United Nations Peacebuilding Fund  
Priority Plan for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total amount of envelope requested:</th>
<th>USD 20,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority Outcome Areas:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Improving security and civilian protection</td>
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<td>2. Demobilization and reintegration of combatants and high-risk groups</td>
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<td>3. Extension of State authority</td>
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<td>4. Local peace-building and recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approximate ratio of PBF funds targeting government entities and civil society:</td>
<td>80%</td>
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A. Peacebuilding Context and Role of the UN System

Recent developments in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have opened a window of opportunity for the consolidation of peace that the Government (GoDRC) and international community are eager to seize. 2003 peace accords addressed the overall political crisis, reduced armed conflict and led to the establishment of a legitimate government in 2006 in the DRC. However peace remains fragile and the DRC’s eastern provinces have continued to suffer recurrent cycles of violence.

Ongoing challenges and specific identified conflict drivers, many of which are interrelated, include¹:
- Inter-ethnic tensions
- Presence of foreign and local armed groups
- Unregulated natural resources wealth (land and minerals)
- Capacity and discipline levels of national armed forces and relationships with civilians
- The nature of warfare employed, including brutal reprisals and systematic rape
- Weak state capacity and considerable geographic and infrastructure challenges
- Demographic pressure and large scale displacement (as internally displaced and refugees)
- Regional dynamics (which also relate to much of the above)

By early 2009 tensions in the East were considerably reduced and diplomatic relations with Rwanda and Uganda improved. In January 2009 a cease-fire was brokered with the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and its integration into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) commenced.² Joint operations of the GoDRC with Ugandan and Rwandan armies against foreign armed groups have also stepped up with GoRDC reoccupying much territory. The March 2003 peace agreements between the GoDRC, the CNDP and most other armed groups in the Kivus – mediated by the SESG Obasanjo, created new frameworks for reconciliation that are being exploited. These recent developments have considerably reshaped the political and military landscape and present an opportunity for the UN system to support the national Government to extend legitimate State authority and pursue reconciliation and national recovery with an increasing respect for human rights in the Eastern DRC.

¹ Sources include: Exercice participatif d’analyse des conflits et capacités de paix pour la planification du développement dans la province du Nord Kivu. Cellule Provinciale d’Appui à la Pacification (CPAP) with UNDP, April 2009.
B. Strategic Framework

Related Assessments and Determination of PBF Priority Areas

The UN, in collaboration with the Government and international partners, has developed a strategy for supporting the implementation of political agreements and consolidating peacebuilding gains building upon existing assessments and frameworks.

Derived from priorities articulated in DRC's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), DRC's Country Assistance Framework (CAF 2007 - 2010) initially laid out a common strategic nation-wide approach for assistance in the post-elections period. CAF areas include: Security Sector Reform; Transparency; Public Financial Management; Natural Resources; Public Administration and Civil Service Reform; Local Governance and Decentralization; Investment and Public Enterprise Reform.

Within this framework and in order to address the transitional requirements of Eastern DRC, the UN system launched the Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) for Eastern DRC in mid-2008. With a specific focus on preventing a relapse into conflict and to enhance security and stability, the strategy is designed to consolidate immediate gains and support conditions for longer-term recovery. Drawing on existing national and other frameworks, the UNSSSS aims to help stabilize the East and protect civilians by 1) security sector reform and disbanding armed groups; 2) supporting political processes to implement agreements; 3) restoring state authority; 4) assisting the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees and community recovery, and 5) combating sexual violence.\(^3\)

In order to address the various challenges to peace in Eastern DRC and to consolidate the gains of recent peace initiatives and other political and military interventions, the GoDRC elaborated a Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (known as STAREC) in June 2009. The GoDRC Plan was developed on the basis of pre-existing stabilization interventions supported by the international community and the “Amani Programme”.

The GoDRC and international partners have agreed that the UNSSSS will constitute the primary operational and financial mechanism for international support to stabilization efforts in Eastern DRC.

The UNSSSS is clearly related and demarcated from humanitarian activities and longer-term recovery and development efforts. (see annex 1). To ensure continuity between humanitarian, stabilization and recovery activities, UNSSSS programs will be closely coordinated with relevant mechanisms and frameworks (including the humanitarian clusters, the reform committees and the government’s thematic groups).

The UNSSSS also constitutes part of the United Nations national transition strategy for DRC, as articulated in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). Within this framework, the UNSSSS provides the detailed programmatic and operational strategy for achieving strategic objectives of UN support in Eastern DRC specifically.

PBF Priority Plan Objectives

The overall objective of DRC’s PBF Priority Plan is to specifically focus on urgent priorities and critical gaps within the STAREC and UNSSSS frameworks which if not addressed in the short-term will undermine current political, security and stabilization efforts in the region. Projects developed on the basis of the Priority Plan will focus on current geographic areas of intervention, as well as additional strategic and high-priority areas and seek to maximize convergence across thematic areas. The specific objectives of the Priority Plan are to:

\(^3\) Activities addressed to Combating Sexual Violence, as specified in the UN Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence (2008) have been incorporated in the UNSSSS in a transversal manner. However, for clarity of reference, a 5\(^{th}\) transversal component specific to sexual violence has been recently added to the UNSSSS strategy. The UNSSSS and the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence are thereby merged into one strategic and programmatic framework.
1) Initiate urgent peacebuilding interventions for which funding is not available and to demonstrate how well-designed, timely intervention can produce peace dividends with immediate improvements in the protection of civilians, fostering confidence in peace agreements, promoting local peacebuilding and supporting a protective environment whereby displaced populations are able to return. In this regard the PBF will instigate and catalyse further support for a planned larger Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) – the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF).

2) Narrow the funding gap of critical activities - particularly in non-ODA sectors - in order to extend on-going interventions to other strategic geographical areas, pilot new approaches and interventions, particularly for security related activities for which non-ODA funding has not been forthcoming, and complement on-going activities in given areas in order to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness.

3) Support the consolidation of political and security initiatives, particularly in areas where armed groups have withdrawn, and where the context remains fragile with risk of relapse into conflict without immediate assistance. PBF projects will serve to consolidate processes at local level through support for local peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, as well as quick-impact economic recovery and livelihoods assistance, in order to mitigate localized causes and consequences of conflict, and create visible peace dividends for the Congolese population.

4) In light of the fluid and volatile environment in Eastern DRC, ensure a rapid response to emerging crises, changing situations and corresponding priorities on the ground, through the flexible and rapid allocation of specifically designated funds from the PBF allocation.4

5) Support the establishment and strengthening of STAREC and UNSSSSS structures to ensure Government and UN capacities are in place to guarantee appropriate leadership, oversight, coordination and technical support for stabilization operations and financing, and support the strengthening of national capacities to identify, programme and implement peacebuilding interventions.

Principles for the Coordination and Management of the PBF

The coordination and management of interventions funded through the PBF will be led by the GoDRC, supported by the UN system, and be undertaken within the framework of existing STAREC and UNSSSS structures at national, regional and provincial levels. Concretely, the following mechanisms have been established by the Government and will ensure national involvement in the allocation and oversight of PBF funds, and the establishment of appropriate linkages with efforts funded through other sources.

- An Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee chaired by the Prime Minister with participation of key Ministries (Defense, Interior, Justice and Plan), with UN (SRSG-led) and international partners.
- Thematic and Operational Working Groups in Kinshasa, chaired by the relevant Ministries and in charge of defining strategic directions and plans. These groups include: 1) army and DDR, 2) police, 3) justice and 4) exploitation of natural resources.
- Provincial Joint Technical Committees co-chaired by the Governors of the Provinces and the Heads of Office of MONUC, with the participation of relevant provincial ministries and partners, meet regularly to determine key provincial priorities and associated implementation plans.
- A special configuration of the Funding Board of the SRFF will be established to manage the PBF. The PBF configuration of the Stabilization Funding Board will be co-chaired by the SRSG and the Prime Minister (or Minister of Planning as secretariat of the STAREC), and be composed of two (2) UN agency representatives on a 6-month rotational basis and two (2) donors chosen from the main contributors of the PBF (e.g. UK and Sweden). The PBF allocation will also be used to establish and operationalize the Stabilization and Recovery Fund Facility.

4 Within programme areas 1-4 a ‘rapid response’ facility will be reserved for up to 10% - requiring co-chair signatures only to release for project amounts up to USD 200,000
In view of better supporting the GoDRC and reducing transaction costs, the efforts of UN and international partners will also be coordinated at the component level by designated MONUC sections and UN agencies selected on the basis of their established lead role functions and mandates in DRC. Component leads will be responsible for coordinating and representing the international community in thematic working groups led by the GoDRC within the STAREC, as well as related groups within other frameworks (e.g. humanitarian, development and reform). (See Annex 2)

C. Monitoring and Evaluation

Indicators and performance benchmarks have been developed for the UNSSSSS - to which the Priority Plan and associated projects will be directly related. Indicators are monitored, internally within the UN, on a monthly basis by the Integrated Management Planning Teams (IMPTs) at the Provincial and National Level, as well as by MONUC Senior Management. Monthly monitoring is also carried out through the publication of a UNSSSSS Score Card which records the progress made and shortfalls and obstacles identified. Impact indicators are monitored on a quarterly basis utilizing a summary results matrix.

Monitoring of PBF project-related performance indicators will be in conjunction with the authorities through coordination mechanisms established on a monthly basis at the provincial level and on a quarterly basis within the Inter-Ministerial Committee. A more comprehensive M&E framework is presently being developed and will be available by the end September 2009. All PBF projects will subscribe to a specific monitoring plan and specific indicators. Information to monitor and establish the success of PBF funded interventions will rely on available monitoring tools including: 1) the protection database; 2) the human rights database; 3) population displacement and return databases. Joint Protection and Monitoring Teams (JPT/JMTs) are currently being deployed in Eastern DRC and will support the updating, measuring and analysis of indicators, in addition to M&E functions undertaken by individual UN Recipient Organizations.

D. PBF DRC Priority Areas and Project Ideas

The total UNSSSSS budget is approximately USD 700 million (excluding activities related to Combating Sexual Violence presently being budgeted), of which USD 137 million is presently available. PBF funds will help support critical non-ODA fundable activities, critical gaps identified in on-going interventions as well as pilot interventions for which further complementary funding from international partners will be sought. With a focus on priority interventions within STAREC and UNSSSSS, PBF projects will address the following areas.

Priority Area 1:
Security and protection of civilians - Improving FARDC professionalism and discipline

In order to help stabilize and consolidate the armed forces in Eastern DRC (and in particular the Kivus), PBF projects will support behavioral training, pilot vetting and ‘right-sizing’ of FARDC battalions, with the provision of garrisons and equipment, as well as the improvement of internal control and discipline.

FARDC units deployed in Eastern DRC suffer from a lack of reliable Government support and facilities, poor command and control, and inadequate living conditions. This has resulted in high levels

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3 In light of continuing costing of stabilization requirements in Eastern DRC, as well as further discussions with international partners ongoing programmes that could be realigned within the UNSSSSS framework, both of these figures should be considered indicative and subject to further change in the near-term.

4 Right-sizing refers to reducing the overall effectiveness of the FARDC (presently at an estimated 60,000 in the two Kivus) by carrying out ‘moral’ and physical screening of FARDC elements, offering demobilization packages and/or economic alternatives through the establishment of public service units composed of ex-FARDC elements.
of indiscipline and impunity for past abuses and very poor relations with civilians and is a major factor contributing to insecurity. The PBF will support a series of priority interventions to urgently enhance the discipline of FARDC units deployed in the Kivus, Ituri and the Uele. This support will be closely aligned with, and help initiate, medium-term actions foreseen in the Revised Army Reform Plan and the Plan Intermédiaire d'Urgence, and will be oriented towards significantly improving the behavior of the FARDC with respect to civilian populations. PBF resources will not be used to support the direct operational combat capacity of the FARDC.

Key interventions within this framework will focus on 1) the construction and rehabilitation of FARDC facilities (including garrisons) and internal control mechanisms; 2) strengthening the military justice system through, among other things, support for prosecution support cells, infrastructure rehabilitation and logistics, and training of military justice personnel; 3) support for the ‘right-sizing’ of a pilot FARDC battalion, including demobilization and socio-economic reintegration of excess troops, as well as ‘recycling’ of others into the public service; and 4) support for the complementary training of select FARDC units (which focus on professional conduct, human rights, and SGBV issues) through the rehabilitation of three FARDC training centers. Funds allocated to this priority area will also serve to catalyze and complement further funding from interested donors.

Priority Area 2:
Demobilization and community-based reintegration of combatants and high-risk groups

PBF support will reduce looting and attacks on civilians by helping thousands of irregular combatants (primarily informal combatants not eligible for regular army integration and DDR) as well as high-risk youth to reintegrate into, and become productive members of local communities.

The National DDR program funded by the World Bank and African Development Bank will address an estimated 23,000 FARDC and 12,700 combatants from armed groups throughout the country. However, estimates for the numbers of non-integrated combatants in Eastern DRC amount to over 15,000. Although the Amani Process in the Kivus involved the majority of armed groups, not all combatants were integrated or demobilized through the disengagement process, or were eligible (according to the National DDR criteria of “one man, one weapon”) for support to be provided through the MDRP-funded DDR process. Given the large number of ineligible combatants (estimated at 10,000) and as demonstrated in the past, there is a risk that the situation could degenerate into violence and conflict due to perceived inequality in treatment if this category of combatants is not adequately addressed.

Related PBF activities will focus on labor-intensive activities for short-term employment for these combatants, as well as longer-term community reintegration activities to also benefit host communities through alternative livelihoods. An estimated 2,500 ineligible former-combatants will be targeted, together with an additional 2,500 families. Expected outcomes include the prevention of new tensions and conflict, promotion of economic recovery in critical areas, and support for local peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Priority Area 3: Support for the restoration and strengthening of State authority

A third area of PBF projects will aim to quickly stabilize high-risk areas through the extension of State authority, restoration of law and order, and improving access to justice and essential public services including strengthened national capacities to curtail the illicit exploitation of natural resources.

The restoration and strengthening of State presence, capacity and authority in areas vacated by armed groups is a critical complement to efforts to secure environment. Efforts within the STAREC/UNSSSSS frameworks currently focus on the rehabilitation of key access roads, the construction, rehabilitation

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7 Support for complementary training of the FARDC constitutes a critical entry point for a range of issues, as it will be preceded by vetting and screening for human rights and SGBV, and the process of ‘right-sizing’ of selected units. Provision of training will directly contribute to improving the professionalism and discipline of the FARDC, and reducing the level of exactions against the civilian population.
and equipping of State infrastructure, and the deployment of State representatives, notably the national police; civil and customary administration and judiciary and penitentiary authorities. Currently available resources are not sufficient to support all activities of restoration of State authority along the six (6) original UNSSSS ‘priority axes’ in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. PBF interventions will complement existing UNSSSS efforts by supporting the deployment, equipping and training of police, justice, corrections and local administration in key strategic locations, focusing on support for infrastructure rehabilitation, training, equipping and deployment of personnel, and complementing activities along the original axes. Additional priority areas have also been identified and for which resources are urgently required. These include areas which have recently become accessible due to the results of March 2009 Peace Agreements, which resulted in the withdrawal of CNDP and other armed groups, as well as on-going operations against the FDLR. This resulted in the removal of the FDLR from key strategic areas in North and South Kivu. PBF projects will also include a pilot intervention to support national efforts to curtail illicit exploitation of natural resources in key mining areas in North and South Kivu, including support for the creation of centres de négociation for mining authorities in mining areas to improve the tracking and traceability of natural resources.

Priority Area 4:
Support for local peace building, reconciliation and creation of economic ‘peace dividends’

Although progress is being achieved in addressing threats posed by armed groups in Eastern DRC, high levels of poverty, economic and social exclusion, inter-ethnic tensions and disputes over land, housing and property in the context of IDP and refugee return continue to fuel local conflicts or constitute triggers for new forms of violence. While a number of interventions to support return and reintegration of displaced populations, as well as community recovery, are currently underway within the STAREC/UNSSSS frameworks, current funding does not permit the targeting of extremely sensitive and critical areas which could become flashpoints for future conflicts. Within the framework of the Priority Plan a number of strategic interventions are proposed to 1) urgently support peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts to assuage inter-ethnic tensions and create conditions for the peaceful return of IDPs and refugees through support for dialogue, sensitization and strengthening of capacities for peaceful conflict resolution; and 2) address socioeconomic imbalances and consequences of conflict in key strategic areas through support for the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and livelihoods creation. Key expected outcomes of this support include the mitigation and prevention of socioeconomic conflicts in key areas, and the creation of tangible ‘peace dividends’ for war-affected populations in order to support peace consolidation at local level.

Priority Area 5: Building capacity for peacebuilding and resource mobilization

Both STAREC and UNSSSS include robust coordination oversight structures, led by the GoDRC and supported by the UN system, at national (Kinshasa), regional and provincial level to provide strategic direction, technical and programmatic advice, and ensure the coherence of both national and international efforts – especially with respect to catalyzing additional support for the planned larger MDTF effort. Ensuring sufficient capacity for coordination and oversight, including with governmental entities, is critical in light of the number of actors, the different levels (national, regional and provincial) of interaction, and the advisory and technical support required. In this context, minimal PBF resources will also support the establishment and strengthening of relevant capacities within both the national (STAREC) and international (UNSSSS) coordination structures in order to ensure appropriate coordination and oversight of the PBF allocation, and contribute to the strengthening of the overarching STAREC and UNSSSS coordination frameworks. This will include support for the establishment of the STAREC national secretariat (managed by the Minister of Planning), the STAREC Inter-Provincial Coordination Unit, and the Joint Technical Committees at provincial level. In addition, support will also be provided to strengthen the capacity of the UNSSSS Stabilization Support Unit to

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8 Some efforts are ongoing with the rehabilitation and equipping of administrative buildings along priority axes—however minimally covered to 25% of the UNSSSS Budget. Equipping is only covered by 10% and training is not covered (0%) in one example given. An objective of a CAS/UNDP PBF proposal is to cover training and equipping needs of civilian administrations.
provide technical secretariat support to the Joint Steering Committee for the PBF allocation as well as support for programmatic coordination and oversight at regional level.

E. Risks

Below are some of the risks that may jeopardize the results of the PBF projects in the DRC and measures that will be taken to mitigate them. Risks will include engaging stakeholders (sustaining financial support in this current global climate, mobilizing national stakeholders) and the implementation capacity of Recipient UN Organizations and partners.

- **Volatile and complex political and security environment.** Eastern DRC is not on a linear path from conflict to peace. The current unstable environment creates a high degree of risk for the effectiveness and sustainability of stabilization activities. Mitigating risks requires well-thought out operational strategies and a capacity to adapt to changing conditions and exploit new opportunities for consolidating political and military gains as they emerge.

- **Difficult operating conditions.** Though more a ‘certainty’ than a risk, it is worth noting that MONUC, UN agencies and partners find it difficult to operate at speed and at scale due to the harsh physical conditions, the absence of infrastructure in many areas, and the number of competing demands on available resources in Eastern DRC. Bureaucratic procedures burden much of the UN. A review of implementation and operational capacities will be undertaken to examine possibilities for improving capacities and efficiency in this respect, and to identify additional potential implementation partners. Some minimal capacity support may be allocated from the PBF, however, the bulk of capacity must be provided from elsewhere in the UN.

- **Level of Government Commitment.** The GoDRC has not yet clearly committed to professionally reform its security sector and has not yet begun a process and vet human rights criminals from its security services. The international community has limited leverage to motivate the GoDRC to take on these essential reforms to facilitate achieving a sustainable peace. A lack of Government commitment would jeopardize the long-term effectiveness of PBF inputs. With Senior Government officials on the PBF Steering Committee this issue will be pursued.

- **Planning and sequencing of interventions.** The volatility of the current political and security environment, the lack of provisions for flexible fund allocation and management, as well as differing start-up and implementation time-lines of sectoral interventions poses a significant challenge to planning and ensuring a convergent and integrated approach to implementation over time and space. It is hoped that the establishment of a common fund for stabilization will significantly increase possibilities for multi-sectoral and area-based approaches.

- **Critical funding gaps.** A further risk is the sequential inter-dependence of the various components of the strategy and the present gaps in funding for some of its critical components which may cause delays or reduce impact and therefore contribute to donors losing confidence in the process and withhold further necessary funding. PBF funds will help reduce this risk by supporting some of these critical necessary interventions and by allowing the UN to demonstrate the impact of its proposed activities to help mobilize further resources.

- **Sustainability of interventions.** Some of the interventions / pilot support proposed under this Priority Plan depend on achievement of progress on broader issues, and linkages with longer-term development programming. For example, income generation efforts and short-term employment will provide some form of ‘peace divided’ but will rely on more general improvement of the economic climate, as well longer-term development interventions, and to ensure sustainable impact.

- **Delivery capacity of the UN system:** At present, implementing partners within the UN framework currently face a number of challenges and constraints which affect the ability of the UN (as well as other international organizations) to operate with speed and at scale. These include:
- The limited field operational presence of implementing partners outside provincial capitals due to limited accessibility and insecurity;
- Insufficient delegation of authority to regional or provincial level;
- Lack of essential project implementation services at regional and provincial levels.
- Heavy bureaucratic procedures and requirements for procurement, contracting, human resources and logistics. Limited application of emergency rules and procedures for operating in DRC.
- Insufficient human resources and dedicated expertise at project level for supervision and monitoring of project implementation.
- Impact of external factors which obstruct implementation, including: harsh physical environment, remoteness and inaccessibility of implementation areas, volatile security environment, dependence on other actors who are not consistent in providing support, weak capacity of public, non-governmental and private sector organizations and enterprises.
- Lack of common visibility/assessments of national and neighboring countries' market options
- Project-based planning rather than joint-programme based planning.

To address these issues, discussions with the UNCT at the country level and with DOCO at HQ level have commenced in view of providing greater flexibility to UN business practices in the country and improve implementation capacity in the near-term (i.e. within the next six months). A first step in this regard is to identify issues which could be addressed in the near term from a collaborative approach involving UN system partners and international donors. Possible starting points include:

- Increasing inter-agency collaboration and joint planning, defining clear divisions of labor, improving information-sharing and establish a system of common services;
- Expanding the pool of implementing organizations to include other UN agencies and non-UN organizations (major international NGOs, private sector, others).
- Assessing and revising agency-specific business processes and organizational configurations with a view to identifying what could be changed in order to improve delivery
- Identifying possible support from donors that could assist in the strengthening of the capacities of implementing organizations
- Exploring possibilities for anticipatory scaling up of programmatic and operational capacities by organizations against projected future funding
F. Indicative Budget and Results Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PBF DRC Priority Areas</th>
<th>Indicative Outcomes</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>PBF (USD)</th>
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</table>
| 1. Improved security and protection of civilians | - Improved FARDC discipline, conduct and motivation with respect to local communities, through intensified training and international mentoring.  
- Cantonment of 5 FARDC brigades in functional garrisons and barracks, and families accommodated in appropriate facilities  
- Military justice systems improved through support to investigation and prosecution capacities provided by international mentoring teams.  
- Pilot effort on retrenchment support and right-sizing of 2000 FARDC elements completed and documented | - No of FARDC soldiers and dependents cantoned in functional garrisons  
- Professionalism and discipline of FARDC units improved through strengthened internal control mechanisms, improved command and control, and enhanced discipline and conduct  
- Reduction in the number of reported cases of misconduct and violence against civilians and/or involving firearms  
- Number of soldiers unfit for military duty reduced in one pilot battalion and excedent elements successfully demobilized or integrated into public service programs  
- Increased number of military justice cases successfully prosecuted  
- Garrisons, accommodation and social infrastructure for dependents established and functional | 5,500,000 |
| 2. Demobilization and community-based reintegration of combatants and other high-risk groups | - 2,500 Ex-combatants, otherwise not eligible for PNDDR, disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into communities through provision of vocational training and income-generating activities.  
- 2,500 community members benefit from income generation and livelihoods opportunities  
- No of essential social services restored through community-based reintegration projects | - No of XC disarmed and demobilized  
- Decrease in acts of armed violence, banditry and sexual abuse perpetrated by ex-combatants and other high risk groups  
- Number of income generating opportunities created at community level for ex-combatants and community members  
- No of community beneficiaries accessing restored basic social services | 4,000,000 |
| 3. Support for the restoration and strengthening of state authority | - Improved access to critical areas through the emergency rehabilitation of road axis  
- State authority to key strategic axes restored through deployment of trained National Police, local administration, justice and penitentiary personnel | - Decrease in tensions or conflict in priority areas  
- Improved access to justice and public services,  
- improved regulatory control in key zones, including mining areas  
- No km road repaired and used | 6,500,000 |
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<tr>
<th><strong>4. Support for local peacebuilding, reconciliation and economic ‘peace dividends’ at community level</strong></th>
<th><strong>Integration of CNDP and other armed groups into PNC structures</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Control mechanisms over mineral and natural resources to curtail illicit exploitation established and strengthened in designated pilot areas</th>
<th><strong>Penal justice system in priority areas reinforced, and increase in no of arrests and court cases...</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Decrease in illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural and mineral resources in pilot areas&lt;br&gt;- Increased movement of people and goods along main road axes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>- Local peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts in key strategic areas promoted through support for dialogue, awareness-raising and strengthening of local conflict management capacities.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- Local ‘peace dividends’ delivered in former conflict areas through local community development and income-generating activities (rehabilitation of community infrastructure, support for agricultural cooperatives, etc.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Reduction in conflicts related to HLP in priority return areas (IDPs and refugees)</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- Decreased local tensions or conflict in strategic priority areas</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- No of income generating opportunities created</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- No of essential social services restored</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,000,000</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5. Strengthen national and UN capacities for coordination of peacebuilding efforts</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Govt. and UN Stability Team capacity to effectively manage peacebuilding programs and PBF funds enhanced, especially with respect to pursuing additional resources upon PBF catalytic support.</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Improved GoDRC capacity to coordinate stabilization efforts at national, regional and provincial/district level</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- Enhanced UN staffing capacity to provide technical support to the Funding Board and PBF project implementation</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- Joint Steering Committee (JSC) actively monitors PBF progress and results, supported effectively by the PBF secretariat</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>- Sustainability of peacebuilding projects increased through secured funding</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>USD</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,000,000</strong></td>
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NB Within programme areas 1-4 a ‘rapid response’ facility will be reserved for up to 10% - requiring co-chair signatures only to release for project amounts up to USD 200,000

MONUC revised 1 October 2009
### Annex 1

#### Relation Cadres stratégiques et mécanismes de coordination

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<th>Stratégies du Gouvernement</th>
<th>STAREC</th>
<th>PRSP/PAP</th>
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<td>UNSSSSS (IFP)</td>
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<td>Mécanismes de Coordination Du gouvernement Nationale (Nationale)</td>
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#### Humanitaire Transition Développement

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#### Annex 2:

**PROGRAMME DE STABILISATION ET DE CONSTRUCTION DES ZONES SORTANT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS**

**Président de la République**

**Comité de Suivi STAREC/ZSCA**

Premier Ministre

VPMs, MdP, MdI, MdD, MCIR, MdJ, MdB, MdF, CPD, Partenaires Bi/Multilatéraux **

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**Groupes Techniques**

- Armée, MdP et partenaires
- SAIDCO/ Moto et partenaires
- Police, MdP (PNC) + partenaires
- Justice, MdI + partenaires
- Admin, MdI + partenaires
- Ressources naturelles, MdD + partenaires
- Témoins Publics, MdT + partenaires
- Coopération régionale, MCIR + P
- Santé et dépistage, MOSS + P
- Protection civile, MdI et MdD + P

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**Coordination Interprovincial (STAREC / ZSCA)**

**Autorités Provinciales et de District**

- Nord Kivu
- Sud Kivu
- Ituri
- Haut/Bas Uélé
- Maniema
- Nord Katanga

**Comités Techniques Conjointes (Provinces)**

- Nord Kivu
- Sud Kivu
- Ituri
- Haut/Bas Uélé
- Maniema
- Nord Katanga

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**Partenaires Internationaux**

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<th>Sub-Components</th>
<th>Support Lead Agencies</th>
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<td>1.2 Disengagement of armed groups</td>
<td>MONUC DDR/RR</td>
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<td>1.3 Reintegration of combatants</td>
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<td>1.4 Protection of civilians</td>
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<td>2. Support to Political Processes</td>
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<td>3. Restoration of State Authority</td>
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<td>4.1 Support for basic needs and restoration of basic social services</td>
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