>FARDC, PNC, Impl. partners for security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-risk groups are not included in communities' economic activities.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Increased risk of violent mobilization.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lack of trust among community members, especially towards specific groups (migrants, IDPs, etc.); Lack of inclusivity in activities' programming.</td>
<td>Focus on dialogue (with and within communities), inclusivity and strengthened social cohesion throughout ISSSS activities.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-risk groups are not included in communities' economic activities.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Increased risk of violent mobilization.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lack of trust among community members, especially towards specific groups (migrants, IDPs, etc.); Lack of inclusivity in activities' programming.</td>
<td>Focus on dialogue (with and within communities), inclusivity and strengthened social cohesion throughout ISSSS activities.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, Donors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercommunity disputes increase instead of decreasing.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communities’ vulnerability increases.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Improper media coverage of destabilizing events may fuel existing tensions.</td>
<td>Preventive monitoring of media reporting on events that could trigger violence.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, SSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanticipated population movements.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Social integration becomes more challenging.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conflict/Natural Catastrophy/etc.</td>
<td>Cooperation with local authorities to jointly manage emergencies.</td>
<td>Impl. partners, STAREC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. FSV

*If (1) civil and state structures are empowered to fulfill their responsibilities in terms of protecting men and women against sexual violence; (2) gender roles are perceived and challenged as factors perpetuating sexual violence; then trust in peaceful prevention and response actions will increase, incidents of sexual violence will decline, the needs of survivors and their communities will be addressed and peacebuilding efforts will be more resilient to external shocks.*

<p>| Filed sexual violence cases are not followed through, verdicts are not applied, national Laws on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence are not implemented. | 2 | Trust in judicial system will decrease; impunity is maintained; no incentive to change behaviour for perpetrators of SV; victims cannot seek reparation. | 2 | Courts lack institutional support; | Effective monitoring of activities under the first component of the 5th pillar. | MONUSCO Joint Human Right Office, Min. of Justice |
| Girls and women - to a lesser extent - boys and men continue to face daily risks of SGBV. | 2 | There is no protection against sexual violence; the participation of women in communities’ life is limited. | 3 | Prevailing impunity; general insecurity; girls and women’s vulnerability is not improved, sexual violence against boys and men remains taboo. | Effective monitoring of activities under the second component of the 5th pillar. | UNHCR, Min. of Social Affairs |
| SGBV Incidents attributed to FARDC and PNC agents do not decrease, or reported perpetrators are not prosecuted. | 2 | Girls and women in particular are not safe; Security agents and forces are perceived as a destabilizing, threatening presence. | 3 | Prevailing impunity; failure of sensitization trainings; prevention procedures are overlooked in DDR and other relevant processes. | Effective monitoring of activities under the third component of the 5th pillar. | MONUSCO SSR, Min. of Defence and Justice |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Risk</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multisectorial response mechanisms for sexual violence survivors are inexistent or inaccessible at the local level.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Survivors of sexual violence do not find any support in their communities.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The National Protocol for multisectorial response to sexual violence survivors is not applied.</td>
<td>Effective monitoring of activities under the fourth component of the 5th pillar.</td>
<td>UNICEF, Min. of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The database on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence is unreliable, contains double-entries, missing or misleading data.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Understanding the extent of the issue and monitoring any improvement is jeopardized; actors involved in stabilization do not use available information.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Data is collected by a multitude of different, uncoordinated actors; survivors of sexual violence are unwilling to disclose relevant information.</td>
<td>Better monitoring of data collection agencies, and mentoring on data collection methods when necessary.</td>
<td>UNFPA, Min. of Gender</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. OPERATIONALIZATION

Having identified the general approach to stabilization and the concrete areas of intervention guided by the logic of the revised ISSSS pillars, this last chapter will examine (1) the operational principles for the revised pillars, with an emphasis on retaining focus on and measuring the impact of stabilization interventions; (2) the geographic zones in which the strategy will be active; (3) how the area-based approach will be implemented concretely; (4) coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the strategy; and finally (5) the new M&E mechanism that will allow the partners to ‘measure’ whether their interventions are having an effect.

1. Operational Principles

Throughout the programmes for the revised ISSSS, there will be three cross-cutting operational principles:

- **Conflict transformation, conflict sensitivity, and gender.** The primary purpose of all activities will be to contribute to diminishing conflict through increasing trust and accountability between state and society to address the drivers of conflict. In order to do so, the Democratic Dialogue will be used to conduct in-depth, common, and participatory analysis of the conflicts in each of the stabilization priority areas and programmes should be targeted towards transforming the conflicts as identified by the populations themselves. Conflict sensitivity and gender will be integrated in a cross-cutting manner in all activities under the pillar. Activities will be designed, planned, implemented and evaluated to avoid a negative impact on conflict dynamics and enhance a positive one, and to have a positive impact on men, women, boys and girls, and the relations between them.

- **Assuring the sustainability of interventions.** Programme design will take into consideration absorption capacities of the GoDRC and civil society and ensure their ownership. Before activities are set up, an analysis will be made of (1) the needs of beneficiaries as expressed through the Dialogue; (2) the technical, financial and staffing capacities of the national and provincial government to support the programme. The respective responsibilities of the GoDRC and international partners for the meeting of objectives will be clarified (see III.3.1). International partners will work with the GoDRC during the project cycle to support the government so that it is able to fulfill its role, and the programme will be adjusted accordingly if the GoDRC experiences delays or difficulties, but with the principle of a real partnership in mind, and a clear understanding of the long-term responsibility of the Government to ensure sustainability of the investments being jointly implemented.

- **Stabilization interventions will be systematically linked to existing strategies and budgets of the GoDRC so as to be part of a broader planning cycle.** Interventions will bring local authorities and communities into the consultation process and project design and empower them to follow-up and monitor activities over the life of the project cycle. This should increase ownership and accountability and ensure the sustainability of external support initiatives. Local and provincial authorities will be supported throughout the programme to provide leadership.
- **Ensure the effective measurement of the outcomes and outputs of stabilization through a revised M&E system.** The new M&E framework for the overall ISSSS provides for the elaboration and piloting of various tools aimed at capturing the impact of ISSSS against its objectives. As stabilization is about perceptions as much as it is about objective reality, regular perception surveys and other types of qualitative surveys will be used to complement the collection of more traditional quantitative data. All interventions framed with reference to the ISSSS will be required to contribute to the collection of data on impact, and go beyond outcomes and outputs. The communities of the locality where the project is being implemented will be involved during the length of the project cycle, proposing changes where required and evaluating the project’s impact.

2. **Area-Based Stabilization Programming**

During the first phase of the ISSSS, instead of addressing every conceivable need all across eastern DRC, partners chose a linear, sectorial and geographically limited approach implemented on axes.

The axis approach was sequential by nature: FARDC and MONUSCO would clear areas from armed groups, then infrastructure would be constructed, in the meantime policemen, judges and administrative staff would be trained, and then deployed to make full use of the infrastructural investments. This approach raised many questions from the government and partners, notably due to lack of clarity on ‘stabilization’ as a concept. As a result, interventions were diffuse and cross-pillar synergies were not always exploited to their fullest. Finally, due to the requirement of a rapid roll-out of programmes after adoption of ISSSS, interventions had been largely designed in a top-down manner and without sufficient analysis of the specificities of the local context along the priority axes. As a result, programmes sometimes failed to address the complex realities of eastern DRC where conflict dynamics can sometimes vary from one village to the next.

To remedy to these shortcomings and to adapt to the revised stabilization concept ‘holistic, integrated, but focused’, the revised stabilization strategy is to be operationalized through area-based programmes implemented in stabilization priority zones.

The ISSSS will be operationalized through a number of limited area-based stabilization programmes. Area-based development is defined as “targeting specific geographical areas in a country, characterized by a particular complex development problem, through an integrated, inclusive, participatory and flexible approach”.

Studies of area-based development programmes have revealed that such an approach presents various benefits, such as favouring holistic, cross-sectorial responses and presenting a high potential for better coordination; increasing the ability to understand local conflict dynamics and developing intervention mitigating conflict; and promoting good governance and accountability. Finally, this approach has been judged to improve monitoring and to be more cost-effective. Limitations identified include the difficulty to take into account the broader strategic context and to influence national and regional dynamics, as well as to secure funding for the assessments.

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13 Donors also have a responsibility in ensuring that programme and project M&E and reporting is aligned with ISSSS requirements. This can be ensured through the use of the ISSSS multidonor trust fund (see VI.6. Funding Modalities).

2.1. Defining the Stabilization Zones\textsuperscript{15}

In order to implement the area-based approach, the first step is to define the zones which will be covered by each of the programmes. A limited number of zones (2 to 3) will be selected for each of the target provinces (North- and South-Kivu, and Province Orientale the first instance; and Maniema and Katanga at a later stage).

The following characteristics and considerations will be taken into account when defining the zone(s):

- Zones where conflict drivers — security dilemmas, mobilization around land and identity, natural resources and regional tensions, interact to create either direct conflict or a fragile situation which may be manipulated to turn violent within a relatively short time span;
- Zones recently cleared of armed groups through military operations or through political negotiation (see Annex 2 ‘Islands of Stability’);
- Zones where interventions can demonstrate results in a relatively short timeframe. This includes considering the level of state presence, the pre-existence of interventions, in particular ISSSS’s, and the capacities of international and local partners to deliver on stabilization programmes in the area;
- Each zone should have a potential for inclusive interventions — i.e. interventions which do not favour one identity, socio-professional or a particularly disadvantaged group and exclude others, in order to avoid a potential backlash from excluded groups;
- When possible areas should match administrative boundaries — village, groupements, chefferie/sectors, territory, in order to facilitate the involvement of GoDRC authorities and thus contribute to the sustainability of programme outcomes;
- Linkages with the broader context, such as economic specificities, migration and displacement patterns, should also be explored and taken into consideration.

Concretely, this means that the revised ISSSS will be less focused on working on the six priority axes, even though these will remain important, due to the prevailing conflict dynamics along them and the need to ensure previous commitments are fulfilled.

The following graphic shows clearly the differences between stabilization and other types of interventions:

\textsuperscript{15}A more detailed discussion of the stabilization zones is available from SSU.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Humanitarian</strong></th>
<th><strong>Stabilization</strong></th>
<th><strong>Development</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>Short (6-24 months)</td>
<td>Around 5 years, but this will differ fundamentally per zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implication</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Paradoxical: government is both responsible/lead, as well as lacking capacity/ party to conflict / target for interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td>Saving lives / alleviating suffering / supporting transition</td>
<td>Enabling state and society to build mutual accountability and capacity to address and mitigate existing or emerging drivers of violent conflict, creating the conditions for improved governance and longer term development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political / social context</strong></td>
<td>Urgency / no or little state authority / ongoing conflict</td>
<td>Patrimonial state / people have negative engrained frames of reference / fragmented Congolese Identities / Socio-demographic issues / Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criteria for Zones</strong></td>
<td>Anywhere human suffering demands it (open war, disease, displacement).</td>
<td>Areas where <strong>the interplay of the following dynamics</strong> create conflict or creates a fragile situation which be manipulated to turn violent within a relatively short timeframe: (1) Security Vacuums; (2) Mobilization around land and Identities; (3) Regional dynamics; (4) Exploitation of natural resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less concerned with long-term sustainability.</td>
<td>These dynamics could for example play out in the following types of zones: Zones touched by ongoing conflict or where insecurity prevails; Zones with a large ethnic diversity; Zones with considerable demographic pressure and poverty; Zones recently cleared of the presence of armed groups; Zones rich in natural resources (minerals, timber, oil etc.); Buffer zones close to the borders; Zones at risk from 'spill-over' from neighboring conflict zones; National parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct effects more than targeting root causes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each zone will be identified through an inclusive assessment at provincial level on each of the characteristics and considerations mentioned above, which will include a general conflict scan of the two Kivus and Province Orientale, a desk review of available quantitative and qualitative data and provincial strategic plans, such as the *Plans d’Action Quinquenaux*. The desk review will be complemented by participatory and inclusive methodologies enabling communities to identify priority areas, including through the existing committees at local level. The assessment will be conducted by GoDRC authorities and international partners working together and supported by the STAREC coordination and SSU teams.

### 2.2. Programme Development

Once the priority zones are identified, the formulation of each area-specific programme will be informed by a detailed conflict analysis supported through information emerging from early stages of the Democratic Dialogue, as well as a review of pre-existing activities in the area.

Once the conflict analysis is completed, an integrated programme will be developed for each of these proposed stabilization zones through collaboration between GoDRC authorities and international partners with the support of STAREC coordination and SSU teams. These programmes will be validated in the *Comités Techniques Conjoint* (CTC). The programmes should be designed to permit a flexible response to the outcomes of the Democratic Dialogue.

### 3. Coordination

The coordination of the ISSSS will be ensured at local (district), provincial and national levels and among ISSSS partners and with governmental authorities and institutions and Congolese civil society.

Coordination among international partners has to date been ensured through the following mechanisms:

1. At local/provincial level: through the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) meetings held monthly, chaired by the MONUSCO Head of Office and attended by Heads of MONUSCO sections and UN agencies, including humanitarian.
2. At national level: in absence of IMPT, stabilization implementing partners coordinates their positions through a Stabilization Working Group.

Those two mechanisms will be reviewed in order to ensure their contribution to the coordination requirements of the ISSSS.

Concerning coordination with the Congolese authorities and institutions, as well as civil society, the existing mechanisms established through Congolese legislation, are:

- At national level, STAREC coordination mechanisms are the *Comité de Pilotage* and *Comité de Suivi*. The first provides the strategic orientation of the STAREC and acts as steering committee for the multidonor trust funds. The second decides on matters of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the central-level institutions.
- At provincial and local level, the CTC on matters of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, validates and monitors projects at the provincial level.
While these mechanisms are useful and ensure ownership by GoDRC authorities, their functioning and efficiency is variable. An evaluation will be undertaken as the revised ISSSS is operationalized, capacity building needs identified and an approved capacity building plan implemented.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation

4.1. Monitoring purposes

The M&E framework can be seen as the nervous system of the ISSSS. ISSSS conducts on-going monitoring for the following purposes:

- To provide data required to report against logical framework indicators;
- To provide data required to make strategic and programme-related decisions;
- To collect evidence of the ISSSS impact;
- To stimulate learning;
- To provide material for external communication.

4.2. The ISSSS Logical Framework

The diagram below gives an overview of the ISSSS logical framework that is the main component of the ISSSS M&E framework. The overall number of indicators is 70, which will be measured through a series of tools and data collection methods. Of the total indicators, 13 are based on perception surveys.16

The M&E logical framework of the revised ISSSS can contribute to monitoring progress made against the benchmarks defined in the PSCF.

16 Some indicators are merely suggestions and remain to be validated by the various stakeholders, governmental, UN and NGOs involved in this work.
4.3. Data Collection

The M&E framework is to be implemented through a range of assessment instruments and the application of procedures. A work plan will be prepared in order to keep track of the use of the tools and to ensure that all data are collected and collated in due time.

The M&E framework defines the kind of evidence the ISSSS intends to collect in order to fulfill the monitoring and evaluation methodology outlined in the previous sections. It will also describe some existing tools which correspond to the proposed indicators.

(i) Data requirement

The M&E system will be specific about who is benefiting from the programme’s impact. It will take a disaggregated approach to data that reveals effects on marginalized groups such as women, children and ethnic minorities.

The first type of data collected respond to requirements of the logical framework. Those are (1) statistical information provided by various MONUSCO units, UN agencies and if possible provided by governmental bodies; and (2) data on perceptions. Surveys will be administered annually / quarterly (to be defined depending on the partner) to measure the impact the ISSSS may have on the way populations in target areas perceive for example the evolution of the dialogue with the authorities, the access to justice and the work of the FARDC and the PNC.

A second type of data will be collected to contribute to inform programme decisions and risk management by providing information on changes to the context and stakeholders engagement.

(ii) Monitoring & Evaluation Instruments

Specific tools and procedures have been identified for each indicator in order to allow the collection of data designed to permit an analysis of the impact of the revised ISSSS programme. Those tools are divided into 9 broad categories: Perception Surveys, Focus Group Discussions, Violence Gravity Assessment, Research, Inclusivity Assessment Index, Reports, Questionnaires, Summative tools and Pre/Post-training questionnaires.

For some indicators multiple tools have been identified, in order to ensure the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, to ensure the quality of data through triangulation of information collected and to obtain all relevant information on a specific issue.

5. Strategic Communication

An effective strategic communication component will play an important part in the overall success of the second phase of the ISSSS strategy. It will ensure that the proper planning and resources are in place to allow effective communication between the various levels of ISSSS and each of the partnering organizations, with the various groups that it is working to help and support, and with external players, such as donors and the media. A more focused approach to communications activities aimed at government engagement, real and consistent involvement with communities and key actors, such as local, provincial and national government and civil society, and a better use of M&E results about ISSSS achievements and potential resources will help to achieve more successful outcomes.
6. Funding Modalities

During ISSSS first phase around 90% of the funding was allocated bilaterally. The remaining 10% came from the Peacebuilding Fund (USD 20 millions) and the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility - SRFF (USD 21 millions) – a multidonor trust fund established for the ISSSS.

For the funding of the revised ISSSS, it is strongly recommended to use the SRFF as it provides for:

- GoDRC ownership;
- Flexibility needed for the funding of area-based community driven stabilization programmes and Islands of Stability;
- Facilitation of coordination and synergies among interventions;
- Facilitation of data collection for M&E purposes.

The SRFF Terms of Reference will be reviewed to ensure their coherence with the objectives of the revised ISSSS.